Analysis of party loyalty and current electoral rules

The legal principle that links the holding of an elective mandate to the party organization

LEANDRO CHEMALLE/THENEWS2/ESTADÃO CONTÚDO
The party window allows politicians to switch parties before elections without facing penalties

Party loyalty is one of the fundamental pillars for the stability of the Brazilian political system, especially with regard to proportional elections. In Brazil, representative democracy operates under the logic that, in certain positions, the mandate does not belong exclusively to the elected individual, but rather to the party for which he ran. This understanding aims to strengthen party institutions and ensure that the voter’s will, often deposited in the party and not just in the candidate, is respected during the exercise of power. The relationship between the politician and his party is governed by constitutional norms and resolutions of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), which establish limits for migration between parties.

Fundamentals and attributions of party loyalty

The central concept of party loyalty lies in the obligation for parliamentarians to remain affiliated with the party for which they were elected throughout their term of office. Brazilian legislation distinguishes the application of this rule based on the electoral system adopted for each position.

For positions contested in the proportional system (councillors, state, district and federal deputies), the legal understanding consolidated by the Federal Supreme Court (STF) is that the mandate belongs to the party. This occurs because, in this system, seats are distributed according to the electoral quotient achieved by the party or federation, adding up the votes of all candidates and the party’s votes. Therefore, the unjustified departure of the parliamentarian would undermine the representation obtained by the party at the polls.

As for the positions of majority system (mayors, governors, senators and president of the Republic), the STF decided, in 2015, that the loss of office due to party infidelity does not apply. The understanding is that, in these cases, the election is directly linked to the candidate who obtained the absolute or simple majority of votes, granting the individual the title to the position.

Historical evolution and regulatory framework

The discussion about party loyalty in Brazil has gone through decades of instability. Historically, the country has lived with the phenomenon of “party switching”, where politicians constantly change clubs in search of political or budgetary advantages, weakening the ideological identity of the parties and confusing the electorate.

The turning point occurred in 2007, when the TSE, responding to a consultation from the Democrats (DEM) party, established the thesis that the parliamentary mandate belongs to the party. This decision was later confirmed by the STF. TSE Resolution No. 22,610/2007 regulated the process for losing an elected position, as well as the acceptable justifications for disaffiliation.

Subsequently, Constitutional Amendment No. 91/2016 and Law No. 13,165/2015 (Minir Electoral Reform) brought new guidelines, incorporating into the Constitution and the Law on Political Parties (Law No. 9,096/1995) the rules on the party window and just causes for disaffiliation, institutionalizing mechanisms that previously depended mostly on jurisprudence.

Operating mechanisms and the party window

Law enforcement focuses on determining when a politician loses his mandate if he changes party and when this change is permitted. The general rule establishes that disaffiliation without just cause results in the loss of office for representatives elected by the proportional system. The interested political party, the Electoral Public Prosecutor’s Office or substitutes may request this loss from the Electoral Court.

However, the legislation provides for specific exceptions, known as “just cause”, which allow the change of subtitles without punishment:

  • Substantial change or repeated deviation from the party program: When the group drastically changes its ideological or operational line.
  • Severe personal political discrimination: Situations in which the parliamentarian is persecuted or isolated within the party itself.
  • Party incorporation or merger: When the caption ceases to exist or joins another.

In addition to these exceptions, there is a specific temporal mechanism. It is essential to understand what is the party window. This is a period of 30 days, which occurs in the election year, six months before the election. During this interval, councilors and deputies who are at the end of their terms can change parties without running the risk of losing their position. This window aims to allow the re-accommodation of political forces before new elections, guaranteeing flexibility to the system without promoting continued instability.

Importance for democratic stability

Party loyalty plays a crucial role in structuring Brazilian democracy when trying to balance governability and representation. By linking the mandate to the party in proportional positions, the system seeks to strengthen parties as essential institutions of mediation between society and the State, discouraging excessive personalism in politics.

This legal structure protects the will of the voter who voted for a certain ideological platform and prevents the electoral quotient, collectively constructed, from being individually appropriated for subsequent political negotiations. The existence of clear rules on loss of mandate and transfer windows provides predictability to the political scenario, reducing party fragmentation and encouraging coherence in legislative action.

Maintaining these standards ensures that the composition of the legislative houses more reliably reflects the results of the polls throughout the entire period of the legislature. The institution of party loyalty, therefore, not only serves to punish infidelity, but to organize the system of electoral competition, ensuring that political movements occur within transparent and predictable regulatory frameworks.

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