More than two years ago I wrote about Tammany Hall: a kind of , it inspired films and books, and ended up becoming a symbol of a corrupt political machine. It was dismantled in the thirties of the last century, but in specialized literature it is the paradigmatic example of political corruption. Contrary to what one of its leaders stated, in a famous formula, it was not just about what he called “honest corruption” — that is, that which only involves “conflict of interests”, fraud in tenders and shielding against punishment. The corrupt scheme gradually involved “dishonest corruption” by “looters” (embezzlement) and was intertwined with violent crime led by capo Lucky Luciano.
Tammany Hall may cease to be the paradigmatic example of political corruption and give way to . The magnitude of the schemes recently revealed is such that it reaches practically the entire institutional structure — from the three Powers to the Prosecutor’s Office and State bodies, private organizations. And, as if reality sought to imitate the fiction that established New York as a classic mafia setting, one of the organization’s alleged bosses lives in Miami.
Tammany Hall inspires three reflections.
The first is that the state — and more importantly, the country — is losing the war against corruption. After all, all governors elected in Rio de Janeiro in the last 30 years have been arrested or removed from office. The case is emblematic. What authorizes this strong conclusion is that many protagonists of notorious cases of corruption reappear in recent accusations. And not just in relation to the case of Rio de Janeiro. This applies to Lava Jato and . The Economist reported internationally on the institutional degradation of the state. And he dedicated more than one article to the Master case.
The second is that the Master case and its colossal capillarity raise the question that systemic institutional degradation has escalated to the national level. After all, the complaints reached the most important court in the country. The issue of the reputational costs involved has now acquired enormous importance. The American government’s recent decisions on the classification of Brazilian criminal organizations take the problem to another level. However, the worse the reputation of Brazilian institutions, the lower their ability to effectively respond to the challenge they face.
The third is that what was in common between “honest” and “dishonest” corruption in Tammany Hall was above all the forms of money laundering. Those arising from political dealings and violent crimes intertwined and contaminated each other. Exactly as it happens in Master, especially in the case of Reag.
As occurred with other decisions taken by Trump (application of Magnitsky, punitive tariffs, etc.), the new classification given to Brazilian criminal organizations is part of his transactional tactic of maximizing threats to guarantee strategic gains. Its repercussion in the country is maximized by its electoral exploitation. The real effect will probably be much smaller than that claimed in political narratives.
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