Two weeks ago, the Ministry of Defense notified her that authorities were investigating General Zhang Yuxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), as well as General Liu Zhenli, also a member of the CMC and chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army, for “serious disciplinary and legal violations.”
It is the latest round, just months after nine generals were dismissed by the Armed Forces and the ruling Communist Party on charges of serious financial crimes and corruption. As a result, KSE, which started its current term in 2022 with seven members, has only two.
However, Beijing’s latest actions against the military leadership – and indeed against persons who enjoyed the confidence of the Chinese leader – are seen by some analysts as an internal realignment in preparation for a war and by others as a move away from this possibility.
Chien-Wen Kou, professor of Political Science and head of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, Taipei, spoke to “Vima” about how Xi’s initiatives affect the island state and the balance of power in China.
What do you think is the reason for the recent purges of senior commanders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)? Is the event connected to China’s eventual invasion of Taiwan?
Over the past three years, the removals and prosecutions of PLA leaders can be attributed to two main reasons: one is economic, so-called “collective corruption”; the other is political, involving “cliques” and “factions” that have formed within the Chinese Communist Party. These two factors are not mutually exclusive and may coexist, although their importance may vary. The main cause of these political purges are domestic factors, which have less to do with China’s aggression towards Taiwan.
All generals with the rank of lieutenant general and general were promoted during Xi Jinping’s tenure. Figures such as Zhang Yuxia and Miao Hua were Xi’s trusted military allies, who were reactivated after he came to power. Therefore, all the turmoil in the ranks of the PLA over the past three years is more likely the result of infighting among the trusted military factions that maintained strong ties to Xi.
However, as the conflict between Hu Weidong and Zhang Yuxia escalated and took on “life and death” characteristics, Xi could no longer maintain a balance between the two factions, a development that led him to eliminate his confidants and their subordinates.
Do you think Xi Jinping’s role within the Communist Party will be strengthened after the purges?
Xi’s power appears to be temporarily stabilizing, but the political purges within the PLA over the past three years will have long-lasting effects.
The first concerns the generational transition between generals. Currently, there are generals born after 1966 serving in various Military Commission functional divisions, theaters of operations, and military branches. If they survive this wave of purges, they may gradually be promoted to generals during the 21st National Congress, which is expected to be held in late 2027.
The second implication is related to instability at the level of military morale. Xi runs the PLA through fear, and there will likely be more generals who fall out of favor in the future. With the entire top echelon of the PLA under scrutiny, mid-level officers will no doubt be confused as to why their superiors are in trouble.
The third implication is that the credibility of the leader will inevitably suffer and there will also be discontent within the CCP elite. While this resentment may not lead to something as drastic (like a coup), Xi’s power will certainly be undermined. In the future, he himself will probably look more and more like an emperor, sequestered in a great palace, trustworthy but not believable.
A final implication is the reduced likelihood of China invading Taiwan. While normal military exercises may not be significantly affected, the start of a major war is a different case. On the one hand, the Central Military Commission has not yet completed its strengthening process. On the other hand, the leadership of its individual functional departments and military branches related to war operations has not really been cleared. So the PLA will need some time to prepare for a war.
What do Taiwanese people think about China and the Chinese, do they see them as something separate or related? And what is the mood in Taiwan today regarding the US and the administration of Donald Trump?
In terms of how they see China, in Taiwan, I would say that at the moment, most citizens of the country identify themselves as Taiwanese or as both Chinese and Taiwanese. The percentage of those who identify themselves exclusively as Chinese is now low, indicating that a Taiwanese-centric national consciousness has taken root. At the same time, there are many who favor an attitude of positive engagement and cooperation with Beijing.
In terms of Washington’s stance, Trump’s leadership style and policy positions have indeed raised concerns about US commitments to national security, creating skepticism towards Washington and the White House. However, due to the continued threat from China, the general climate within society still sees US support as critical to Taiwan’s security
