It is understood that he will do everything in his power to get rid of the Palácio do Planalto and it is also understood that he will do everything he can to get to Pindorama. Outside of this circus, at least in theory, American commercial diplomacy promises to negotiate and promote public hearings until July 15th, before going down.
After the noise of last week, the professionals will enter the field, with arguments and numbers.
The document foreshadowing the tariff, produced by the Office of the US Trade Representative, is a salad of conflicting examples and even absurd claims. When talking about deforestation, he cites figures from the Bolsonaro government, acknowledging that the situation has improved but then calling for a curse: “Even so, as historical data indicates, these efforts could be undone by future administrations, and illegal deforestation rates could increase again.” (Especially with a Bolsonaro on the Planalto.)
At one point the report says:
“It is easier and less expensive to produce agricultural products in degraded and previously deforested pastures. This contributes to more Brazilian agricultural products competing on global markets, which leads to a drop in the prices of these products.”
Now, if a crop is grown on land that was deforested 20 years ago and if the soybeans planted by the new farmer are cheaper, what’s the problem? The “price drop” could be good news.
The Americans’ arguments have moments of weakness, but they also have robust arguments that once again force Brazil to look at the damage caused by agroglodytes.
The report cites the departure of large exporting companies from the Soy Moratorium. Little known outside the world of agriculture, this moratorium is a pact signed by large trading companies almost 20 years ago, by which they undertake not to buy soybeans planted in deforested areas. In return they received tax benefits.
Little by little the pact was being eaten away and incentives were withdrawn. Result: large trading companies left the pact and now the American government uses this case to exemplify Brazil’s ability to move backwards.
The American bad mood also derives from the fact that Brazil knows how to move forward.
Johanna Döbereiner, the godmother of soy
In 1970, with American help, agronomist Norman Borlaug won the Nobel Peace Prize, in a dispute with Dom Helder Câmara. His merit was to have created a new variety of wheat, resistant to pests.
In Brazil, Johanna Döbereiner (1924-2000) revolutionized soybean planting and was nominated for the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, but did not win. Having spent almost her entire life in Seropédica (RJ) and considering herself a “laboratory peasant”, she is today little known outside the scientific or more enlightened agricultural world.
In the 1970s, when going against chemical fertilizers was sacrilege, his discoveries allowed soybeans to enter the Cerrado and made Brazil, at the time, the second largest producer of soybeans, behind . (Döbereiner discovered a way to fix nitrogen in plants using bacteria.)
As early as 1973, the Central Intelligence Agency produced a report entitled “Brazilian Soybeans: An Emerging Threat to US Exports”.
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