Behind all the public reactions, a less visible transformation began to take place
When the United States announced its classification, the immediate reaction was predictable.
Part of the political class celebrated. Another part criticized. Experts began to discuss the legal criteria behind the decision. Diplomats analyzed the consequences for relations between Brazil and the United States.
But behind all these reactions, a less visible transformation began to take place.
From the moment Washington decided to place the PCC and Red Command within the international structure for combating terrorism, a dispute began that goes far beyond criminal factions. It’s a dispute over who defines the nature of the problem.
For decades, Brazil built its strategy to confront the PCC and the Red Command within the logic of combating organized crime. This approach influenced laws, institutions, police operations, financial investigations and international cooperation mechanisms.
The central idea was relatively simple: they were criminal organizations that sought profit, territorial control and expansion of illicit markets. The United States started to use a different definition.
By framing these factions within the universe of international terrorism, Washington is not just adopting a new label. It is adopting a new interpretation framework. And structures of interpretation often produce practical consequences.
When a problem is defined as organized crime, certain institutions take center stage. When the same problem is defined as terrorism, other institutions gain space.
New legal instruments emerge. New international cooperation mechanisms are activated. New priorities begin to guide government actions.
Therefore, the most relevant question may not just be whether or not PCC and Comando Vermelho fit into a certain legal definition. The question is to understand how this new classification could influence the way the problem will be dealt with from now on.
This discussion becomes even more important because PCC and Comando Vermelho are no longer exclusively Brazilian phenomena.
Investigations in recent years have shown the presence of factions on international trafficking routes, money laundering schemes, transnational logistics networks and operations that cross borders. This means that the challenge is no longer just national.
Confronting these organizations increasingly depends on international cooperation. At the same time, all international cooperation involves permanent negotiation between national interests and external interests.
It is precisely at this point that a strategic question arises for Brazil. How can we expand cooperation against transnational criminal organizations without giving up the ability to define our own priorities?
There is no simple answer.
No country fights global criminal networks alone. But it is also rare for States to passively accept interpretations constructed by other governments on problems considered central to their internal security.
Therefore, the American announcement perhaps represents more than a new stage in the fight against the PCC and the Red Command. It could mark the beginning of a new phase in discussions about security, international cooperation and sovereignty.
Because, deep down, classifying factions as terrorist organizations doesn’t just change the way the United States views these groups.
It also forces Brazil to reflect on a broader question: Who defines the categories used to explain contemporary threats? The answer to this question could have effects that go far beyond the PCC and Comando Vermelho. It can influence the way the country relates to its international partners, organizes its security policies and builds its own vision of the challenges it faces.
And that is precisely why the discussion started now will likely remain relevant long after it disappears from the headlines.
*This text does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Jovem Pan.
