Shredding the documents would mean an attempt to erase the evidentiary trail of the functioning of important organs of the state in a period when its foreign policy was systematically moving away from commitments to allies in the EU and NATO.
The system must be dismantled, not broken
After the election, Magyar’s tone regarding Szijjártó, whom he threatened with life imprisonment, is calmer. However, it is not softer in essence. He talks about “regime change” led by an “organized crime group”, an investigation into abuse of power, entry into European control mechanisms and the restoration of the rule of law.
The difference from the campaign is that it no longer talks only about the guilt of individuals, but about the need to dismantle the state’s functioning mechanisms that made such actions possible. The accusation of document shredding fits exactly into this logic. It is not an episode of post-election political communication. It is a signal that the fight is also being waged for the memory of the state and the retrospective and ongoing control of its functioning.
If we want to understand how TISZA wants to make Hungary safer against Russian influence, we don’t need to stick to sharp sentences. You have to look at what he wants to change. The program talks about anchoring in the EU and NATO, adopting the euro, joining the European Prosecutor’s Office, restoring the independence of institutions and ending energy dependence on Russia by 2035.
These are not just political slogans. This is an intervention in the conditions in which Russian influence in Hungary arose. The latter was not only based on Viktor Orbán’s personal sympathies with Vladimir Putin, with his conservative ideology and way of exercising power.
It was a system based on energy dependence, clientelism and political isolation, into which Orbán’s regime maneuvered in the EU. The first pillar tied the state economically to Russia, the second distorted decision-making within the state, and the third deliberately separated it from the control mechanisms of the European Union. It seems that TISZA is not trying to break this system with one decision. He is trying to dismantle it.
Reconstruction of the state without memory
However, the most sensitive question remains open. How deeply has the state been penetrated by Russian influences and what does this mean for the security services? Péter Magyar has not yet announced dramatic purges or a detailed reorganization of intelligence structures.
Evidently, he first wants to obtain documents, map the scope of ties, and only then change institutions. However, if it turns out that part of the documentation has been destroyed, this procedure becomes more complicated. The reconstruction of a state without memory is always slower and less accurate.
This is also why the accusation of shredding is more important than it seems at first glance. It is not just a dispute between an outgoing and an incoming power. It is a dispute about whether it will be possible to name exactly how Orbán’s system worked, where ordinary politics ended and security problems began.
A fundamental difference from Orbán
At the same time, Péter Magyar talks about a pragmatic dialogue with Russia. Not because he does not see the risks, but because the state cannot be rebuilt overnight. The economy remains interconnected, energy dependencies persist and are due to end by 2035.
The institutions, or their staffing, are not replaced and the state apparatus operates according to the old rules. The new government is going to follow the path of gradual dismantling of the security-problematic elements of the Orbán regime. The question is not whether it is realistic. The question is whether it will be enough. The difference with Orbán is nevertheless fundamental.
While Orbán made Hungary a weak link in Europe, Magyar talks about returning to its core. While Orbán relativized the Russian threat, Magyar names it. While FIDESZ built wide and deep dependencies on Russia, TISZA wants to weaken and dismantle them. And if it is confirmed that the foreign minister was passing information to Russia, the new prime minister-to-be says it needs to be investigated by independent bodies, not explained away.
This is good news for the EU. Perhaps even more important for Slovakia. If the Hungarian government stops working in favor of the Russian Federation, the Slovak government will lose its closest partner in relativizing the Russian threat. This can change the conditions in the region more than the mere exchange of one prime minister for another.
