The rise of “Merzoni”: the alliance between Merz and Meloni is reshaping Europe

With Brexit taking the United Kingdom away from Europe, Merkel’s departure and Macron more focused on internal problems, Merz and Meloni have taken the helm of Europe with an unlikely alliance.

“Merzoni” is not an easy neologism to pronounce and has not yet fully consolidated itself in the world of European politics.

However, for months now there has been a a pragmatic alliance between German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.

And although politicians are, in many ways, unlikely partners, the union has been quietly redefine the balance of power in Europe. In the latest demonstration of this dynamic, a joint policy document drafted by Merz and Meloni was delivered to European Union partners at an informal summit on February 12, 2026, advocating reforms to improve the bloc’s competitiveness.

Overcome “Merkron”

Post-war European politics has seen the center of gravity shift before, but that revolved around power shifts between France and Germany, the bloc’s two largest economies today. The UK’s ability to dominate EU politics has always been hampered by its late accession to the “European project” and internal ambivalence. And this influence came to an end with the 2016 referendum, which resulted in the United Kingdom’s exit from the Union.

For almost a decade after the British exit, Europe revolved around the axis formed by Angela Merkel, of Germany, and Emmanuel Macron, of France, a alliance nicknamed “Merkron”: Merkel’s clumsy charm and cautious pragmatism combined with Macron’s charisma and broad European idealism. Joint leadership helped steer the EU through Brexit, Donald Trump’s first term and the pandemic.

But times have changed.

Merkel left. He stepped down as German Chancellor in December 2021. Macron, in turn, has faced political difficulties in your country and increasingly resembles what diplomats and journalists describe as a European “Cassandra”: accurate in its warnings about global instability, but less capable of mobilizing support internally or across the continent to face the problems.

The end of the “Merkron” era coincided with countless crises plaguing Europeincluding Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, current US unpredictability, growing climate pressures, unremitting migration tensions, and the collapse of arms control regimes.

The comforting post-Cold War assumption that peace in Europe would be permanent has disappeared.

An unlikely partnership

Into this vacuum, Merz and Meloni emerged. At first sight, the duo looks strange.

Merz is a conservative Atlanticist and a convinced economic liberal. His message, and the title of his 2008 book, “Dare More Capitalism,” signal a shift toward an assertive pro-market agenda after years of cautious centrism under Merkel. Merz insists that Germany must rebuild its military capacity – a break with decades of reticence, both internally and across the EU, about such a move.

Meloni, in turn, rose to power coming from the Italian nationalist right. The lineage of his party, Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy, goes back to the remains of Mussolini’s fascists. However, in office, he demonstrated political agility, repositioning himself as a responsible and highly successful European figure. As prime minister, Meloni maintained support for Ukraine and cooperation with the European Union – ignoring concerns about both areas before her rise to power. He has also skillfully cultivated strong ties to Washington – including Trump’s political camp – and has generally demonstrated successful strategic chameleonism.

Critics call him opportunistic; the admirers, pragmatic. In any case, Meloni mastered the art of political dissimulation, becoming a bridge between nationalist Europe and traditional Europe.

O que un Merz e Meloni It’s less ideology than necessity.

Germany remains Europe’s economic engine, but it needs partners to push the continent towards greater defense capability and economic competitiveness. Italy seeks greater influence and credibility in the center of Europe.

Both governments now speak the language of strategic autonomy: Europe needs to be able to defend itself and protect its interests, even if the US becomes unreliable. As the joint document states: “Continuing on the current path is not an option. Europe needs to act now.”

Europe unites against an enemy disguised as a friend

Ironically, Europe’s unity has often emerged in response to crises.

Brexit has strengthened pro-EU sentiment on the continent. Likewise, Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine revived cooperation between NATO and the EU.

Now, Trump – with his flirtation with abandoning NATO commitments, threats of tariffs and questions about territorial agreements in places like Greenland – has caused a shock to European political consciousness.

Recent polls show overwhelming European support for stronger EU defense cooperation and greater unity against global threats.

For leaders like Merz and Meloni, this creates political space for policies that would have seemed unthinkableor certainly more difficult, a decade ago, with measures such as increased military spending, defense integration, industrial protection and stricter migration policies.

Defense and militarization

The most drastic change is undoubtedly happening in Germany. For decades, Berlin has avoided military leadership, haunted by its past and protected by US security guarantees. That era is coming to an end. German officials increasingly talk about rearmament, European defense readiness and long-term strategic competition.

The moment could not be more urgent. Merz, in framing Moscow’s continued aggression as a direct attack on European security and unity, said in September 2025 that “We are not at war, but we are also no longer at peace”.

The new German-Italian action plan explicitly reinforces cooperation in defense, cybersecurity and strategic industries. Both governments emphasize loyalty to NATO while pushing for a more robust European military capability.

The idea of ​​a future European defense force, once dismissed as fantasy, is now circulating seriously in political circles. Rome will be planning a big acquisition agreement with German weapons manufacturer Rheinmetall, worth up to 20 billion euros. Including hundreds of new generation armored vehicles and tanks, representing one of the largest defense ensemble projects in Europe.

The measure reflects a joint effort by Berlin and Rome to strengthen Europe’s military capacitywhile consolidating rearmament in European industrial partnerships.

What do Meloni and Merz gain from this?

For Meloni, the partnership with Berlin brings legitimacy. Italy traditionally oscillates between European leadership and peripheral frustration. By aligning with Germany, Roma returns to the decision-making core of Europe.

At the same time, Meloni can present himself as nationalist internally and indispensable for Europe. His political positions allow him to maintain communication channels with Washington, while remaining within the EU consensus – a balance that few European leaders manage to achieve.

Germany, in turn, gains political flexibility and a partner more aligned with the strategic vision of EU policy.

Macron’s ambitious federalist vision has at times alienated more cautious partners in the bloc. Italy offers Merz a pragmatic counterweight, focusing on competitiveness, migration control and industrial policy rather than a major European overhaul.

Macron is not completely excluded. France still leads nuclear deterrence and many diplomatic initiatives. However, the political moment is changing and the center now in government intends to prioritize economic competitiveness and security over institutional reform.

Will it work?

The Merzoni partnership faces major challenges.

The Italian economy remains fragile and Germany’s export model has struggled amid global economic changes. Far-right and populist movements still challenge the cohesion of the EU. And defense integration continues to be politically sensitive among member countries.

However, necessity often drives European integration. And as crises accumulate, the cooperation becomes less optional.

The real question is whether Europe can move from reactive crisis management to a proactive geopolitical strategy. For now, the Italian-German partnership suggests that Europe’s political map is being redrawn – not through grand federalist visions, but through pragmatic alliances shaped by fear, necessity and opportunity.