Ali Vaez He is one of the most cited analysts on Iran and its nuclear program. He was born and raised in the Persian country. He currently lives in Geneva, where he directs the department on Iran from the International Crisis Group think tank. He participated as a technical consultant in the negotiations that concluded in the 2015 nuclear deal (known as JCPOA) between the ayatollah regime and five Western countries, led by the United States of America. Barack Obama. Previously he worked on the nuclear and iranian missiles at the Federation of American Scientists and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.
He answers EL PERIÓDICO by phone to unravel the complex political and military framework of Iran and its response to the war launched by Israel and the United States on February 28.
Can the United States and Israel win this war?
Operationally, tactically, and militarily, the United States and Israel could win this war. The question is whether they would be able to translate that victory into stable strategic gains. And that’s where I think they have a blind spot: they don’t really understand where Iranian society is today. They can win the short-term war, the tactical war, but not necessarily the strategic war. They can win every battle and still lose the war, because they would not be able to convert those victories into political achievements. And that would require a strong Iranian middle class, capable of holding the country together.
There is talk of possible negotiations. But one of the leaders who could carry it out was Ali Larijani, who was killed in an Israeli bombing. Was he the person to lead them?
I wouldn’t say he was a savior figure, but he had been elevated as a pragmatic politician, with experience within the system and its security apparatus, to help the regime weather this storm.
You have to understand that this is the oldest nation-state in the world
But his image is also associated with hard lines and repression.
Yes. He was a key figure in the establishment political. And, to varying degrees, almost all leaders in similar positions believe in repression as an instrument to preserve their power. That does not absolve him of responsibility. But after having held very high positions for so long—as speaker of Parliament and in national security—he had become more pragmatic.
Does eliminating figures like this make a political solution difficult?
Yes. The more leaders who could still be talked to are eliminated to bring this war to a reasonable end, the more the Revolutionary Guard is strengthened, which wants to continue until the last drop of blood.
What percentage of the Iranian population supports the regime?
It may be around 10% or 15% of Iranian society. The rest have long sought profound change, but the regime has consistently resisted or thwarted any attempt at meaningful reform.
So, the majority of society is against the regime?
Yes. Among that 80% or 85% of society that opposes the regime there are, yes, very different visions about the political future they would like. Some want the restoration of the monarchy; others prefer another republican and secular system. There is no clear leadership or consensus on what formula might work.
And the ethnic divisions? There is a lot of talk about them.
I don’t think you can analyze Iran primarily in ethnic terms, because those lines cut through all other categories. There are Kurds who support the regime and Kurds who oppose it. There are Balochs who support him and others who reject him. So I don’t think anything definitive can be said in that sense. Approximately 30% of the country is Azeri, about 10% is Kurdish and about 5% is Baloch. The Persians would be around 40%, 45% or maybe 50%. It is a country clearly made up of a mosaic of ethnicities and confessions.
Although the regime has very little social support, those who support it are really willing to fight for it. They are willing to do whatever it takes to ensure their survival.
There has been much speculation about the possibility of arming the Kurds to fight the regime. But other analysts say it is not such a simple matter, because most Kurds feel Iranian. Is that so?
Yes. I would say that the separatist elements within the Kurdish minority are an absolute minority. That’s why they face enormous obstacles: we are literally talking about a few thousand people. That can create problems for a central government, but I don’t think it will fundamentally change the situation.
Protesters wave Iranian flags while at a rally in support of the new supreme leader in Enghelab Square, central Tehran. / Iranian Supreme Leader’s Office/ DPA
Then they wouldn’t be a deal breaker.
Exact. Furthermore, among the majority of the Iranian population there is a strong rejection of any idea of the disintegration of the country. It must be understood that this is the oldest nation-state in the world, the first country that had a national identity and that has maintained it over several millennia. Iranians are very protective of that identity. That is why separatist movements have always faced enormous difficulties and have never been particularly popular.
And in the current context of war?
Under current circumstances, the quickest way to turn the population against the war effort and cause a closing of ranks around the homeland would be precisely to promote separatist movements. That’s why I don’t think they have a real chance of success at this point, unless the central authority collapses.
When you say “they have no real chance,” what exactly do you mean?
Because these separatist movements have no serious chance of succeeding unless the central authority collapses. And that would require Israel and the United States to continue to weaken the political leadership and state institutions to the point that the central government would no longer be able to project power throughout the country.
Do you then see a civil war as possible? And, more generally, what do you think the outcome of this war could be?
Yes, I think a civil war could happen, but only if central authority collapses. That would require Israel and the United States to continue to weaken the political leadership and state institutions in such a way that the Government would no longer be able to exercise control at the national level. But that would open up a whole series of much bigger problems: a country of 92 million people falling apart, with consequences that would go far beyond Iran’s borders.
How long will the war last?
Israel and the United States do not have exactly the same ultimate goals. And as things stand today, I fear this may drag on: the risks and costs will continue to rise for both sides.
What objectives do Israel and the United States have? Do they match?
They have different objectives. Israel wants the complete neutralization of its historical adversary, what it requires is the collapse of the State, they do not want a soft landing. The US is not clear, they are improvising. Trump would take an exit ramp, the problem is that the Iranian regime, increasingly cornered, believes that it has not done enough damage. Although they have taken the economy hostage, and put pressure on neighbors, they have not yet created intolerable grief. That’s why I think they will continue.
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