A few days were mediated by the Mexican armed forces and US intelligence services, against the leader of the Jalisco New Generation (CJNG), Nemesio Ruben Oseguera Cervantes, known by the nickname , which led to his death.
But the bloody toll (73 dead in total), the multi-level response of the cartel (hundreds of attacks in 15 states and 60 municipalities) and the tension (burnings of federal banks, blocking highways, burning vehicles), bring back to the surface concerns about the erosion of the historic country of the American continent by criminal networks.
Estimates by the academic journal Science for 2023 estimated the number of members of all kinds of large and small cartels operating in Mexico at 175,000. This is a conservative calculation, since it does not count casual collaborators or corrupt government officials, who complete the “troops” of criminal organizations.
After all, to what extent do the infamous cartels rule the Aztec Land? Vima spoke with Maria Calderon, associate of the think tank Inter-American Dialogue, specializing in Mexico, about the real influence of the cartels in the country, the attitude of the government and the role played by the American factor.
“Fragmented Country”
A first question that arises from the extent of hostilities between CJNG members and National Guard and military men is how it is possible for the cartels to organize such large-scale operations. “Mexico’s most powerful criminal groups – especially the Jalisco Youth Cartel (CJNG) – today operate as large, diversified criminal enterprises with armed capabilities. They can coordinate complex operations because they are organized around specialized roles: logistics, recruitment, armed enforcement, surveillance and intelligence gathering, financial services. This division of labor, as well as local networks that provide real-time information, explains why they can move quickly, operate in multiple locations and adapt when the authorities apply pressure,” explains Calderon.
He confirms the image of a network that operates based on a business model: “Economically, these organizations are not sustained by just one activity. Typically, they combine profits from synthetic drugs with other sources of profit generation, such as money laundering and local crime, which makes their operations more difficult to disrupt.”
The power of criminal organizations in Mexico creates the impression of a power grid parallel to the official State. Donald Trump’s statement in January 2025 that “in certain areas, drug cartels operate as a semi-state entity” caused a stir.
It was preceded by a similar statement by the then Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, in 2023, as well as an estimate by the command of the US Armed Forces for North America, in 2022, that 30-35% of the country’s territory is under the control of criminal organizations.
Finally, ? “The perception that the cartels ‘control Mexico’ reflects what many communities are experiencing, but it should be understood that they have influence in a part of the country, not nationwide. In areas where local institutions are weak, criminal groups can impose rules through fear — blackmailing and intimidating journalists, pressuring officials and influencing local politics. In places where the state’s presence is stronger, cartels tend to operate more quietly. A central reason why cartels’ influence remains strong is their relationship with parts of the state, not as a single alliance, but through fragmented local methods: corruption, collusion, selective enforcement, intimidation. The result is a patchwork — some places with effective state power and others where cartels infiltrate or compete with it,” Calderon comments.
He adds that “where criminal organizations are deeply rooted, citizens often adapt to harsh realities: reporting crimes seems dangerous or pointless, and trust in the authorities is eroded. Of course, cartels are no real substitute for government: they provide no public services, no legitimate governance. But in administratively weak areas, they can act like local legislators, selectively imposing “order” through coercion and extracting profits from economic life. The result is a fragmented country: in some communities, the state rules clearly, and in others criminal power restricts daily life and infiltrates institutions.”
Bullets or hugs?
The executive branch’s response has not been uniform over the past decades. The conservative Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) launched the “war on drugs” strategy, where large-scale operations, with the “stamp” of the national army, set the tone. The same method was followed by his successor, Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018). Leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024) followed a different path, announcing in January 2019 the end of the previous tactic and promoting the amnesty and reintegration of junior cartel members who decided to leave the underworld behind.
But despite proclamations and successful arrests of prominent leaders (such as the son and successor of arrested former Sinaloa cartel leader “El Chapo,” Ovido Guzmán López), anti-cartel spending has increased. Finally, is there progress or are we facing an impasse?
“. The most confrontational period was based, to a large extent, on militarized operations and the pursuit of cartel leaders. This approach resulted in significant arrests, but often created new problems: groups splintered, rival factions fought over territory, and violence escalated in the disputed zones. Under former president Obrador, the government emphasized the slogan “abrazos, no balazos” (hugs, not bullets), emphasizing prevention and social policy and promoting restraint in the use of force, in many contexts. Recently, Mexico’s current approach has again become more dynamic operationally, with a greater emphasis on coordination, intelligence, investigations and targeted actions in the most violent areas,” notes Calderon.
But she appears cautiously optimistic, pointing out that “whether this amounts to a real recovery depends on what is considered success. Homicides may decrease, but it is possible that criminal organizations will switch to other crimes or the violence they carry out will shift geographically. Therefore, it is still premature to say that Mexico has “turned the page”. The structural problem remains the same: in many areas, police and judicial authorities lack sufficient capacity, so impunity remains high. We are in a transitional phase: there are encouraging signs on some indicators, but the real test is whether the state can sustain progress through credible local institutions – rather than relying on short-term operational gains.”
A fragile relationship
There is of course the foreign policy factor. The operation against “El Mencho” was Mexican-American. As Washington, under Donald Trump, exerts strong pressure on Mexico to limit immigration flows and support Cuba, how likely is it that bilateral cooperation in counter-narcotics operations will be used as leverage in other areas?
“In principle, yes it is quite possible – because cooperation in one area can be extended to wider negotiations. Counter-narcotics cooperation is often presented as a shared responsibility, but the US provides information, technology, training and coordination to a degree that critically affects operational effectiveness. Since the first term of Donald Trump, Washington has shown a greater willingness to link security cooperation with other issues on the bilateral agenda – often indirectly, through pressure, rather than a clear, straightforward quid pro quo,” argues the Inter-American Dialogue researcher.
It describes the interdependence of the two neighboring states, but also the limitations of American power. “There is a precedent for issues related to Cuba becoming politically sensitive when it comes to US-Mexico relations. Mexico’s energy relationship with Cuba has, at times, been exposed to pressure from Washington and the perceived risk of retaliation — showing that issues outside of security can enter into broader negotiating dynamics. The interdependence is two-way: the US depends on Mexico for border stability, immigration management and fentanyl interdiction. If pressure becomes too aggressive, there is a risk of backlash and could weaken cooperation on key priorities. Mexico’s strong tradition of sovereignty and non-intervention also raises domestic political costs if security cooperation is seen to dictate the country’s foreign policy. Thus, US influence on Mexican foreign policy is possible, but it is likely to be indirect and limited, not unlimited.’
