The head of Climatology of the Spanish Meteorological Agency (Aemet) in the Valencian Community, José Ángel Núñez, was clear when asked about the reaction of the Valencian Government, which caused 230 deaths due to the floods: “Managing an emergency reactively when the water is in the channels, when it is already in the ravines, is like trying to cure cancer when there is already metastasis.” Núñez made this statement this Monday morning, during his statement at the investigative commission on the management of the crisis derived from the Congressional damage.
The technician has already testified before the Catarroja judge, who is investigating the case about the floods, about how Aemet warned of the storm days before the event and of the delay in the Cecopi (Integrated Operational Coordination Center) in sending a massive alert to mobile phones. That message reached the devices after eight o’clock, when at least 156 people had already died and another 37 were in an insurmountable situation, according to “Measures must be taken before it starts to rain, which is what has always been done,” the technician insisted.
In the afternoon, Raúl Quílez, former manager of the Valencian Society for Comprehensive Management of Emergency Services (Sgise), also testified in the commission. Quílez was the senior official of the Generalitat who had access to some videos of the Cecopi meeting in which the then vice president Salomé Pradas was seen giving instructions and assuming command on the fateful afternoon. Scenes that were hidden from public opinion for months from public opinion and from the judge leading the case.
Núñez has reviewed the events of that day, the work of Aemet and the accusation that the Valencian Government made to the agency for not notifying the seriousness of the matter in time. “The first special note was published on Friday, the 25th, and a description of the meteorological phenomenon was already made,” said the technician, who added that the media echoed the warnings. “Information was being posted on Aemet’s Twitter that we were going to have a cold drop (…) indicating that the situation we were going to have was very serious,” he argued.
The head of Climatology has also stated that he reported constantly throughout the morning of the day of the dana. To demonstrate this, Núñez took out his mobile phone during the session and played an audio of an interview he gave at 12:00 to local television. At Punt. This is how it has been heard: “They are precipitations that form in the interior mountains. We are seeing that practically on the coast there are very weak rains, while there are areas of the interior mountains that accumulate more than 200 liters per square meter (…) [Esto] It makes us have to be more attentive because in areas where it does not rain, rivers, boulevards, very swollen ravines can arrive and, even if we are in an area that is not rainy, we should not trust ourselves because this cold drop situation (…) are the most dangerous, that is precisely because they are where the water runs, drags cars.
A description of what happened hours later in some towns in the province. At least 60% of the victims died in buildings (50 in ground-floor apartments, 33 in houses, 39 in garages and 12 in residences), according to the data cross-check carried out by this newspaper. “We do not have public television, we are not a media outlet, we do not have the mayors’ telephone numbers, we do not have the power to warn,” Núñez alleged when asked by the deputies.
For this expert, at the Cecopi meeting there was “a lack of decision-making” and he stated that “at five [de la tarde, cuando comenzó] It was clear that half the province of Valencia was flooded and no one was making decisions.” When the Cecopi meeting began, they had already died and 29 representatives of municipal, regional and state institutions were discussing how to address the situation. Pradas, then responsible for Emergencies (he was the one who convened the Cecopi), was the highest-ranking leader from the beginning, since the now former president Carlos Mazón was extending the after-dinner meal at the Valencian restaurant.
Núñez exchanged several messages with colleagues during that meeting, in which he participated electronically. At 5:26 p.m. he wrote: They are thinking about evacuating, because the discharge is going to be very fast. The Júcar Hydrographic Confederation is going to declare emergency scenario 2.” She also recorded one of the interventions at 7:15 p.m. where the sending of the alert to mobile phones was debated. The audio was published a few weeks later and dismantled one of Pradas’ lies about the management of that day, since until then the former counselor maintained that she had learned of the existence of that alert system at eight in the afternoon.
Regarding the leak, Núñez, a councilor Valencian has insulted him, accusing him of being a “Sanchista spy meteorologist.” During his interventions, the head technician regretted the accusations he has suffered, not only in the weeks after the event, but to this day.
Núñez has also pointed out about the overflowing of the Poyo ravine, the cause of most of the deaths of the dana, that it is not the responsibility of Aemet to give notice of this, but the agency reported in the morning and he warned “whenever he was given the word in the Cecopi” of the torrential rains that were falling in the channels. “They were waiting for the water to be running through the ravines and [dicen]: ‘They didn’t warn me that the water was in the ravines.’ Pussy! But I told you 10 hours ago that it was going to rain torrentially,” Núñez stressed.
The president of the commission, the socialist Carmen Martínez, has repeatedly called several PP and Vox deputies to order for their interruptions during the interventions of Núñez, who has been accused of lying in his statements. “The majority of us here regret some of the expressions that you have had to hear, we very much regret that media and personal and political harassment that you have had to endure,” Martínez concluded, addressing Núñez and while pointing to the seats of the Popular Party deputies.
“I found out about Cecopi from my wife”
Raúl Quílez, former manager of Sgise, has reported that he first learned of the call for the Cecopi meeting, in which he was present, thanks to his wife. “My wife tells me when she comes home from work and tells me that on social media [se había difundido] “that a Cecopi had been called,” the former manager pointed out, before reporting that he arrived at the meeting at 6:30 p.m. and that “a little before seven there was a statement from someone from the Confederation that warned of a possible situation of breaking the level 2 or level 3 dam around 9:00 p.m.”
Quílez has maintained that in that meeting around seven o’clock “he begins to see an exchange of ideas on how and what message can be sent” to alert the population. The former high official has once again confessed, as he already declared before the Catarroja judge, that he felt like “a stone guest” during the Cecopi meeting. “I have worked in Emergencies, and in Emergencies there are some roles. And at that time the role I had was that of the manager of the Valencian Society for Comprehensive Management of Emergency Services, which does not have any operational function and does not have any function within Cecopi. Beyond the possible logistical needs that may be demanded,” Quílez stressed.
