In the time leading up to , they vowed to make it literally red with the blood of Iran’s enemies. Such a stance would be consistent with the fact that in last June’s 12-day war, the Houthis had used dozens of missiles and drones, coming to his support and drawing fierce retaliation from the .
In the wider period between September 2024 and July 2025, the Houthis had fired 101 ballistic missiles in the direction of Israel, according to United Nations experts. At the same time, between November 2023 and May 2025, they had launched about 300 attacks against warships and merchant ships in the Red Sea.
In March 2026, by contrast, the silence of the Houthis is deafening. What happened and one of the most dedicated members of the “Axis of Resistance” has not followed through on his promises of crushing blows?
The fear of being targeted
The answer probably lies primarily in the fact that the Houthi movement itself has suffered blows that have undermined its ability to threaten Israel and US allies in the region. The surviving Houthi leadership, after the killing of Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi and members of his cabinet last August, acknowledge that if they launch missiles, they mobilize procedures that allow them to be targeted, due to telecommunications and electronic emissions.
It is typical of the way in which in Iran the launchers are quickly targeted after each launch of a ballistic missile towards Israel. The difference is that Iran is now waging a war of desperation, where those involved in the missile launches know they may have minutes to live after each launch due to the speed of target selection in a war dominated by , which compresses the so-called “kill chain”.
Iran, after all, has prepared stocks of ballistic missiles with which it aspires to exhaust the deterrent means of Israel and the USA or, at least, to incur great costs from their waste. It does not have a similar arsenal and seems to be thinking about the regime’s survival conditions with greater pragmatism. After all, the related precedents of beheading the Iranian leadership, including the supreme leader Ali Khamenei, but also the head of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, attest to Israel’s capabilities for precision strikes on multiple fronts.
There are of course demonstrations of thousands of people in support of Iran, such as the one on March 6 in Al-Sabin Square in Sana’a. But demonstrations have the “good thing” that, unlike the launch of ballistic missiles, they do not leave electronic signals that would lead to direct targeting.
To deplete their reserves?
The Houthi’s concerted war activity in 2023-2025, when they systematically harassed shipping in the Bab el-Madeb straits between Yemen and Djibouti, as well as in the Red Sea in general, depleted much of the reserves, but also allowed the targeting of the supporting infrastructure, which was heavily bombarded until the end of 2025. Especially in October 2024 American B-2 Spirit stealth bombers destroyed underground missile storage facilities, while dozens of launchers and radars were also destroyed.
However, there was also an organized blockade that made it difficult to supply ballistic missiles, drones and other offensive means from Iran. Last July, US forces seized 750 tons of equipment originating from Iran. After all, in the attacks of August 2025, the chief of the general staff of the armed forces, Muhammad al-Ghamari, as well as commanders and technicians, whose expertise was not easily replaced, had also been killed.
To be sure, the Houthis have acquired the ability to domestically manufacture offensive weapons. This fact is also evidenced by the fact that the material of Iranian origin seized in the 2024-2025 biennium were not complete weapons, but components that would assist local production. However, the systematicity of the seizures has made this production very difficult, as many of the components, such as detectors, engines and electronic guidance elements of the missiles need to be shipped from abroad.
It seems that the intensive effort to cut off Yemen’s supply chain from Iran has paid off, despite the fact that there are always alternative routes, e.g. and partly terrestrial.
US and Saudi Arabia diplomacy
However, the diplomatic changes are also important. The May 2025 ceasefire with the US, brokered by Oman, had led to recognition of the Houthis as Washington’s interlocutor. This fact did not change at all during the 12-day war of June 2025. Now it would be considered silly to attract the American month when the US aircraft carriers are so close to Yemen.
An important detail is that the cease-fire treaty included the US and the Houthis not targeting each other, thus ensuring free navigation. He did not refer to the Houthis’ relations with Israel. This means that the Houthis are formally compliant with the terms of the ceasefire to the extent that the Bab el-Madeb straits are open, even as they openly threaten Israel.
But, in the current war to the end to overthrow the Iranian regime, a possible practical alliance with Iran would involve par excellence making the Bab el-Madeb Straits a chokepoint of the international economy, which would invalidate the spirit and letter of the agreement with the US, in a way that did not e.g. with sporadic strikes on Israel in June 2025.
Second, it appears that Saudi Arabia, which subtly but explicitly supports the war against Iran, has found a modum vivendi with the Houthis that has led to a relative pacification in the region with the crucial mediation of Oman. The Houthis are no longer behaving as a “proxy” in a “proxy war,” but as a governing component in a Yemen seeking its federal future.
The term “proxy war” itself can be misleading, as it appears that in the Middle East actors such as the Houthis are autonomous and do not simply act as proxies for Iran, except to the extent that this is beneficial to their own independent ends.
Navigation safety as a bargaining chip
The attitude of the Houthis is, therefore, likely to be due to political pragmatism. Support for Iran was a one-way street as long as Tehran supplied the Houthis with equipment, helped build a stockpile of missiles and drones, and helped them financially. The decimation of Hamas and Hezbollah, followed by the decapitation of the Iranian leadership, means that Iran is no longer a regional power.
The Houthi leadership appears to be reactive, questioning whether Iran will in the future have the ability to effectively support a network of wars that we conventionally call “proxy wars.” It should be noted, moreover, that in the Arabian peninsula the support of Iran does not have the same prestige as that of the Palestinians.
As of 2023 the Houthis’ alignment with the Palestinian struggle had helped them gain local popularity over the rival internationally recognized government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia. Iran, by contrast, is not as popular, and its support does not automatically confer symbolic legitimacy.
The fact remains that even with decimated forces, the Houthis have the potential to make the Straits of Bab el-Madeb, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, a second “choke point” after the Straits of Hormuz. It seems that instead of treating this possibility as an opportunity to undermine the global economy, following the example of Iran, the Houthi leadership sees it rather as a bargaining chip for a possible legitimization by the US government.
The Trump administration appears to be valuing the art of the deal over hard-wired rules and alliances, and the Houthis can propose in a negotiation the security of the straits for international shipping. It is true that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland points in the direction of possible dynamic solutions in this corner of the Middle East and Africa as well. But this probably results in the Houthi leadership seeking good relations with the US in order to recognize their status in a federal Yemen.
The unstable balance in Yemen remains fragile and could be disrupted if a US ally, such as Israel or even Saudi Arabia, decided to take decisive action again against the Houthis. To the extent that something similar does not happen with the intention of the US, the stability of navigation agreed to last May becomes rather an opportunity for fermentation in a long-standing civil conflict that is in recession.
