Mentions of impeachments and resignations of supreme court judges soared. Such events are uncommon, but two contrasting cases, na and , reveal how a spiral of institutional degradation associated with deviant behavior at the top of the system forms. At the same time, they offer a counterfactual: the possibility of a virtuous institutional response.
Populist leaders tend to attack or manipulate the Republic’s autonomous institutions, such as high courts and central banks. Argentina has a long tradition of interventions in the Judiciary, but, in the democratic cycle that began in 1983, the first relevant manifestation occurred during the Carlos Menem government (1989-1999). Menem candidly justified his intervention: “Because I will be the only president of Argentina who does not have. He then increased the number of ministers from five to nine, which allowed him to appoint four new magistrates, from among unqualified partners and co-partisans.
The court’s reputation went into a tailspin. When another Peronist, Néstor Kirchner, came to power, accused the court of being cowed and politically captured and ruled No, the institutional assault was led by Cristina Kirchner. At the same time, Peronist activism organized numerous riots, including in front of judges’ homes. Political pressure and allegations of corruption led to the resignation of two magistrates and the opening of impeachment proceedings against two others. One of them also resigned; the other, Moliné O’Connor, resisted and ended up being offside.
The Argentine episode illustrates how the institutional degradation initiated by Menem produced a populist counter-reaction under the Kirchners, generating a self-destructive spiral marked by violent abuse, persecution and extreme reforms. The inevitable question is: What guarantees that
In Chile, there are two instructive cases: a judge was impeached for providing privileged information to his daughter in a real estate dispute under his supervision, and a judge was removed by the court itself for influence peddling in the institution and collusion with a lawyer.
Congress initiated an impeachment process, but the court, realizing the threat to its reputation and institutional integrity, removed the judge even before the conclusion of the process, which ended up resulting only in the additional sanction of banning her from exercising public functions.
The institutional design facilitated this response: in Chile, Germany and , supreme court judges can be removed both by Parliament and by the court itself. In Italy, France and Spain, control is predominantly internal. In Brazil, the US and Argentina, dismissal occurs exclusively via impeachment.
Our situation is very serious. In the end, what will matter is the strength of the social reaction to the spiral of When corruption reaches counter-majoritarian institutions, the solution via elections is no longer an option. When self-restraint is illusory, there is a lot of trouble, social anomie and
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