CNN Portugal posed three questions about the impacts of the end of the nuclear non-proliferation agreement between the US and Russia to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, creators of the Doomsday Clock, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). These were the worrying responses
The only remaining nuclear weapons non-proliferation agreement between the US and Russia has ended. With the end of New START, the two superpowers are no longer restricted to a maximum of 1,550 warheads and routine inspections of the arsenals of both sides cease to exist.
This is one of the causes that caused the doomsday clock to move forward. It’s only “85 seconds until midnight” [como quem diz para a autodestruição humana].” The famous , which analyzes and measures how much closer humanity is to self-destruction, placed the needle closer than ever to 00:00 in the 2026 edition.
In an attempt to have a more comprehensive view of the real impact of the end of New START, CNN Portugal asked the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, creators of the Doomsday Clock, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) three questions about the eventual nuclear race, the beginning of a new world order shaped by the law of power and, in the midst of all this, what Europe is like.
The answers given exclusively to CNN Portugal were written by Alexandra Bell, president and CEO of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and Vladislav Chernavskikh, researcher at the SIPRI Weapons of Mass Destruction Program and former associate at the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), based in Moscow. The choice of the two organizations sought to analyze the problem in the most comprehensive way possible, with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists being a North American organization, the SPRI a European institution and Vladislav Chernavskikh having vast knowledge of the Russian nuclear arsenal and doctrine.
1. Does the end of New START significantly increase the risk of a new and accelerated nuclear arms race?
Alexandra Bell: There are those who claim that we are already in a new arms race, but the end of restrictions imposed on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals will undoubtedly make things more dangerous for everyone on this planet.
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Vladislav Chernavskikh: The New START treaty set limits on the number of strategic nuclear weapons that Russia and the US can have deployed in delivery systems. New START also provided a level of mutual transparency through data exchange and verification provisions that allowed both parties to avoid the worst presumptions about the other party’s nuclear capabilities and an unnecessary arms race.
Without transparency and established limits, a nuclear arms race is significantly more likely.
Both Russia and the US can rapidly increase their nuclear capabilities by drawing on existing stocks of warheads and launch vehicles that are currently sitting in their reserves. If one side increases nuclear arsenals, the other side may feel compelled to do the same.
The US may feel pressure to deploy more nuclear weapons to respond to both China’s nuclear growth and Russia’s development of so-called “exotic” nuclear systems, including nuclear torpedoes, cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons.
Russia may also find it necessary to use more nuclear weapons due to the continued development of strategic missile defense by the US, including the Trump administration’s plans to build the “Golden Dome” system, and due to the fact that NATO states in Europe are developing and fielding advanced long-range precision strike weapons that could endanger Russian nuclear forces.
2. With the end of the last bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, will we see a shift from an international order based on the rule of law to an international order increasingly shaped by power politics? What implications could this have for strategic global stability?
Alexandra Bell: We are seeing an abandonment of the rules-based international order in favor of a zero-sum approach to international relations. where the winner takes all. Existential risks cannot be managed without global cooperation. Nuclear risks are not limited by sovereign borders, nor are the effects of nuclear conflicts. If nuclear-weapon states fail to communicate or cooperate in reducing nuclear risks, the likelihood of catastrophe will rapidly increase.
The United States and Russia are still parties to some other bilateral arms control agreements, such as the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, but overall the two countries are entering uncharted and dangerous territory. With the expiration of New START, there are no restrictions on the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States for the first time in half a century. It is truly astonishing to see leaders disregard all the work and effort that has gone into creating stability among countries that still control over 90% of the world’s nuclear arsenal.
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Vladislav Chernavskikh: The end of New START will be a further blow to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime – the basis of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation governance. For years, non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT have been frustrated by the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, which is an obligation of nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty (signed by the US, Russia, the UK, France and China). The end of New START without any follow-up is further undermining the credibility of this obligation. It is not unreasonable to assume that we may also witness the acquisition of nuclear weapons by new States. And this is already an increasingly common discussion in many countries around the world.
3. From a European perspective, what are the most immediate and long-term consequences of the expiration of New START? Could it contribute to an accelerated rearmament of the old continent?
Alexandra Bell: The immediate consequence for Europe is that there are no substantial restrictions on the Russian nuclear arsenal, nor limits on the number of nuclear weapons that can be used. Furthermore, with the loss of data exchanges and field inspections, the scope and scale of the Russian strategic arsenal will become less clear and both the US and other European countries will have to make position choices based only on estimates, presumptions and not on concrete facts.
This can lead to miscalculations, misunderstandings, misperceptions that lead to an arms race or even kinetic actions. This is dangerous for all countries, not just European countries.
Reckless abandonment of arms control measures could lead to nuclear proliferation in Europe or elsewhere, further increasing nuclear risks. What is certain is that Europe’s security would be better served if Washington and Moscow returned to the negotiating table with the priority of maintaining stability between their respective nuclear arsenals.
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Vladislav Chernavskikh: Given the current political climate, in the absence of new arms control or nuclear risk reduction measures, we are likely to continue to see the unfortunate trend of increased reliance on nuclear deterrence among nuclear-weapon states and their NATO allies in Europe.
Currently, there are even conversations about the possibility of some European countries separating from the NPT and developing their own nuclear arsenal, which would not increase security, but would end up creating even more risks and vulnerabilities for these States.
It would benefit Europe to reflect more deeply and strategically on the method it will choose to balance its conventional deterrence capabilities with risk mitigation measures that could help minimize the possibility of escalation with Russia.
Europe could also be a mediator between the USA, France and the United Kingdom [os dois países europeus com armamento nuclear para além da Rússia]on one side; and Russia and China, on the other, in discussions on strategic stability and arms control.
