When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled Iran as supreme leader, he had the final say on everything: war, peace and any negotiations with the United States. His son and successor does not occupy that place so absolutely.
Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, the heir, has become an almost invisible figure. Since being named leader in March, he has not appeared in public or had his voice broadcast. Those who actually call the shots today on issues of security, war and diplomacy are a group of Revolutionary Guard generals and figures aligned with them — a hard core with combat experience and a lot of political weight.
“Mojtaba is running the country as if he were president of a board of directors,” says Abdolreza Davari, a politician who was a special advisor to former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and knows the new leader. “He relies heavily on his advisors, and decisions are made collectively. The generals are that council,” he says, in a telephone interview from Tehran.
The design of this new power structure in Iran is based on testimonies from six senior government officials, two former members of the public sector, two members of the Revolutionary Guard, a senior cleric who knows the behind-the-scenes of the system and three people close to Mojtaba Khamenei. Nine other sources linked to the Guard and the government also described the chain of command. All requested anonymity because they dealt with sensitive state matters.
Mojtaba was chosen as the new supreme leader by a council of high-ranking clerics shortly after the American and Israeli bombing of the compound where he lived with his family on February 28. The attack killed his father, his wife and his son. Since then, he has lived in hiding, under tight security and with extremely restricted access. Surrounded by doctors, he treats injuries caused by air strikes.
Guard generals and high-ranking officials avoid visiting him, for fear of being tracked by Israel and attracting a new attack. President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is a cardiologist, and the Minister of Health participate directly in care.
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Despite his serious injuries, Mojtaba remains lucid and active, say four authorities with access to medical information. He underwent three surgeries on one of his legs and is awaiting the placement of a prosthesis. He also underwent surgery on one of his hands and is gradually regaining mobility. The face and lips suffered deep burns, making it difficult to speak. At some point, he must still undergo plastic surgery.
According to these sources, the new leader has so far refused to record videos or audio precisely so as not to appear weakened in his first public appearance. Instead, it issued written statements, published on the internet and read on state TV.
Communication with him is analogue and slow: handwritten messages, in sealed envelopes, pass from hand to hand through a chain of trusted messengers, crossing main and secondary roads, by car or motorbike, until reaching the hideout. The answers come back the same way.
This combination of security risk, physical limitations and difficulty in access meant that Mojtaba delegated a large part of the decisions to the generals — at least for now. Reformist and ultraconservative currents continue to participate in political discussions, but analysts point out that the new leader’s personal ties with the Guard, since the time of the Iran-Iraq war, have consolidated the weight of the military in running the country.
From the outside, American President Donald Trump sells the narrative that the war and the death of successive layers of the Iranian political and security elite mean a “regime change”, with new “more reasonable” leaders. In practice, however, the Islamic Republic remains standing. What has changed is that power has become even more concentrated in a hard-line military apparatus, while the broader influence of the clergy is shrinking.
The President of Parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — former Guard general and now the main interlocutor with the US in Pakistan — stated in a televised statement that the American proposal for a nuclear agreement and a peace plan, as well as the Iranian response, were submitted to Mojtaba Khamenei, and that the summit took his opinion into account before deciding.
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The strength of the Guard
Created to protect the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Revolutionary Guard accumulated power year after year: in important political positions, in relevant parts of the economy, in command of intelligence and in alliances with armed groups in the region that share hostility towards the West and Israel.
Under the elder Khamenei, however, the generals still had to respect the word of a single religious leader, who was also the supreme head of the armed forces. He strengthened the Guard over decades, but always maintained control at the last level.
The death of Khamenei Sr. on the first day of the war opened a void and, with it, an opportunity. The Guard quickly sided with Mojtaba in the succession dispute and played a decisive role in his selection as Iran’s third supreme leader.
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Today, the group has several strength centers. The commander in chief is Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi. General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, recently chosen to head the Supreme National Security Council, is another historic member of the Guard, from the toughest wing. General Yahya Rahim Safavi has served for years as the main military advisor to both the old and new leaders.
“Mojtaba is not ‘supreme’ in practice; he may be a leader on paper, but he does not have the same weight as his father”, summarizes Ali Vaez, director for Iran at the International Crisis Group, with extensive experience in the country. “He is dependent on the Revolutionary Guard: he owes them his position and the very survival of the system.”
According to sources heard, the generals view the war against the USA and Israel as an existential threat to the regime. After five weeks of heavy fighting, they believe they have contained the worst of the risk. And, at key decision-making moments, they are the ones who define the strategy and use of resources.
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On the external front, they were responsible for closing the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic, affecting the heart of global oil trade. Internally, they used the political balance of the war to isolate rivals. The president-elect and his cabinet were instructed to take care of only the domestic agenda — keeping food, fuel and basic services functioning — while foreign policy and the theater of war remain in the hands of the Guard.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who led nuclear talks with Washington before the escalation, lost his role. Ghalibaf took the lead in negotiations with the Americans, representing the hard line.
On the other side, Mojtaba Khamenei accompanies but rarely confronts the generals, according to people familiar with the meetings.
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It was the Guard itself that designed the missile offensive against Israel and Gulf countries, in addition to the strategy of closing the strait. It was also the group that endorsed a temporary ceasefire and discreet negotiations with the United States. To speak with Vice President JD Vance in Islamabad, the generals called on Ghalibaf, one of their own. For the first time, several Guard officers officially sat at the negotiating table with the Americans.
People close to Mojtaba say that this posture of deference has two main reasons: the lack of political and religious background to impose himself like his father — who had accumulated decades of leadership — and the deep personal connection with the Guard, since his youth.
At age 17, he enlisted as a volunteer in the Iran-Iraq war and was sent to the Habib Battalion, a Guard unit. Combat experience consolidated friendships that spanned decades. Many of these colleagues today occupy key positions in the military and intelligence structure.
After the war, Mojtaba completed seminary studies and achieved the title of ayatollah. On a day-to-day basis, he worked within his father’s compound, helping to coordinate military and intelligence operations — a role that only strengthened his ties with generals and security chiefs.
Splits and internal disputes
Despite the predominance of the military, Iranian politics continues to be marked by multiple centers of power and internal conflicts. The system was designed like this: with parallel bodies, overlapping responsibilities and space for disputes between factions. Open discussions between politicians and military personnel, sometimes in harsh tones, are nothing new. Pezeshkian and Araghchi, for example, maintain seats on the National Security Council.
Today, however, the voice of the generals prevails — and, so far, there are no signs of a rupture between them.
Last Tuesday, when Iranian and US delegations were preparing for a second round of talks in Islamabad, the Guard decided to pull the handbrake. Tension had been growing for days: one wing defended continuing to speak with Vice President Vance, another considered it unacceptable to negotiate while Trump maintained the naval blockade of the country. Around 27 Iranian ships had already been blocked when trying to enter or leave national ports.
On the American side, Trump raised the tone on social media, saying he would force Iran to accept all his conditions and threatening to bomb plants and bridges if Tehran did not reach an agreement. The US then seized two Iranian ships — which, according to sources, was seen by the generals as a direct violation of the ceasefire.
Vahidi, the commander in chief, and other top officials argued that the talks had lost their meaning: for them, the blockade showed that Trump wanted to impose surrender, not negotiate. Pezeshkian and Araghchi disagreed. The president insisted on the brutal costs of the war, which the government estimates at around $300 billion, and the urgency of easing sanctions to finance reconstruction. There was also debate about how far Iran should stretch the rope in closing the Strait of Hormuz.
In this clash, the generals won. The negotiations foundered.
Trump extended the ceasefire but maintained the blockade, saying he was waiting until Iran’s “fractured leaders” come up with their own peace proposal. The next chapter is unpredictable. It is unclear whether the Guard will accept enough concessions on the nuclear program — such as freezing enrichment and divesting about 1,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium — to make room for a lasting deal.
At the most radical end of the political spectrum, an ultra-hardline group rejects any type of concession, convinced that if Iran continues the war, it will end up defeating Israel and the United States. At night, his supporters fill the streets in demonstrations, waving flags and promising to “give their blood” for the Islamic Republic. When Araghchi published that the strait would be reopened, he was attacked online by activists from that camp, who accused the negotiating team of “betraying the people”.
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