The truce between the United States and Iran, that fragile paper bible, is on the verge of total collapse after a series of reciprocal retaliatory attacks and crossed threats, increasing fear of an immediate return to open war. We’ve been like this for two days now, after countless reproaches and fiery statements weeks ago. But this is different, it is the return to the bombs, when the Trump Administration triumphantly announced that it was about to sign a definitive agreement with Tehran. Everything backwards.
The new spiral of hostilities was unleashed after the downing, last Monday, of a US Apache helicopter near the strategic Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump directly attributed responsibility for the incident to Iranian forces, declaring that his country’s military must “of necessity respond.” For their part, Tehran authorities denied the accusations, suggesting that the device suffered an accident. The two American pilots were unharmed.
The tension had already risen several degrees days before: Israel insisted on bombing Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, despite the fact that Iran insisted that with that open front there was no diplomacy that was worth it and when even the White House asked Benjamin Netanyahu’s Executive to stop machines. The ayatollahs attacked Israel in retaliation, to defend their allies from Hezbollah, and since then, the shooting has ceased to be sporadic. Until it touches the helicopter, until it disrupts everything.
Washington’s response has been swift. Trump would have looked like a weak wimp if he hadn’t. And here we are, again, with the “and you more” and the testosterone in spurts. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) carried out what it described as “proportionate self-defense strikes” against almost 20 targets in Iranian territory. The offensive, described by Trump as “very strong and very powerful”, began at 5:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday and hit key infrastructure, including air defense systems, ground control stations and surveillance radars near the Strait of Hormuz. American media report that radar sites in towns such as Goruk and on the island of Qeshm were attacked.
A few hours later, Iran launched a counteroffensive using swarms of drones against North American military installations in Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan, activating the air attack alarms and missile defense systems of these Gulf countries. Iran’s Foreign Minister warned in an official statement that no threat or attack against his country “will go unanswered.”
Diplomacy to the limit in the “Situation Room”
This worsening of the military crisis coincides with absolute stagnation at the diplomatic level. According to intelligence reports and news website reports AxiosPresident Trump met urgently Wednesday afternoon in the White House Situation Room with his top national security team to assess new waves of bombing.
Among those attending the meeting were Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine, as well as White House envoy Steve Witkoff.
Hours before ordering the initial strikes, the White House tried unsuccessfully to get a response from Tehran on a deal proposal sent by Trump himself, warning anonymously that “time was running out.” During the deployment of the American aircraft, Washington notified Iran that the attacks would be strictly limited to military installations. Official sources also confirmed Axios: “We told the Iranians that if the Apache pilots had died, we would be in a completely different scenario today.”
Internally, White House advisers acknowledge to outlets like CNN that, obviously, this was not the president’s plan. He thought, encouraged by Israel, that he could carry out a Venezuelan-style coup in Iran, but everything has been breaking down: he eliminated the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, but the other prominent local politicians who were on the list to succeed him were also killed; There has been a more radical replacement, with Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba; The status of the nuclear program or the missiles is not known, and already a year ago the reports on the damage were contradictory and, in the end, erroneous; Tehran has closed Hormuz and has shown that its geographical power is unbeatable and that it maintains a sufficient military structure to maintain the order.
In these circumstances, neither victory nor quick. Today there is more pain, more death, more destruction and more blockage than in February, adding the blockage of the bottleneck through which, then, 20% of the world’s crude oil passed. Getting entangled in a longer war is not good for any of the parties, but the question is whether someone will give in first, whether they will save the furniture with some salable solution as a triumph or with a flight forward that who knows where it ends.
Negotiations at a dead end
The military crisis buries, at least temporarily, expectations for peace. Just one day before the helicopter incident, Trump had assured that negotiations to extend the ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz were in their “last throes” and that a definitive agreement was feasible “in two or three days.”
However, the tone of the American president changed radically this Wednesday after the expiration of his ultimatums. “We were very close to an agreement, but they keep dragging us out, they keep taking us for fools,” Trump reproached the press before warning that the attacks will continue harshly: “We are going to continue attacking them, attacking them with great force.”
Security analysts, in an analysis of the Washington Postagree that both countries have replaced formal diplomatic channels – with no known direct meetings since April 11 – with a dangerous negotiation dynamic based on ultimatums and demonstrations of military force, placing the region at its most vulnerable moment since the outbreak of war on February 28. Even so, both countries seem to be looking for a way to end the conflict, AP sources say, if they manage to present it as a victory in their respective countries. It is the key, the story.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu – who also has elections in the fall – appears determined to pursue goals that make compromise difficult: the collapse of Iran’s theocratic government, the elimination of its nuclear program and the destruction of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In your case, you also need to sell achievements and you don’t have them in your hand today.
A man walks past a billboard advertising the US-Iran meetings, near the special press center set up in Islamabad, Pakistan, on April 11, 2026.
The possible scenarios
Analyst Mona Yacoubian, director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), asks in an analysis published by the American think tank whether the diplomatic process can withstand a period of 100 days of conflict, despite the strong stagnation of the proposals and, above all, the direct military hostility of these days, highly contaminated by the impulse of Tel Aviv. Trump said tonight that either something is signed today or hell is on the way to Iran, although it is not the first time he has made similar threats and then does not follow through on them. Now, however, the situation is more desperate, however frustrating.
He talks about negotiations like “Russian dolls”, which are divided into two complex phases. The first is to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which is the previous step to return to the discussion table. Iran demands the immediate release of up to $24 billion in frozen assets to reopen Hormuz. This is difficult for the Trump Administration to accept, as it previously criticized the Obama-era deal (JCPOA) for giving “cash” to Iran.
And then there are the nuclear talks: if that MOU is signed, a 60-day window opens to negotiate the nuclear issue. There are deep disagreements, the author acknowledges: the US demands that Iran send its highly enriched uranium abroad (it has about 450 kilos, according to the UN) and impose a 20-year freeze, while Iran proposes diluting it at home and a freeze of just five years, without accepting strict verification systems.
Yacoubian defines three possible final scenarios. The first is a successful peace, with a verifiable nuclear deal and the unconditional reopening of the strait (the least likely, he says). The second is an “empty agreement”, with legal loopholes, where the US gives in to financial compensation and Iran maintains conditional control over the strait without subjecting itself to rigorous inspections. Political (unpopular war), military (shortage of US defense missiles) and economic (energy supply crisis) pressure push Washington towards this option.
And the third is the most feared at this time, the return to total conflict, with a permanent stagnation with the strait closed and constant war interruptions. It is possible.
Politically, the conflict with Iran is increasingly unpopular in the US, and a recent poll of The Economist and YouGov indicates that almost 70% of Americans are in favor of ending the war as soon as possible. Although symbolic, the recent House vote to invoke the War Powers Resolution, in which four Republicans joined Democrats, is another indicator of declining support, even domestic, for Trump. The upcoming midterm elections, in November, could also influence the magnate’s decisions.
The author is not particularly optimistic. “After one hundred days of war with Iran, the likelihood of a positive outcome is slim. While negotiations offer the best opportunity to end the conflict, a return to the status quo ante is unlikely. Instead, a ‘new normal’ is taking shape: one in which Iran will likely retain de facto control of the strait and its ability to threaten its Gulf neighbors. The coming months and years will be marked by measures to mitigate the worst impacts of this looming reality, as regional and global actors grapple with its new features,” concludes.
