How Boeing’s new CEO led the company out of the crisis of accidents and billion-dollar losses

Before Boeing named Kelly Ortberg CEO in August 2024, the planemaker was a company in crisis, and confidence that one of the greatest icons of American industry would regain its luster was fading.

Just as Boeing was beginning to recover from the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max accidents in 2018 and 2019, which killed 346 passengers and crew, the rupture of a door seal panel on a Max over Portland, Oregon, in January 2024, once again put the spotlight on its manufacturing practices, which increasingly prioritized profits over quality.

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Federal regulators tightened oversight and froze Max production at a level a third below the previous peak. At the same time, Boeing’s defense and space division was racking up billions of dollars in losses on federal contracts marked by huge cost overruns.

The list of problems only grew: the challenge of integrating the struggling Spirit AeroSystems, an airframe supplier that Boeing had sold two decades earlier and had just agreed to buy back, significantly raised its risk profile for the future.

To make matters worse, Boeing was facing a potentially devastating strike from its powerful union of 33,000 mechanics in the Puget Sound region, whose leaders claimed that since management was unable to do this, workers needed to “save Boeing from itself.”

The job seemed so difficult that Boeing had trouble finding someone to take it. Among the big names that the aviation giant would have unsuccessfully probed were Larry Culp, CEO of GE Aerospace; Dave Gitlin, CEO of Carrier Global; and Boeing’s own chairman, Steve Mollenkopf, former head of Qualcomm.

Ortberg was an unlikely name. He had successfully served as CEO of aerospace and defense manufacturer Rockwell Collins for five years. United Technologies acquired Rockwell in 2018 and less than two years later sold the business to RTX.

Shortly afterwards, Ortberg retired. When he took the position at Boeing, he had already been without an operational role for more than four years.

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Ortberg has been so low-key and maintained such a private public profile that the extent of his achievement has since not received the recognition it deserves — but that is beginning to change.

In short, Boeing is on track for one of the most dramatic and rapid turnarounds ever seen among major companies that were facing serious difficulties.

“Boeing found the change agent it needed in Ortberg,” says Scott Mikus, analyst at Melius Research. “Thanks to Ortberg, the dream of a large industrial company lives on.”

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An experienced engineer

Ortberg has the right qualities: he is an experienced engineer with a track record of promoting harmonious labor relations.

He reestablished an “engineering first” culture at Boeing, a radical shift from the decline in interest and investment in innovation and the focus on share buybacks that prevailed before the Max crashes between 2014 and 2018.

Ortberg adopts a no-show approach, based on a return to fundamentals and gradual advances, aiming for major improvements in quality, reliability and on-time deliveries.

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It also seeks win-win deals with suppliers, in contrast to Boeing’s long-standing tendency to erode its relationships by squeezing them hard on prices.

When he was a young engineer, Richard Safran — an analyst at Seaport Securities — saw Ortberg work at Rockwell Collins. “So, unlike most people, I wasn’t surprised by his achievement at Boeing,” says Safran.

“He’s from the American Midwest and follows the philosophy of not making decisions too soon. He’s methodical and checks off every item on the list one by one. He’s such a good engineer that he knows enough about everyone’s work to ask tough questions. And he knows how to make money.”

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A person who saw different administrations pass through the company and worked alongside Ortberg at Boeing is impressed by the cultural change. “He set a new tone within the company,” says this source.

“He evaluates people not just on what they do, but how they do it. You need to seek opinions and feedback from colleagues. His approach ties pay and promotions to how people treat and respect each other, as well as evaluating their performance. Are there still people in senior positions who don’t treat others well? Yes, but it’s a good start.”

This same person highlights that Ortberg’s interpersonal skills serve as a model: “He knows how to listen and has high emotional intelligence. His focus is to return Boeing to its place.”

Ortberg is also known for having high expectations and demanding that colleagues are always very well prepared when he questions them about their business.

What makes Ortberg’s turnaround particularly impressive is that it faced an almost immediate obstacle: less than a month after his arrival, the mechanics’ strike reduced production of the 737 MAX family, the company’s flagship product, from a pace already limited by the FAA to practically zero.

Ortberg adopted his usual conservative stance and raised more than $24.3 billion in new capital to cover upcoming losses and strengthen Boeing’s balance sheet.

He resolved the strike in a relatively quick 53 days, and a string of victories followed.

In March last year, Boeing won the competition from the United States Air Force for the sixth generation fighter program, surprisingly surpassing Lockheed Martin, which until then dominated this market.

The contract paves the way for a new era of profitability in defense and space. After recording an operating loss of more than US$5.4 billion in 2024, a legacy of excessively cheap proposals in military projects, the division returned to showing a small profit last year and, in the first quarter of 2026, obtained US$233 million in operating profit, reaching a margin of 3.1%.

In commercial aviation, by far Boeing’s largest division, the campaign to overhaul manufacturing safety standards began after the crashes, under intense FAA oversight. But Ortberg’s systematic and tireless approach has accelerated progress, and the results are now showing in a big way.

He managed to increase the production limit of the Max, the company’s main aircraft, from 38 to 42 units per month and expects to end 2026 producing 52 aircraft per month, close to the peak reached eight years ago.

Thanks largely to increased production and deliveries of the Max, Ortberg predicts Boeing will be on track to generate $10 billion in free cash flow. Although he did not indicate a date, both Mikus and Safran believe the company will reach this milestone around 2028.

In the first quarter earnings call, chief financial officer Jesus Malave stated that Boeing intends to go further. “I believe that our cash flow potential allows us to exceed US$10 billion,” said Malave.

Exceeding that figure would take Boeing back to levels close to its 2017 and 2018 records — but at that time, profits grew largely due to a proportional reduction in spending on research, development and workforce, strategies that sacrificed the future.

Ortberg receives high praise from airline customers. “Boeing is doing an almost miraculous job of recovering,” said Michael Leskinen, chief financial officer of United Airlines, recently. “Our confidence that the Max planes will be delivered on time has never been greater during my more than eight years at United.”

Still, “Captain Kelly” faces major challenges in putting Boeing on a path to maximum growth.

The company continues to suffer from supply chain, quality and certification issues, although these have diminished.

For example, wiring faults in Max models have delayed deliveries scheduled for the first quarter until the second quarter, and a shortage of business class seats has been delaying production of the 787, a mainstay in its line of wide-body aircraft.

Ahead: labor challenges and a new plane

A crucial test looms in October: Boeing’s contract with its 16,000 engineers, signed before Ortberg’s arrival, is about to expire. It is essential that Ortberg, an engineer admired by his own engineers, reaches an agreement that satisfies all parties and avoids a prolonged strike, as happened with the mechanics. “This would send a message that Boeing’s cultural transformation is real,” says Mikus.

Indeed, Boeing will need the world’s best engineering talent to develop an all-new aircraft capable of matching or surpassing Airbus in the single-aisle segment, where the Max and the A220 and A320 families compete, which represent the largest category of aircraft on the market.

Since 2010, its main rival has captured around 60% of this segment, mainly due to the superior range of the A320neo and A320XLR families. Ortberg has already stated that Boeing needs to wait until the technology is ready before committing to this decisive project, which will shape much of its future.

A fundamental part of this process will be the choice of a highly advanced engine from GE, RTX or Rolls-Royce, capable of providing fuel savings of close to 20% and greater durability, reducing the high maintenance costs of current models.

The big question is: can Ortberg, whose caution has worked well so far, be able to act quickly enough? “By focusing their efforts on increasing cash flow, wouldn’t they be leaving the development of the next generation of aircraft on the back burner?” asks an industry veteran.

In contrast, Airbus has been very aggressive in collaborating with GE Aerospace on testing its so-called Rise engine, which, in part by eliminating the nacelles surrounding the fan blades, making those blades from ultra-strong, lightweight carbon fiber and increasing their size, could set new standards in energy efficiency.

But Boeing also has an asset: its new head of commercial aircraft development, Brian Yutko.

His appointment — a doctor in aeronautics from MIT who, at around 40 years old, is among the world’s leading experts in revolutionary aircraft designs — signals that Boeing will carefully evaluate the most advanced options available on the market and reduces the risk that the company, now in recovery, will take too long to act.

According to Wall Street’s best estimates, the earliest Boeing could approve an all-new design would be 2029 or 2030, with production beginning around 2037.

It is worth remembering that Ortberg has just turned 66 years old. “He took office at an age when most top executives are already retiring,” says an aerospace industry source. In fact, Ortberg could remain in command for several years and even make the final decision on the new plane.

But for Boeing’s board, the number one priority is establishing a succession plan, and there will be a huge figure to replace. Hopefully, the directors will be in a much more favorable position than when they recruited Ortberg.

At that time, the situation was so bleak that neither Boeing’s colossal size nor its legendary reputation were enough to attract renowned CEOs into the fold. This time, the position will be much more attractive. The merit goes to the unlikely choice that proved to be perfect for the moment: Kelly Ortberg.

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