Only three pre-candidates for the Presidency of the Republic operate with their own digital activism in 2026: , and . This is what data from more than 100,000 public groups monitored in real time shows in a sample of messages between May 6th and 24th. The other two names currently considered as alternatives to the right, and , depend on borrowed mobilizations or rely on traditional political models without an autonomous digital component. In a country where political opinion is increasingly formed via the internet, having an organic militant base is a strategic variable of the first order.
The party’s activism precedes the digital era and allowed the party to survive several crises, from Mensalão, Lava Jato, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s arrest in 2018 and the defeat by Bolsonaro. This happens because militancy continued to exist even when the party faced its worst moments. Even with high structural rejection in the monitored WhatsApp universe, with negative sentiment oscillating around 70% of messages, PT activists remain mobilized.
An obvious counterpoint from recent history is . It had strong organic activism for two decades, it was the third most consistent force in Brazil in recent electoral cycles. It sheltered Ciro during this period, but they cracked when Lula returned to power in 2022. Without an institutional home to house the militancy, it became dehydrated. Today Ciro is a figure without a field, and his electorate has been diluted between those who returned to the PT, those who migrated to the anti-PT right and those who gave up on politics. The lesson is that militancy without a party is fragile, and, for the same reason that new laborism lost ground, the PT managed to remain cohesive.
Bolsonarism solved the problem in another way. It does not have its own institutional party, but operates what philosopher Marcos Nobre, from Unicamp and Cebrap, calls a digital party. Nobre describes the phenomenon as a political ecosystem that does not depend on a traditional party structure. It works like a party without the obligations of a party, and captures Valdemar Costa Neto’s formal structure without having to negotiate every decision with it.
After the leak of the audios between Flávio Bolsonaro and on May 13, Bolsonaro activists produced a coordinated defense in four distinct and simultaneous narrative lines: direct denial, distinction between private and public financing, selective leak against the senator and pulling Lula into the scandal. All of this without visible order, in the messages analyzed this week. Flávio’s militancy treats Valdemar and Centrão as internal enemies who have captured the authentic right. They accept the alliance, but they don’t like it.
Renan Santos operates differently. With a newly created party, the Mission, and authentic militancy, although not hegemonic. It has its own identity, identifiable vocabulary and concrete proposals. In the groups, the Renan base talks about industrializing the Northeast, fighting factions, cutting Judiciary spending and annexing municipalities that do not meet development goals. It is a younger and fiercer militancy. Attacked simultaneously by Bolsonarists, who call him “MBLixo” and “right-wing”, and by PT members, who classify Renan as a “fascist threat”. Missão and PT are the only parties with pre-candidacies today in the dispute in which institutional party and organic militancy coincide.
Romeu Zema is the clearest negative case of the fortnight. It was on the rise until May 13, with positive sentiment around 75% and sustained growth. He posted a video on Instagram that afternoon attacking Flávio Bolsonaro over Vorcaro’s audio. Within 24 hours, sentiment plummeted to over 73% negative. The Bolsonarist militancy itself, which applauded when Zema attacked the , turned against him, classifying him as a traitor and opportunist.
Without his own organic militancy, Zema was unable to retaliate or absorb the blow. His positive perception was borrowed from the Bolsonarist base, which saw him as an ally. Ronaldo Caiado, who also does not have his own membership, managed to avoid the worst when he did not launch a direct attack on Flávio. And he received praise, increasing positive mentions, also lent by supporters of Flávio Bolsonaro.
No political force survives in the long term without militancy. It was militancy that held the PT back from 2016 to 2022. It is Bolsonarist digital militancy that sustains Flávio even when he faces crises with Vorcaro’s audio, and it is Renan Santos’ nascent militancy that makes him grow even without hegemony. In October 2026, candidates arriving with different types of political capital will go to the ballot box. Electoral research measures voting intentions, but does not capture this structural asymmetry. Those who are militant can lose the election and continue to exist. Those who don’t have it lose the election and run the risk of disappearing.
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