Why Trump may not be able to get out of the war with Iran

ANALYSIS || The escalation between the US and Iran is entering a critical phase, with contradictory signs of de-escalation from Donald Trump

Wars, unlike illegal tariffs, cannot be turned on and off at the whim of a president or to permanently sustain

So the fundamental question following President Donald Trump’s suspension of attacks on Iran’s power plants is not whether he had another TACO moment.Trump always chickens out/Trump acobarda-if always”).

It’s about whether Trump can get out of his war with Iran, even if he wants to.

After days of wavering rhetoric, Trump gave a first sign of possible de-escalation on Monday, when he mentioned 15 points of agreement in what he said were productive talks with Iran. Tehran said there had been no dialogue.

The most optimistic reading of the latest developments is that both the United States and Iran have reached a point where the cost of further escalation would be so devastating that they both need a way out. Epiphanies of this kind can begin to end wars.

Trump had pushed his enemies to the limit by threatening to bomb Iranian power plants if they did not open the , a critical point for oil exports. Tehran has vowed to retaliate by torching vital infrastructure in US-allied Gulf states. The conflagration could trigger an already serious global recession for the very Iranian civilians that Trump promised to help.

But there are many reasons to doubt that a breakthrough is imminent.

Days of erratic and contradictory rhetoric from Trump and the administration’s inability to present a consistent justification for the war or outline an exit strategy make any U.S. statement lack credibility.

The president’s habit of bombing to his own deadlines in Iran means no one will be surprised if he breaks his own five-day moratorium on attacks on the country’s power plants.

Some skeptics also note that the president’s pause lasts through the trading week in global markets. With stock futures falling and oil prices rising after the weekend, was he simply seeking to create a cushion of stability in the markets?

It wouldn’t be the first time that official statements appear aimed at containing volatility. : The Dow, S&P 500 and Nasdaq all rose more than 1% on Monday, while Brent, the global oil benchmark, fell 11%. North American drivers will now expect some relief at the gas pumps.

Why Trump needs to lower the tension

Trump may want to buy time for another reason: U.S. forces that could give him the option of invading Kharg Island — the epicenter of Iran’s oil industry and a vital economic hub — or occupying islands and coastal regions in the Strait are not yet fully assembled. A U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit, deployed from Japan, may soon arrive in the region. But a second one only left the West Coast last week.

It’s also worth remembering that Trump likes hyperbole. Experience suggests that his exaltation of diplomatic progress and claims that Iran “badly wants” a deal may be exaggerations — even if deliberate disinformation is sometimes a tool used by statesmen to create space for breakthroughs.

The president’s sudden swings, one day talking about “reducing” the war and the next about intensifying it, are incompatible with the traditions of stable leadership in times of war. But they are typically Trump. On Monday, it all seemed like a ploy to allow him to argue that his tough stance had produced diplomatic progress.

This unpredictability and the tendency to try to mitigate crises that he himself creates are known characteristics of Trump’s personal life and his business and political career, as well as his multiple confrontations with the judicial system. Each day often unfolds as an attempt to reach the end while still standing. With this technique, Trump postpones reckoning and pushes the worst consequences of his actions into an endless improvised dance.

Still, there is the worrying possibility that Trump’s erratic method will be tested beyond its limits in the Persian Gulf.

Iran may be at a disadvantage compared to the military power of the US and Israel and suffering very heavy losses in its naval, air and land assets during a war that eliminated senior members of the Islamic clerical regime.

But as the conflict enters its fourth week, it has also demonstrated its leverage by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz and holding the global economy — and Republican political hopes in November — hostage.

Logic suggests that a regime that was already ultra-radical before the war is unlikely to be more open to Trump’s demands after the death of its supreme leader and after enduring an intense attack by US and Israeli missiles and planes.

Trump’s terms for ending the war — likely including Iran’s abandonment of its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile programs — may be unacceptable. This is because the last three weeks show precisely why a hostile regime might decide to seek this type of “insurance” against future attacks from foreign powers.

Even if the talks move forward — and Pakistan has already offered to host them — it is not clear who would negotiate for Iran. A regime that has decentralized power and lost key figures may have difficulty making collective decisions. And if, as some experts believe, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is now in complete control, it could be even more inflexible than before.

Furthermore, in the past Washington has spoken with relatively moderate Iranian officials, only to find that more radical figures opposed compromises.

It would also not be surprising if Iranian leaders interpreted the president’s retreats, contradictions and emotional social media posts as signs that their strategy of imposing economic consequences on Trump is working.

Why almost all of Trump’s options are bad

No one can know what will happen next in Iran. It is possible that the assassinations of senior leaders and the attacks by the US and Israel have caused fatal fissures in the regime that are not yet visible. But so far, there are no clear public signs of disintegration.

The air war has seriously reduced Iran’s regional threat. But if brute force has not yet brought it to its knees, Trump has not yet explained why Iran would give up its main asset — control of the Strait — without substantial US concessions.

Still, it’s easy to see why the president might be attracted to the prospect of negotiations. You need a way out, because many of your options are unappealing.

It may escalate the war in its current form — focusing U.S. fire on Iranian assets around the Strait — but there is no guarantee that this will sufficiently reduce Tehran’s capabilities to make shipping safe.

It may decide to send ground troops. But that would mean crossing a political Rubicon that would recall the endless wars that Trump criticized.

The TACO option—and a declaration of victory, whether real or not—seems attractive. But pulling back would leave U.S. allies in the Gulf who opposed the war exposed to an angry and emboldened Iran. Ending the war without securing control of highly enriched uranium reserves could allow the country to move towards a nuclear weapon in the future and would undermine Trump’s main justification for the conflict.

Presidents often face crises without good options, but few face situations as intractable as the one Trump created for himself in Iran.