Interview with Stratis Aggelis
It cannot ignore its red lines, Eitan Samir, director of the Begin Sadat Center (BESA) and professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv’s Bar Ilan University, told Vima, estimating that its escalation is likely despite Donald Trump’s persistent reports of progress in talks between the US and Iran. Professor Shamir has served as head of the strategic doctrine department in the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office.
Q- Are the “talks” between the US and Iran a smoke screen for further military escalation?
AP- Yes, it is definitely possible. It would fit with Trump’s overall negotiating tactic of keeping all options open while maintaining strong pressure on the opponent. In this sense, talks are not an alternative to military action, but work alongside it. We are seeing a significant buildup of US forces in the region, including Marines and paratroopers.
This suggests a two-pronged strategy: Diplomacy supported by credible military preparedness. If Washington concludes that the talks are not yielding the desired result, forces will be in a position to rapidly escalate. In this sense, the diplomatic route may function in part as a smoke screen, keeping all military possibilities open.
Q-What is Israel’s role in these talks and what are its red lines?
AP- Israel has no official, direct role in the talks – the US is leading this process. But Israel remains an important, if indirect, player. President Trump is listening carefully to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s positions, but he is also influenced by important partners such as Saudi Arabia, which according to recent reports has hardened its stance on Iran.
Israel has clear and firm red lines. First of all, to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Limit uranium enrichment levels, ensure mechanisms of thorough verification with inspections. Second, it seeks to drastically curtail the ballistic missile program, particularly long-range and high-precision systems. Third, it demands an end to support for the proxy network (Hamas, Hezbollah, etc.) that is an integral part of Iran’s strategy of regional encirclement (of Israel).
Q- Could Netanyahu be ousted by Trump if the US president decides he wants a way out of the war?
AP- Yes, at least on an official level. If the US decides to pursue a diplomatic “way out”, it is in a position to do so on its own. But sidelining Israel carries significant risks. Israel retains the ability to act unilaterally, especially on the nuclear issue, and any deal that does not address its core concerns would increase the chances of independent Israeli action. Washington is leading, but it cannot ignore Israel’s red lines, because to do so would potentially undermine the stability that such an agreement aims for.
Q- Is Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf a target or is he someone who could tolerate Israel and make a deal?
AP- Ghalibaf is very much a product of the Iranian regime, rather than an alternative to it. A former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, then mayor of Tehran, he has long been part of the security establishment and political elite, combining military credentials with pragmatic political experience. From the Israeli side the issue has less to do with personalities and more to do with behavior. As long as Ghalibaf operates within the framework of his regime’s core politics (nuclear program, missile development, proxy support), he will be considered part of the problem, not a partner for any meaningful agreement. If he advocated substantial changes to the above, there might be room for engagement, but for now there is little indication of such a change in attitude.
Q- After four weeks of war, Iran maintains the ability to hit Israeli cities with missiles. Does this surprise you? Was there a design mistake?
AP-It doesn’t surprise me at all. Iran has been preparing for this scenario for many years. It seems that the original plan called for a barrage of 100-200 missiles per day. Thanks to the Israeli and American operations they were able to launch only 60-70 in the initial phase and since then the rate has decreased to 10-15 missiles per day against Israel. Before the war there were estimates that the Iranian arsenal had about 2,500 missiles. They invested in the dispersion of forces and the decentralization of command structures. However, the strategic effect is limited. Although there were some successful strikes, Iran failed to cause significant damage to critical infrastructure. And this is largely due to the effectiveness of Israel’s multi-layered air defenses and American support.
ER- It seems that Israel, with the invasion of Lebanon and the plan for a “security zone” up to the Litani river, is preparing for another war of attrition with Hezbollah. How long will it last and how will it end?
AP- There are some similarities between the fronts in Lebanon and Iran. In both cases, Israel can use military power to reduce the threat and create better conditions for a political solution, but it cannot itself create the political solution. In Iran, this raises the question of regime change or even a major shift in regime behavior. In Lebanon, the question is whether the Lebanese state has the will and ability to regain control of its territory and dismantle Hezbollah’s independent military infrastructure. Consequently, Israel’s strategy will continue to rely on sustained military pressure, both from the air and on the ground, in order to weaken Hezbollah as much as possible, even if it cannot eliminate it completely.
In Jerusalem, they hope that the weakening of Iran and Hezbollah will boost the confidence of the Lebanese government and army to confront Hezbollah more seriously. If that doesn’t happen, Israel may find itself in a protracted war of attrition to keep Hezbollah off the border and prevent it from regaining its strength. How long (the war of attrition) will last depends less on Israel’s military endurance which is important, and more on whether a credible political apparatus emerges on the Lebanese side. Without it (the mechanism) the conflict will continue for a long time, with Israel seeking not a decisive end, but an acceptable level of deterrence.
Q- Is the complete annexation of the West Bank considered possible after the end of the war with Iran? And what will happen in Gaza?
AP- I do not believe that full annexation of the West Bank is a likely outcome. Neither the Trump administration nor the Israeli government appears to have any genuine interest in such a move at this stage. For Washington, annexation would provoke significant regional and international backlash, complicating its broader strategic goals. For Israel, annexation appears in political rhetoric, especially as elections approach, but there does not appear to be any concrete intention to implement it in the near future. More importantly, the US and Israel want to promote a regional realignment after the war, strengthening relations with important Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia. Annexation would be a major obstacle to this process, as it would be very difficult for those countries to accept the normalization of relations under such conditions. For this reason I believe that annexation is not seriously on the table.
In Gaza the situation is even more complicated. When the war with Iran subsides, attention will likely return to Gaza, but any movement forward will depend on the central issue, which is Hamas’s military capabilities. As long as Hamas maintains its weaponry and the ability to govern it is hard to see how any political or reconstruction plan, American or otherwise, could go forward. Perhaps attempts will be made to develop alternative governance or reconstruction zones, possibly in Israeli-controlled areas near the Egyptian border, as a sort of pilot program. But extending such arrangements to the wider Gaza Strip, where Hamas remains entrenched and where most of the population lives, would pose a much greater challenge.
Eitan Samir is director of the Begin Sadat Center (BESA) and professor of Political Science at Bar Ilan University in Tel Aviv.
