“With Iran at the table, the ultimate question is: does the US know what it wants, or is this an excuse to keep all options open?”

Tehran finds itself between a rock and a hard place. In the coming days, the theocratic regime is expected to meet with a North American delegation in Oman for negotiations, including nuclear ones, an unprecedented concession since the so-called Twelve Day War, when the US and Israel launched surgical strikes against Iranian plants in June. This is all if this meeting actually ends up happening, as Axios reported that there is a risk of the meeting collapsing. In any case, it is not certain what will be on the table or what will come out of the meeting, highlights Samuele Abrami, researcher at the Barcelona Center for International Affairs, to CNN

In one published this week it says that “the worrying issue is no longer with Washington will act, but when is that the conditions you consider acceptable will align” for potential action. What leads you to consider this? And do you maintain this opinion in light of the news between the US and Iran?

Basically, what we wanted to emphasize in this article is that anything can happen. At the time there were negotiations going on in Geneva, the Europeans were involved in them too, and at the end of the day the US decided to attack anyway. There does not seem to be a clear strategy on the part of the US administration, it is more of a ‘wait and see’ approach, but always remaining open to acting in a different way. And therefore it is impossible to close either door on the options that may be on the table.

There is a lot of talk about possible military action, but even that can mean any and all types of action – it could be a strategic attack, a spectacular attack, a momentary attack or a more symbolic one. On the other hand, the United States may also be planning, or at least forcing, the collapse of the current regime. Peace efforts – or not peace, but efforts to reduce tensions – are unclear.

So what would you say we can expect from these negotiations?

The positions of the different actors are unbalanced and the conditions that the United States are imposing make a win-win scenario difficult. On the one hand, we are facing a very Trump-style approach, of diplomacy through force, imposing all types of conditions, from the most classic to the toughest, in relation to Tehran, in relation to the rest of the region, in relation to the so-called axis of resistance, and demanding that Iran reduce its ballistic capabilities, in addition to the issue of the nuclear program.

On the other hand, we have the Iranian position and also the regional position, not only of Iran but also of Turkey and Qatar, trying to impose their terms, and there are clear differences between them. For Iran, the steps are to reach a compromise, not necessarily to give up uranium enrichment, which, on the other hand, is a red line for the US, on which point the US is more adamant.

In these negotiations, what we see is the US presenting conditions that are unsustainable or unacceptable to Iran. Now, with Iran at the table, the final question is: what will a possible agreement be about? Does the US know what it wants? Or is all this just an excuse to keep all options open?

From a regional point of view, we must also look at Israel, which according to some sources has .

That’s the other question: As America’s biggest regional ally, does Israel want a nuclear deal? And beyond that, there is still the internal situation in Iran, within Iran and within the regime, where there seem to be some divisions regarding a possible nuclear agreement. On the one hand, the more moderate reformist factions, especially within the government, may be more willing to accept an agreement, but on the other side, we have the more radical factions of the regime, for whom any type of agreement on the nuclear program that favors US interests is seen as a defeat.

It will be difficult for Iran to capitulate, but also to present this as a victory. Especially because accepting an agreement on American terms could be seen by protesters mobilized in the streets as a sign that the regime is no longer strong, just as the real possibility of an attack could weaken and undermine the regime.

Returning to regional interests: last night, the Iranians asked to change the location of the meetings with the Americans, which were initially scheduled for Turkey but will now take place in Oman. What reading can be made of this?

It’s a great question. I lived in Türkiye for many years, so I have some experience and knowledge of the country and its position. On the one hand, of course, Turkey was already part of the interests, it had already played a role in the recent past, but from Iran’s point of view, Turkey’s position is now seen as a risk. The Turkish priority is any type of direct confrontation or war that further harms regional stability, or instability. And in this aspect, Türkiye’s position ends up being seen as closer and more favorable to the USA.

Now, questioning why Oman and not Turkey, some sources say that by changing the location, Iranian authorities are also trying, in some way, to exclude other regional powers. Oman is more neutral on regional issues, has a different position compared to other countries. And in that sense, Iran may be trying to decouple these negotiations from broader regional dynamics – not by excluding Turkey, Qatar and other countries from the negotiating table, but at least signaling that they are sitting in Oman and not Turkey, so that Turkey has less influence.

Protests have continued in Iran since the end of December, protesters continue to be repressed and the situation continues to be difficult to track and monitor on the ground, where there will already be . A month ago, Trump told protesters that “help is on the way,” but nothing happened. How may or may not this be affected by negotiations?

I think that, lately, the situation has changed. At the beginning of the protests, Trump made a promise that he could not keep, or at least the US thought that the protests would undermine the regime much more, in a much broader way, but with , the option of shaking the regime through protesters in the streets proved to be hardly viable. Unfortunately, and I am very sorry to say this, this initial idea, the hypothesis of external support from the USA and the international community [aos manifestantes]is dissipating, hopes are fading.

Furthermore, I am very skeptical about the entire population of Iran accepting whatever is imposed from outside. After the attacks of the Twelve Day War, what we saw was Iranians uniting around the flag, it went far beyond supporting or not supporting the regime. Of course, the situation today is different, the probability of the regime changing is different, but the strong idea is that, regardless of the cost, of any factor or variable that may or may not be acceptable, the Iranians will deal with it internally.

For now, the regime has proven much more resilient than anticipated, although for international as well as domestic purposes it needs to find a way out… But broader US interest in the region could also be presented as a defeat for the regime, regardless of whether it falls or not. The US can say ‘OK, this is the deal we prepared, we pushed hard and the regime accepted our deal’ – the regime is afraid of losing power.

There have been comparisons between what could happen in Iran and what happened in Venezuela a month ago, starting with US military movements. The US spent months sending ships and assembling an armada in the Caribbean before intervening in Venezuela overnight and now we see it. Is there any comparison between the two cases, considering how different the situations, countries and even regions are?

The comparisons are very limited and only concern the issue of military preparation, the signals coming from Washington and this demonstration of force. This is not a secondary issue, obviously, but that said, the Iranian system and Iran itself are not Venezuela.

Iranian military capabilities, after all, are different. And in the Twelve Day War, not only were they very little hit, but Iranian military forces proved to have the capacity to counterattack, as well as to activate their regional ‘proxies’, despite these now being weaker than before. Iran’s military capabilities, the size of the country, the size of the population, are all factors that cannot be ignored and that we must take into account when talking about a possible US military attack.