The historical character of the conspiracy judgment has been reiterated by analysts of various shades. Douglass North (Nobel Economics) and co-authors emphasize civil control over the military as one of the previews for the transition to a “social order of open access” (which combines and prosperity) alongside the Empire of Law and.
Judgment and condemnation of presidents for scam or corruption have become much more frequent in the world including Europe. From Ros and Gehrke, they show that, from the 1990s, there is qualitative and quantitative change: the proportion of condemned leaders rises from about 2% to 9%. Criminal convictions become more common and less frequent violent and arbitrary punishment. Considering all heads of government that leave the position, the probability of a leader being killed, imprisoned or going to exile in the first post-mandate year falls from more than 30% (1960–1980) to only 12% (2000–2015).
The axis of liability has moved with the time of scams for corruption-sibrinks, illicit enrichment, state resources manipulation. The coup being judged is Primas a reversal of this movement; But it was in endogenously aborted, which suggests resilience of the military stating itself. It is something new. And as I already argued here it is not just individual decisions of generals. There is one.
The application of the Empire of Law and the punishment to sectors of the political and business elite in the monthly was also historical; It was applied by a court with a majority appointed by the incumbent and reached the party summit in power and the president of a bank – 0.01% of the income distribution -, convicted and maintained for three years in closed regime. The historical pattern – in Brazil and outside – was to punish, at the very time, politicians after leaving office, and by the work of a rival elite.
The country of impunity guaranteed by formalism and criminal selectivity – for three ps: “In Brazil, it only goes to the black, poor and slut jail” – seemed to break with the past. Symbolically, the monthly process reversed this pattern. For a short time. The fate of the judgment of the coup can be similar and may lead to anomalous setbacks and nullities – as in the Lava Jato.
Before the case, I stated that, under any scenario, the balance of the trial would be negative for the hyperpartisanship, confusion between judge and victim (the first was also the target of attack by the president himself), forum issue, personalistic pattern of appointment of the ministers, trial in class, monocratism …
The alternative to Moraes as a rapporteur would include even worse scenarios: former personnel of the president and/or politicians who are notorious opponents of the defendants. When I pointed out these aspects, Trump’s bizarre interference had not yet occurred, which exacerbated the level of conflict around judgment in some orders of magnitude. In fact, the reception of the US analyst trial makes a shallow tabula of the aspects pointed out because it focuses only (necessary) resistance to Trump.
The result is an advancement with a future backwardness potential.
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