Based on the oft-told cliché that in a war, the first casualty is the truth, the war, which began by invading , on February 24, 2022, and which is in its fifth year, is no exception.
Russian propaganda presents an embellished reality of the war, resorting, for the most part, to the use of euphemisms: from the beginning of the conflict until today, the Russians refer to the war as a “special military operation”. But in this one, the language of the Russian soldiers at the front, which presents a completely different picture of the war.
War slang through the letters of 7000 Russian soldiers and their relatives
Studying 7,000 letters from Russian soldiers and their relatives, anthropologist Alexandra Archipova, who teaches at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris, and psychologist Yuri Lapchin compiled an ethnographic dictionary of the war, with “catchword” words and expressions used by Russian soldiers. And this peculiar “dictionary”, part of which, presented by the French newspaper Le Monde, demolishes the official rhetoric of Moscow and the propaganda of the Kremlin. In frontline slang, the Russian word for “little bird” (“ptitchka”) denotes drone.
The drone operator is called a “ptitchnik”, a “bird hunter”, in this case, military “birds”. If an operator loses their drone, or if it is shot down, then their commander can force them to buy a new one, at their own expense. The lowest price of a drone is around 1,600 euros. What Russian soldiers fear most is the heavy Ukrainian drone dubbed “Baba Yaga,” after the terrifying witch of Slavic folklore.
Fishy silence from Putin on the Ukrainian drone attacks in Moscow
When on June 18, Kiev launched an attack around Moscow with 200 drones, Russian President Putin made no mention. When he finally appeared publicly on June 23, he blamed the West. “These drones, these strikes on civilian infrastructure, what are they for?
about the actions of the Russian armed forces,” he said. Not even in the news reports, the attacks in Moscow were mentioned. Channel One, the Kremlin’s main mouthpiece, aired a brief report on the morning of the June 18 Ukrainian attacks and then went silent until Putin appeared publicly.
Moscow does not warn Russians of impending Ukrainian attacks
At the same time, the problems connected with the war are presented, by the Russian government, deliberately, in technical or neutral terms. Fuel shortages are attributed to “scheduled maintenance”, flight delays to “schedule adjustments”, airport closures are described as “operating according to the actual schedule”. Putin has not tasked state officials with preparing shelters or developing early warning systems to deal with future attacks.
The governor of Bashkortostan, a region of four million people between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains where Ukraine has attacked refineries, told The New York Times that his administration decided not to always activate the sirens so as not to cause anxiety among citizens, citing an increase in the use of antidepressants in Russia. At the same time, there are reports of delays or incomplete notification systems in cases of drone attacks, with some citizens receiving delayed SMS notifications, or not being notified at all.
The slaughterhouse of the front: the “meat” and the “ransoms”
At the front, Russian soldiers are unable to cope with the grim situation they are experiencing with anti-depressants. According to Archipova and Lapchin’s research, they must take care, above all, to stay alive, not to become “meat”, (“miasso”) – the word used for stormtroopers, who are turned into expendable human matter, into “cannon fodder”. This presupposes that the soldiers will not be “obnoulenie” (obnoulenie), that is, that they will not be exterminated by their fellow soldiers, or that they will not be sent on a mission from which it is certain that they will not return alive.
Or that they will not be in the “iama”, the makeshift disciplinary detention center on the ground: a deep pit, with a metal grate, into which soldiers are thrown with their hands and feet tied for some misdemeanor. The pit is two or three meters deep and its bottom is full of water. Soldiers are beaten and, in some cases, doused with water before being electrocuted.
The practice is illegal but the decision to send a soldier to the “pit” is made by his immediate superior, without a written order or other statutory procedure. To escape these tortures, Russian soldiers resort to “ransom” (“otkoup”), that is, bribing a commander in order to secure a reprieve or avoid a deadly mission.
In 2025, , right to a premium of 4,600 euros, while his monthly salary was around 2,300 euros. Money is the basis of the informal war economy that affects the lives of all soldiers.
Before an attack, commanders often suggest that soldiers pay their “ransom”. If they refuse, they can be beaten, taken to the “pit” or “zeroed”, i.e. executed. The same “invoices” reappear in the soldiers’ complaints: 600 euros for a leave, 1,800 euros for a postponement before deployment to occupied Ukrainian territories, 3,000 euros for a transfer to a non-combat position and 5,500 euros for a transfer to the rear.
The Russian media at the service of the Kremlin
All this is never broadcast by the Russian media. War coverage is selective. , while failures, losses or attacks on Russian soil are downplayed or delayed. And always the language used is neutral or technical, avoiding terms that could create a strong emotional reaction in the audience.
Airport and flight information is a prime example. When airports in Moscow or other cities are temporarily closed due to Ukrainian drone attacks, the justification given to passengers is “operational adjustments” or “inbound flight delays.” The Kremlin’s goal is to limit the Russian population’s exposure to images or information that could cause concern or question.
On social media, many Russian citizens reacted to official statements about why sirens are not used during drone strikes, or why shelters are not set up.
Obedience to Putin is the goal
Downplaying the risk and using euphemisms for drone attacks is a “sign of obedience” to Putin and his regime, anthropologist Alexandra Archipova points out. “The Russian authorities are mainly interested in the images in the news reports. They don’t want “a mass panic that could be shown on television and on the news, with crowds crying and running in the streets.”
Arkhipova concludes that the concealment of reality and the linguistic ambiguity of the Russian regime about the war is intentional: “People can understand that something is happening, but it is not so clear what exactly is happening.”
