What happens if the US attacks Iran

The “regime of the ayatollahs”, which has ruled Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, is increasingly threatened by the United States. President Donald Trump has vehemently renewed the possibility of carrying out attacks on the country, justifying the action both by the strong repression that the local government carried out against protesters and by Iran’s ongoing nuclear program. And in the region, raising tensions.

In recent days, several experts in military strategy have been drawing scenarios of a possible American attack and also its consequences. These hypotheses vary in intensity and impacts, but they all have in common a high probability of political change in the second largest nation in the Middle East.

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Various media outlets in the US have brought up a range of possible targets that the Pentagon could prioritize, such as Iran’s nuclear facilities (already bombed last year); ballistic missile and drone production centers; places where key leaders and commanders of Iran’s armed forces or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reside; strategic military positions; and communication centers, to lessen Tehran’s ability to retaliate.

It never hurts to remember that American warships docked in the region carry dozens of fighter jets and hundreds of Tomahawk cruise missiles, offering American commanders long-range options.

On the other hand, according to Israeli intelligence calculations, Iran had between 1,000 and 1,500 ballistic missiles after the 12 days of war in June 2025. Although this is a number well below the 2,500 it previously had, there was also information that Tehran was rebuilding its arsenal.

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CNN recalled in a recent report that the Shahed suicide drone, which proved to be a destructive tool in Russia’s war in Ukraine, is Iranian-made. And that the Iranian regime has also developed, tested or deployed more than 20 types of ballistic missiles, including short, medium and long-range systems capable of threatening targets as far away as southern Europe.

It is for no other reason that Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned this week that between 30,000 and 40,000 American soldiers stationed at bases in the Middle East are at risk in the event of Iran retaliating with missiles or drones.

Another Venezuela?

For Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute, the US has several military options under study to undermine the Iranian regime, always with the aim of obtaining some type of alignment with its positions. But he also warns that retaliations will also come, with greater or lesser intensity.

The first option cited by experts is the repetition of the “coercive diplomacy” exercised in Venezuela. In this hypothesis, the US would guarantee “regime management” and not radical change – this has been done in the South American country since the arrest of Nicolás Maduro.

This would involve the deposition of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, even involving pressure on the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) to hand over the ayatollah to the Americans. This solution would involve agreements involving Iran’s nuclear program, oil exports and guarantees of human rights in the country.

But even Eisenstadt sees this approach as unlikely, given the IRGC’s loyalty to the system. And it would require a lot of vigilance and continuous pressure from the US to avoid setbacks.

Surgical attacks

The second option is to attempt to collapse the regime through airstrikes and cyber operations to disrupt the functioning of the Iranian repression machine. This would include bombing security headquarters, disrupting the country’s surveillance system, and blocking the logistical effort needed to support the repression.

But it is necessary to take into account that the country’s security forces would not be viable targets from the air, as the majority would be dispersed throughout urbanized areas and mixed with civilians. And even the vast contingent of these forces would pose a challenge.

The expert considers that an expected fragmentation of these security forces, with some of them joining protesters against the government, would probably only occur if it was believed that an inflection point had been reached and that the regime was on the verge of collapse. However, the absence of an organized opposition remains a major obstacle to a successful transition.

Symbolic attacks

A third option would be for the US to carry out symbolic and performative attacks, designed to demonstrate American resolve but without fundamentally altering conditions on the ground. Such actions could satisfy domestic political demands to “get something done” while avoiding deeper military involvement. However, these measures risk not changing the regime’s behavior or the trajectory of events inside Iran, says Eisenstadt. This could expose U.S. threats as hollow, weakening American deterrence.

Economic sanctions

Richard Nephew, associate researcher at The Washington, says that the “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran in force today have already exhausted much of the economic leverage available against the regime. “While sanctions impose significant pressure, they also limit additional punitive options and have not prevented the regime from employing extreme violence. Related threats, such as tariffs, are unlikely to generate significant short-term political effects, especially as they do not impose costs on companies doing business with Iran,” he comments.

So, he says, the remaining options include heightened enforcement against Chinese financial institutions that facilitate the sale of Iranian oil; additional targeted sanctions on individuals involved in the crackdown; expanded travel bans, potentially including family members of regime figures involved in crackdowns; and a broad secondary sanctions embargo covering most economic activity outside humanitarian channels.

“However, in addition to requiring substantial enforcement capacity and intelligence support, these measures are unlikely to produce decisive economic shocks capable of altering regime behavior. Sanctions are most effective when combined with a credible path to relief in exchange for compliance. In the current context of mass killings, however, it is unclear what concessions would justify easing the pressure. Ultimately, maintaining sanctions without a what for what realistic risks perpetuating the suffering of the Iranian people without the intended effect of influencing elite decisions.”

Political exit

Another non-war solution to the crisis would be the emergence of political leaders capable of leading Iran towards a democratic path, says Simon Gass, experts at the British Royal United Services Institute. But he admits it would be a difficult option in a country that has no political infrastructure outside the Islamic regime. “But there may be a path to a better Iran. A second variant would push security forces into a power struggle, perhaps leading to extensive bloodshed,” he says.

Gass recalls, however, that former president Hassan Rouhani reportedly told clerics in the holy city of Qom that Iran’s Islamic governance will be threatened without reforms. Therefore, if Iran’s highest clergy were to conclude that reform is an existential necessity, even the security forces might reflect along these lines.

And what might Iran’s response be?

Tehran has already warned that any attack will trigger immediate and powerful retaliation, while Iranian leaders have publicly rejected US threats and insisted that negotiations cannot proceed “in an environment of threats”. Meanwhile, Iran’s air force and missile units were placed on high alert, and military exercises were announced near the Strait of Hormuz — a critical oil shipping route.

For Eisenstadt, if it believes it is facing an existential threat, the ayatollahs’ regime can respond with all the means at its disposal, including attacks on American bases, attacks on American allies and the interruption of oil tanker traffic in the Gulf. However, if it does not believe that its survival is at risk, the government will respond more or less proportionately to the attacks, trying to cause enough pain so that the US does not attack again.

Iran’s dependence on the Strait of Hormuz for its own trade would likely impede any efforts by the regime to block that waterway (with mines, for example) except in the most extreme circumstances. Instead, Tehran would likely continue its current policy of “smart control,” which involves diverting oil tankers in response to the actions of its adversaries.