An earthquake change in the Middle East subsystem is underway after the announcement this week by the Kurdish armed organization that it will end its “work under the name PKK”. The proclamation marks that has cost about 40,000 lives, but its impacts will extend far beyond Turkey’s borders, reshaping reality for Kurdish populations and political entities in Syria and Iraq.
The Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK) has long been fighting for Kurdish rights and, at times, for independence within Turkey. However, as the Kurds are an important ethnic minority of about 40 million people scattered in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, many regional Kurdish groups have maintained links, direct or indirectly, with the PKK.
In Syria, where they make up 8-10% of the population, Kurdish groups, mainly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), occupied the control of the northeast after the 2011 uprising. This area, now known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, to have a military force of about 100,000 people.
While SDF, a major US ally in the fight against the “Islamic State”, officially deny any relationship with the PKK, several observers note that veteran PKK commanders are an integral part of their military leadership. Turkey has long accused SDFs of being merely a PKK trustee, leading to regular attacks in areas controlled by SDF.
The fate of the SDFs has changed for the worse after Bashar Assad’s overthrow last December. US President Donald Trump has withdrawn US troops from the area, eliminating a crucial mound against tougher Turkish actions. In addition, the new Syrian government in Damascus, backed by Turkey, wants to reintroduce resource -rich areas. In March, the SDFs and Damascus agreed to work together, excluding the complete secession.
The disarmament of the PKK will probably reassure Ankara. A successful peace process between Turkey and PKK would be facilitated by the SDF-Damascus agreement. After all, SDFs acknowledge that an agreement on PKK could stop Turkish attacks in Syria, as Ankara would theoretically worry about an ongoing SDF presence along the border.
The open issues
However, open issues remain. Many of the supporters of the PKK are not really happy with what is happening, with the most militant factions, they may break up and continue the race, thus endangering the fragile downturn between SDF and Damascus.
Northern Iraqi mountains serve as a PKK refuge since the 1980s. The semi -autonomous Kurdistan region in Iraq (KRI) has a complex relationship with the PKK. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has historically been closer to Iran and PKK, while the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) maintains closer ties with Turkey, allowing more than 100 Turkish military bases on its territory. These bases have been used for frequent Turkish attacks on supposed PKK positions.
Solving the PKK-Turkey conflict will pave the way for a possible Turkish military withdrawal from Iraqi territory, possibly improving Ankara’s relations with Baghdad.
The timetable, however, is uncertain. In the end, a retreat of the Turkish forces may be put on the negotiating table, but not in the near future.
The future of PKK fighters after disarmament is also a major question, with speculations, as some fighters may find refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan or integrate into SDF structures in Syria.
This week’s announcement by PKK undoubtedly closes a violent capital. However, as the data is read more sober, the real test will be how this decision will reshape alliances, hostilities and ultimately expectations of a subsystem preparing for bigger changes.
Minas Lyris is a PhD candidate in the Department of Mediterranean Studies at the University of the Aegean. Researcher of Middle Eastern Policy Analysis Center (KEMEP)
