After Carnival, it already dominates the public debate. he will seek re-election, consolidate himself as the main name of the opposition and, in the states, uncertainties are multiplying about candidacies for governments and the Senate. But, while the names are still open, the rules and money for the dispute have already been defined and influence decisions on the launch of candidacies in all parties and levels of competition.
In Brazil, it is distributed based on the parties’ previous performance in the election for the Chamber of Deputies, and its internal allocation is concentrated in party leaderships. Thus, party leaders have incentives to prioritize already established structures and competitive candidacies, reducing the space for new experiences or base mobilization.
This calculation must be being made by PSD politicians, both by those who aspire to be in the 2026 presidential race, and by those who would prefer the party to allocate all of its resources to legislative and state government disputes with a great chance of victory.
For example, in 2022, around 80% of campaign resources came from the state. Comparative literature shows that public financing is not neutral. Its institutional design affects competition, party organization and links with society.
A recent study published in the European Political Science Review by Fernando Casal Bértoa, William Horncastle and Sergiu Lipcean reviews international evidence on the effects of direct public financing. The conclusion is less normative and more institutional: public financing is, in itself, neither a solution nor a problem. It can reduce competitive inequalities, but it can also produce paradoxical effects, such as party cartelization and bureaucratic insulation.
It all depends on the design. When resources are distributed at very high levels, paid only as post-election reimbursements or restricted to parties already represented in Parliament, the system tends to reinforce the reelection of those who already occupy seats and make renewal difficult. Instead of increasing competition, it crystallizes the status quo.
The extensive review carried out by Casal Bértoa and co-authors allows us to conclude that public financing can increase inclusion and reduce dependence on large donors, but only when combined with independent oversight, transparency rules and incentives for social mobilization. Without this, it tends to strengthen parties as organizations dependent on the State and without roots in society.
The public debate, however, remains focused on the amount of the fund. We discuss whether the value is too high, but we rarely question the distribution criteria and their effects on competition, leadership renewal and the connection between representatives and voters.
If we want to strengthen the legitimacy of public financing, we need to go beyond the billion dollar figure. The central question is not just where the resources come from and how much democracy costs, but what kind of democracy we are financing.
Public financing can be a blessing or a curse. It all depends on the institutional design.
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