Withdrawal of US troops from Germany poses a challenge for Europe

The departure of 5,000 US troops from Germany is just the tip of the iceberg of the challenges Europe faces in terms of defense

Hardly a week goes by without there being some new dispute between the Trump administration and Europe.

But in a year that has seen a major dispute over US President Donald Trump threatening annexation and disagreements over aid to Ukraine, the most pressing challenge facing Europe is the current transatlantic divide over NATO.

Trump that the US will withdraw 5,000 – and probably many more – soldiers stationed in Germany, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized the way the US handled the conflict with Iran, saying that Tehran had humiliated Washington.

Donald Trump also criticized Spain and Italy for not helping the US campaign against Iran. Asked if he would consider withdrawing US troops from those countries, Trump replied: “Probably… look, why wouldn’t I? Italy hasn’t helped us at all and Spain has been horrible, absolutely horrible.”

Spain has denied the US military permission to use its bases or airspace for missions or attacks related to the conflict. Trump’s criticism of Italy comes despite his prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, being a key ally.

Trump has long complained that the US is unfairly bearing the burden when it comes to Western security, having once singled out European economic powerhouse Germany as a “delinquent” on the issue. The partial US withdrawal is yet another chapter in this saga, but one that highlights larger problems.

As U.S. willingness to prop up European security erodes — and the Russian threat grows — Germany, the United Kingdom and France are vowing to usher in a new era of spending. But they have a mountain to climb and little time to do it.

US changes priorities

“If we want to maintain the transatlantic line, we have to reinforce the European pillar within NATO,” said German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius on Saturday, after Trump spoke of troop withdrawal.

Pistorius suggested the reduction was expected, calling it “predictable”.

Similarly, Merz told German broadcaster ARD on Sunday that there is “no link” between the friction with Trump and the reduction of US troops, according to a Reuters translation of the interview.

Thousands of American troops remain in Germany, although levels are a fraction of what they once were.

As of December 2025, 36,436 active-duty US military personnel are stationed in Germany, according to US Department of Defense data. At the height of the Cold War, around 250,000 active soldiers were based in what was then West Germany.

The “umbrella” has been removed, despite Russia continuing to be a threat – and the latest US measure “underlines the need for Europe to invest more in defense”, NATO spokeswoman Allison Hart said on Saturday.

Washington intends to focus on challenges “where only American power can play a decisive role” in Asia and its own hemisphere, according to a senior Pentagon official, . This requires “much greater efforts on the part of our allies to step forward and assume primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense,” Colby added.

From the U.S. perspective, he said, “there is nothing anti-European about this vision. On the contrary, it reflects hope and, indeed, confidence in Europe’s ability to act substantially and vigorously.”

Some Europeans see the situation differently – as a loss of solidarity and a common goal – and a striking example of US unilateralism.

“The biggest threat to the transatlantic community is not its external enemies, but the ongoing disintegration of our alliance,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Saturday. “We all have to do whatever it takes to reverse this disastrous trend.”

Reversing the trend requires increased defense spending in most NATO members, a resurgence in weapons production, investment in new technologies and deeper collaboration.

Under current plans, Europe’s annual defense spending is expected to almost double by 2030, reaching around $750 billion.

But using that money sensibly also requires a different mindset. When it comes to defense, governments jealously guard national preferences, so there has been a historic lack of collaboration in production and procurement.

Smaller production runs mean equipment like the German Leopard battle tank costs much more than its North American equivalent, analysts say. The US produces a main battle tank; Europe produces a dozen.

The collapse of a Franco-German project to build a new generation of fighter jets is an example of irreconcilable national interests. Amid constant disputes over the leadership of the project, the CEO of French aircraft manufacturer Dassault, Eric Trappier, about his neighbor: “If they want to do it alone, let them do it alone.”

There is another challenge as Europe moves away from US military equipment. The European Union wants at least half of Member States’ defense spending to remain within the EU by 2030.

The logic is simple: you can’t develop your own skills if you’re buying off-the-shelf equipment elsewhere. Historically, almost 80% of acquisitions have been made outside the zone, mainly in the US.

Managing this transition without creating new vulnerabilities will be a huge challenge, one that is already causing headaches for Europe amid an increase in US consumption of weapons and ammunition in the war against Iran, both by its own forces and by its Gulf allies.

The Missile Gap

The shortage of missile defense systems is especially acute – an area in which Europe is already weak. Analysts describe a rate of consumption of missile defense interceptors such as Patriots and THAADs in the Gulf conflict, with the US poised to send Gulf allies more such weapons worth several billion dollars.

Notably, in addition to the reduction of troops in Germany, the Pentagon stated that it would no longer send, as planned, a battalion of Long-Range Fires equipped with Tomahawk and hypersonic missiles.

European manufacturers produce various types of missile interceptors, but not at scale and especially not those capable of countering advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. They do not offer “a single complete replacement for U.S. systems,” according to a recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

More co-production would mitigate the crisis, but as the CSIS report noted, this “requires a degree of transatlantic trust and prioritization that may not already exist.”

Therein lies Europe’s dilemma. The quick path to rearmament goes through the US, but it requires mutual trust and consistency.

The slower path requires Europe to spend more, overcome a fragmented industrial structure and try to assess whether Washington’s current priorities are a passing phase or a new order.

There are signs of progress, with the UK heavily involved in building a European Defense identity despite Brexit, and a growing series of joint projects between defense companies and Ukraine.

Companies such as Saab in Sweden, Germany’s Rheinmetall and BAE in the United Kingdom have record-breaking order books.

Sweden and Finland, which recently joined NATO, quickly joined the alliance.

But sharing sovereignty to accelerate Europe’s self-defense capability remains the Holy Grail.