In just a few days, Beijing has been the scene of two top-level summits: with the Chinese president, and then with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. What is the geopolitical meaning of these two meetings and, in general, of the development of relations between the three great imperial powers of our time? The answer is probably a stabilization process that reduces some risks – for example, the geoeconomic confrontation between the US and China – and increases others – erosion of the rules-based international order, defense of human rights and democracy.
The Sino-American summit revealed as a key element a concept that is located on that track, that of “new constructive strategic stability.” The two parties agreed to enhance that idea. Although tensions, discrepancies and competitive momentum remain, there is no doubt that both parties wanted to consolidate a stabilization process, a kind of non-aggression pact, after the tremendous 2025 marked by and Xi’s strong response with the restriction of rare earth exports. For different reasons and with different intentions, Washington and Beijing seem to agree that controlled management of the competition is preferable for the moment.
It can also be interpreted in terms of stability. Xi offered Putin two assets: the reception itself a few days later, which sends a message that the détente with Trump it does not equal erosion with Putin; and a joint declaration that reaffirms the harmony of Beijing and Moscow in the search for a reconfiguration of the balances of power in the world order. China supplies the products without which the Russian war effort would collapse. But, significantly, Xi did not grant Putin what he deeply desired, that is, concrete development of the new Siberian Power 2 gas pipeline. Here stabilization consists both of demonstrating that détente with the United States is not to the detriment of Russia, as well as of emphasizing the Kremlin’s position of vassalage. Xi subjected Putin to a moment of subtle humiliation by showing him a portrait of the two in which the Chinese leader appears larger, in front, looking straight ahead, while the Russian is smaller, behind, and looking towards the partner.
Although there has been no summit, the Russian-American relationship also shows signs of stabilization. Unlike a Joe Biden Administration very committed to Ukraine and Europe, Trump’s has substantially reduced – although not completely eliminated – the pressure on the Kremlin. It maintains some support for kyiv by providing intelligence information, selling weapons, and with some significant sanctions against Moscow, but overall it is much more accommodating than the previous one, and has even included one in exchange for nothing. It no longer gives weapons to kyiv, weakens its commitment to NATO, and recognizes Russia’s status as a power. Overall, it is evident that the transition from the Biden stage to the Trump stage has meant a stabilization of the bilateral relationship.
This framework of fragile stabilization is in no way that of a great strategic pact a la Yalta, when Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill agreed on the future of Europe after World War II. What happens is a mere tactical, occasional convergence. But this does not mean that it has no relevance and that it has no consequences.
For example, during the Sino-American summit talks, Trump suggested to his Chinese counterpart that the two, along with Putin, should join forces to fight the International Criminal Court.
This is an example of that path of convergence that imperialist forces can follow in the erosion of areas of international institutions and norms that hinder the deployment of their interests.
If there is no doubt that the United States and Russia seek the demolition of the international order and act with imperialist instincts, it should be noted that China also, despite not resorting to violent force and presenting itself as a defender of a rules-based order, in reality has similar instincts to its partners. It is interested in the stability of the economic order, but seeks the demolition of the political order that refers to universal human rights and democracy. It is not subject to international court rulings. It wants to project itself – whether in Taiwan, Hong Kong or in disputed waters – regardless of what the rules and treaties say.
Each one has their reasons in this stabilization process.
China considers that stability counts in its favor, because it allows the advancement of a dynamic in which it closes distances with the United States.
Washington understands that its assault against Beijing failed and, in an election year and while it is stuck in Iran, it does not want a raw fight that would cause serious turbulence. Trump, who mistreats and insults his allies in democratic countries, has come to be deferential to Xi. Biden called him a dictator. Furthermore, without reaching a radical turn, as his predecessor did and, although he has approved huge military aid packages to the island, he keeps the last one frozen and even, breaking with tradition, has inserted it into the dialogue equation with Beijing.
Russia is the weak link; For her, with a GDP like Italy’s, it is already an immense achievement to project the appearance of power in dealings with the other two, and she certainly cannot allow any act of destabilization.
There is, in addition, a certain personal harmony between the three leaders, men over 70 years old, two of them undisguisedly authoritarian and the third with very strong authoritarian instincts constrained by democratic institutions.
It is not a great pact for the distribution of spheres of influence, it is not a strategic agreement, stark competition and disagreements remain, but signs of a desire for stabilization and some elements of convergence do emerge.
Of course, stabilization and convergence between those three countries means some good news for the others. Another economic conflict between the US and China would, for example, be a disastrous development for the entire world. , because maintaining open communication channels in this sector reduces risks. But it is evident that, at the same time, this stabilization and convergence brings bad news for so many. First of all, for all those who believe in a multilateral world order based on rules and with universal human rights at its center. Then, for example, for traditional US allies in Europe or Asia Pacific who wonder what Washington’s attitude means to them.
It is possible that this fragile trend will blow up, especially taking into account the instability inherent in the actions of the current US president. However, it is worth noticing it, being happy for the risks it avoids – and preparing for those it entails.
