The case “” did not overturn (), but it may have caused a shake-up in his pre-candidacy precisely in the segments in which Jair Bolsonaro’s son is placing his bets on overcoming .
The figures from the survey carried out in full after the revelation of the scandal indicate that the scandal did not cause more than a hiccup within the more Bolsonarist core of the electorate, which tends to defend the clan even in its difficult moments.
It is a group of voters large enough to reinforce the idea that he is consolidated as a competitive candidate and also, from what everything indicates so far, to alleviate speculation that he should be in this year’s presidential race.
Spontaneous poll numbers, in which the respondent names their preferred candidate before even reading a list of names, are usually the indicator used to measure the mood of loyal voters. At this point, Flávio went through the case practically unscathed, fluctuating from 18% to 17% of voting intentions.
The bad news for Bolsonaro’s son appeared in segments that are also part of the right-wing electoral base, but which have a more volatile relationship with Bolsonaroism.
The results captured by Datafolha show problems for Flávio in certain evangelical groups, in the South region, among young adults and – what is most significant – among Bolsonarists who describe themselves as moderates.
This last segment is made up of voters who declare themselves Bolsonaro supporters, but position themselves in second position on a scale that goes from 1 to 5 — in which the first stratum is made up of loyal Bolsonarists, the central point is non-aligned voters, and the fifth group is made up of loyal PT members.
In this group of Bolsonarists who declare themselves moderate, Flávio went from 53% to 40% of voting intentions in one week. It is a small segment, representing around 5% of the total number of respondents, but it is the senator’s target and could make a difference in a tight election.
Among evangelical voters, Flávio had 49% and now appears with 42% of voting intentions in the first round. There, its rejection was 28% and is now at 34%.
In the South, the drop was greater, from 48% to 35%. Among voters aged 25 to 34, who represent a good portion of the chronically online population, the impact was 11 percentage points.
Flávio’s pre-campaign now enters a damage and risk assessment phase. Any new revelations could keep the wound open and provoke a slow bleeding of voters upset with their fraternal relationship with Vorcaro.
To take the senator out of the game, however, a mass movement of right-wing voters would be necessary for names like (), (Novo) or (Mission). So far, none of them have shown the ability to convince Bolsonarists that they are more viable options than Flávio.
One of the reasons for this is the fact that Bolsonaro’s son is still a strong supporter of anti-PTism, which leads him to retain votes from right-wing voters despite being the target of questions.
This, in fact, was a factor that seems to have cushioned Flávio’s stumble in the Datafolha second round simulation. While in the first round Bolsonaro’s son appears nine points behind (PT), in the direct clash he manages to be four points behind the PT member.
