Iran’s veteran supreme leader, , and other top officials and commanders have been killed in US-Israeli strikes, but the ruling establishment has maintained its ability to strategize and operate in the war that began on February 28.
Born from the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic built a complex power structure with stratified institutions, underpinned by a shared commitment to the survival of the theocratic system, rather than relying on a small group of individuals.
Here’s a guide to who now wields power and influence in a weakened but resilient hierarchy:
Is the supreme leader a supreme leader?
Iran’s veteran supreme leader, the , was killed in one of the first attacks of the war. In office since 1989, he enjoyed unconditional obedience throughout the system and had the final say on all important matters.
Under the official Iranian ideology of velayat-e faqihor rule of the Islamic jurist, the supreme leader is a learned cleric who exercises temporal power in the name of the twelfth imam of the , who died in the 9th century.
The leader’s office, known as baythas a large staff that oversees other areas of the Iranian government, allowing it to intervene directly in the bureaucracy.
The new leader, , has inherited the position and its extensive formal powers, but lacks the automatic authority that his father enjoyed. Chosen by the Revolutionary Guard, he could also be subordinate to the hardline military body.
He was wounded in the attacks and has been referred to on state television as a “janbaz”, or “wounded veteran” of the current conflict. More than three weeks after his appointment, he has not appeared in any photographs or videos released by the Iranians and has only issued two written statements, raising questions about his health.
And the Revolutionary Guard?
The Guard has been gaining influence for decades, but in the midst of war and following the assassination of Ali Khamenei and the rise to power of Mojtaba Khamenei, it has assumed an even more central role in strategic decision-making.
Long prepared to face the dismissal of its leadership, the Guard has a flexible organizational structure, with a list of successors already designated for each commander, and each unit can operate independently according to established plans.
Many senior Guard commanders died early on – following a long list of high-ranking commanders killed in attacks last year – but have been replaced by other experienced men who have so far proven capable of managing a complex war effort.
That resilience reflects the command ability of a body that led the devastating and has spearheaded Iran’s close collaboration with groups fighting numerous conflicts in the Middle East for decades.
The political leadership
The Iranian political system merges clerical government with an elected president and a parliament, and all of these, along with the Revolutionary Guard, play a critical role in the administration of the Islamic Republic.
The assassination of , the late Khamenei’s main advisor, was a serious blow to the ruling authorities, given his extensive experience, his ability to operate between the different centers of power in Iran and his ability to negotiate abroad.
While there are still other capable and experienced political figures, the most prominent ones likely to take the place of Larijani and others who were killed may be more uncompromising than those who died.
The president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, on September 16, at a press conference in Tehran.
who’s left
- Ahmad Vahidi, head of the Revolutionary Guard: the last commander of the corps was appointed after the death of his two immediate predecessors. An influential figure in the Guard for years, he fought in the Iran-Iraq war, led the Quds Force, served as defense minister and helped quell internal dissent.
- Esmail Qaani, head of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard: A secretive figure, he has managed Iran’s relations with allies and allies throughout the region since taking command of the unit in 2020, following the death of its veteran leader, Qassem Soleimani, at the hands of a US drone.
- Alireza Tangsiri, head of the Revolutionary Guard Navy: An experienced commander in the role since 2018, Tangsiri has played a critical role in shutting down the by Iran.
- Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Speaker of Parliament: Former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, mayor of Tehran and former presidential candidate, Qalibaf is arguably the most influential political figure still alive. In recent weeks, he has become increasingly critical, exposing Iran’s position as the war unfolded. According to an Israeli official and a source close to the matter, he has been negotiating with the United States in recent days.
- Chief of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei: A former intelligence chief sanctioned for his role in the deadly crackdown on mass protests in 2009, Mohseni-Ejei is widely considered a hardliner.
- President Masoud Pezeshkian: While Iran’s presidency is much less important than before, he is the highest-ranking directly elected figure in Iran, giving him an important voice. The limits of his influence were clearly revealed earlier this month, when he incurred the ire of the Revolutionary Guard by apologizing to Gulf states for Iranian attacks on their territory and had to partially retract his statements.
- Former head of the Supreme Court of National Security, Saeed Jalili: A wounded veteran of the Iran-Iraq War and one of the most uncompromising figures in Iranian politics, he was the losing 2024 presidential candidate and an uncompromising former nuclear negotiator.
- Member of the Guardian Council, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi: The senior cleric is a leading member of the Guardian Council, the body that decides which candidates to exclude from elections, and was so trusted that he was chosen to serve on the three-member interim council that ruled Iran after Khamenei’s death.
- Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araqchi: The veteran diplomat has spent years holding high-stakes negotiations with Iran’s Western adversaries, as well as with world powers Russia and China, which have better relations with Tehran, and with Iran’s Arab neighbors and rivals.
