Shawn Thew / EPA
US President Donald Trump
Although the US has much more military power, the Government of Iran has much more to lose if it is defeated from the war, which could inspire stronger and more determined resistance.
Apparently, little went as Washington planned in the war against Iran.
O Iranian people did not revoltone hard-line leader has been replaced by another, Iranian missiles and drones continue to strike targets across the Middle East, Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz, raising oil and gas prices across the world, and, in sharp contrast to Trump’s demand for “unconditional surrender,” Tehran rejected a 15-point ceasefire plan proposed by the US.
So how did things go so wrong?
As Will Walldorf, Professor of Politics and International Relations, writes in The Conversation, the answer is simple: Trump, like other American presidents before him, fell for asymmetric determination trap.
In short, this occurs when a stronger power, with less determination to fight, starts a military conflict with a much weaker state, which has an almost unlimited determination to prevail. Victory for the strong becomes difficult, almost impossible.
In the case of Iran, the Islamic Republic wants – and needs – victory more than the United States. Unlike the USA, the very existence of the Iranian government is at stake. And that gives Tehran much more incentive – and, in many cases, very effective countermeasures – to keep fighting.
The trap of asymmetric determination
Typically, in asymmetric wars, the stronger side does not face the same potential for destruction of the regime than the weaker side. In short, you have less to lose. And this can lead to less determination, making it difficult to sustain the costs of war necessary to defeat the weaker and more determined rival.
This dynamic manifested itself in conflicts dating back to at least the sixth century BC, when a massive Persian army under the command of Darius I was held back by a much smaller and determined Scythian armyleading, in the end, to a humiliating Persian retreat.
For the US in the modern era, wars of asymmetric determination have not been favorable either.
Already Vietnam Warit is estimated that they have 1.1 million civilians died North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters, compared to 58,000 American troops. Still, the US was no match for the North’s determination. After eight years of brutal war, the US gave up, made a deal, withdrew and watched as North Vietnam triumphed over the South.
In 2001, the US deposed the Taliban in Afghanistan, established a new government, and built a large Afghan army backed by American firepower. Over the next 20 years, the remaining Taliban lost about 84,000 fighters, compared to about 2,400 U.S. troops. Still, the US ended up suing for peace, made a deal and left. You Taliban immediately returned to power.
Many other great powers have fallen into this same trap – and sometimes in the same countries. Despite suffering far fewer casualties than the Afghan resistance, the powerful Soviet Union suffered a humiliating defeat in their nine-year war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. The same happened with the French in Vietnam and Algeria after World War II.
Asymmetric determination in the war with Iran
A similar asymmetry is now manifesting itself in Iran.
Unlike the 12-day war of 2025, which primarily targeted Iranian military installations, including its nuclear sites, Trump and the Israelis now directly threaten the survival of the Iranian government. The assassination of the supreme leader, a series of other powerful figures and the encouragement of a popular uprising made this crystal clear.
Tehran is responding as it promised if its survival were at stake. Before the current war, the Iran warned it would retaliate against IsraelGulf Arab nations and American bases throughout the region, as well as largely closing the Strait of Hormuz to commercial traffic.
In summary, it is do everything to do as much damage as possible to the US and your interests. Iran has suffered a disproportionate number of losses in the current war, both in terms of human casualties and depleted weaponry. By mid-March, there had been more than 5,000 Iranian military casualties and more than 1,500 Iranian civilian deaths, compared to 13 U.S. military deaths.
Still, Tehran does not back down, having declared on March 10: “We will determine when the war ends“.
This Iranian determination appears to confuse Trump. Before the war, he questioned why Iran did not give in to his demands and has since admitted that the regime change – apparently one of the main objectives of the USA at the beginning of the war – is now a “major obstacle”.
This contrasts with the image that Iran had among the American public before the war. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in January that “the Iran is probably weaker than ever“Iran does not have ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US mainland, its nuclear program is decimated and it has fewer allies than ever in the Middle East.
No wonder a Marist Institute survey on March 6 found that 55% of Americans consider Iran a lesser threat or no threat.
With Iran demonstrating resilience, talk of the war has been decidedly negative. This aspect of war resolve can be especially challenging for democracies, where a dissatisfied population can vote to remove leaders from power.
Declining or low public support for the war in the US was equally a primary factor in the US’s previous asymmetric quagmires.
De facto, to war with Iran is more unpopular than virtually any other US war since World War II, with polls consistently showing about 60% of Americans in opposition.
For Iran, as a non-democracy, there is much less reliable data for comparison. Before the war, the government faced a major public crisis with widespread protests, but for a variety of reasons – including brutal repression and a potential “national unity” effect – Iranian public opinion turned out to be much less relevant.
What’s next?
The Trump administration is trying to mitigate the impact of this asymmetric resolution by stating that the duration and scope of the operation will remain limited.
To reassure the public and calm the financial markets, Trump continues to promise a short war and to postpone larger attacks to make room for negotiations that, according to him, are ongoing.
History suggests that, when faced with a smaller military power that demonstrates greater resolve, the larger power has two trajectories. He can succumb to the arrogance of power and intensify the conflict, as occurred in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Or you may reduce conflict in an attempt to save appearances.
Often in the past, leaders on the stronger side chose the first option, escalation. They just can’t shake the idea that a little more force here or there resolves the conflict. President Barack Obama mistakenly believed that the sending 30,000 additional US troops to Afghanistan would lead the Taliban to surrender.
Despite signs that he wants to exit the war with Iran, Trump may yet succumb to the arrogance of power. More US troops are on their way to the Gulf, and B-52 bombers have flown over Iran for the first time.
As Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan show, follow arrogance and escalate conflict against a determined enemy like Iran will likely come at a high cost to the US.
The other option – ending the war – is still available to Trump.
And Trump has been down this path before. It signed an agreement in 2020 with the Taliban to end the war in Afghanistan rather than send more troops. And last year, Trump declared victory and abandoned the air war in Yemen when he realized that ground forces would be needed to overcome the Houthis’ determination.
The US President could try the same thing with Iran – saying the job is done and then withdrawing, or initiating real and sustained negotiations to put an end to the war. Either way, it will need to compromise on something, like unrestricted access to the Strait of Hormuz or sanctions relief.
Trump probably won’t like it. But polls suggest Americans will accept it. After all, who wants another Vietnam?
