There is widespread perplexity at the tentacular structure and colossal dimensions of Sobra (almost) no one! The most recent revelation: the son of a minister and the daughter-in-law of the government leader in the Senate would have received millionaire sums from the bank. The involvement of a staggering number of actors —from authorities from the three Powers to businesspeople—, beyond any ideological cleavage, raises a central question: the greater and more diverse the number of those implicated, the greater the likelihood of cross-complaints emerging that feed a dynamic of reciprocal incrimination? The optimistic answer is: yes!
The first to formulate this intuition was Madison, in the “Federalist Papers“. For him, the most effective institutional arrangement in controlling rulers is one based on reciprocal control between rival interests. Ambition, he said, must be pitted against ambition. It is not a question of trusting in the virtue of those in power, but of structuring institutions and incentives in such a way that competing interests monitor each other.
The Master case exhibits great complexity, as it involves a structure on two interconnected levels. The first concerns the environment external to the Supreme Court. Here plurality is associated with reputational costs imposed by the independent press and semi-autonomous agencies (Federal Police, for example). And cleavages between business sectors (large and small banks, etc.) or rival political agents. The second refers to the internal environment of the Supreme Court (divisions in classes and plenary). The case is absolutely unique: the allegations affect several members of the court. The central question refers to the developments in the case after a possible statement by the Bank’s controller: will the statements in the case be assessed by those involved themselves?
Madison is a guide to understanding the interaction between institutions —especially between the three Powers—, but his intuitions also apply to individuals. Just consider the counterfactual: if the selected rapporteur was not , what would be the outcome? What if the STF ministers had been appointed by a single president or by the same political party faction? The conclusion is clear: the worst arrangement for democratic accountability occurs when there is hegemonic control by a single group. In other words, the high number of opposing interests would generate enough coordination problems to make a corrected reaction unfeasible.
But the answer to the initial question could also be: no! When many interests are affected —even if rival ones— and the degree of compromise exceeds certain thresholds, the result is general collusion. Here it is scorched earth: the degree of commitment of the main political actors is such that it would brutally increase the chances of a tacit agreement between the parties —even with multiple cleavages (government/opposition; left/right)— to guarantee reciprocal impunity. Even theoretically rival to the Executive, majority sectors of the Senate align themselves with impunity in the Executive and in the court.
The Lava Jato experience, however, suggests the occurrence of post-judgment. The revelation of transfers to Taiaia buyers is yet another indication. This
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