Russian-Ukrainian war: “Putin will accept negotiations only to preserve the achievements”

Κατεχόμενα στην Ουκρανία: «Τα δίνει όλα» για το… ΝΑΤΟ ο Ζελένσκι

Kevork Oskanian, a professor at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom, specializing in international security and the . “The prospects for Ukraine are not good,” says the author of the book “Russian exceptionalism between East and West: The Ambiguous Empire” speaking to Vima.

Will President Putin escalate or is he preparing to sit down at the negotiating table?

“He will face a brutal winter, and the escalation will likely continue as he looks to maximize his military gains while holding the upper hand – which he does have right now – ahead of the expected negotiations under a Trump presidency. He also wants to demoralize Ukraine by targeting civilian infrastructure, especially the energy grid. He will probably accept negotiations but only to consolidate, perhaps even extend, his gains. Having declared the annexed Ukrainian provinces part of Russia, I don’t think he will make territorial concessions. Nor will he accept Ukraine, or part of it, becoming a member of NATO or hosting Western troops as part of a peace deal. He has invested too much political capital in these two stated goals of his so-called ‘special military operation,’ and therefore a reversal would be very costly and would require either major failures on the front lines or major incentives from the West.”

What would be the best possible solution of the Ukrainian?

“The ideal scenario would be for Ukraine to completely expel Russia and regain full control of its territories. But given the existing realities, the least bad solution would be a version of a Korean partition, where the front line “freezes” and Ukraine is de facto dismembered without any territorial change being legally recognized. The part of Ukraine under Kiev’s control would then be free to develop its relations with the West – although, to be honest, this would be difficult to achieve because it would require a substantial commitment from the EU and the US.”

What does Keith Kellogg’s selection for the role of US special envoy for Ukraine and Russia suggest?

“The prospects for Ukraine are not good. Obviously, Trump is a central player in the equation that will take shape, as he has assembled around him an administration made up of his loyalists. How much influence will Kellogg and other players, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who voted against aid to Ukraine in the Senate, have? Will Trump be driven more by the demand to finalize a peace deal quickly – though probably not within 24 hours as he has stated – or will he be personally offended if he finds Putin too obstructive? All this remains unknown.”

Will Europe have a role in the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine?

“If there are negotiations, the main decisions will probably be made in Washington. In addition, there is the stated reluctance of Trump and his team to fund European defense or the war in Ukraine. The EU’s role will probably be supportive, e.g. as a financier for the hundreds of billions of dollars in reconstruction of Ukraine. Even the optimistic scenario of Ukraine joining the EU will take years. A lot can happen in the meantime, especially in a political environment where populist forces are strengthening. Romania’s recent electoral surprise is a prime example.”

Could the case of Ukraine set a precedent for losing ground in Europe?

“This is indeed the first time since 1945 that involuntary territorial changes have taken place in Europe – not counting Kosovo. But the answer to your question will depend on whether these changes end up being recognized de jure rather than accepted de facto – that is, whether these changes are formally recognized rather than provisionally accepted as part of a peace agreement. Official recognition would open a Pandora’s box for countries that claim neighboring territories, such as Azerbaijan from Armenia and Serbia from Kosovo. That’s why I don’t see European states recognizing Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine. So the question is whether Russia will be sufficiently pressured to conclude a peace agreement without this recognition. Even then, however, it can set an unwelcome, tempting precedent.”

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