The public image of friendship or at least good harmony between the Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Russian president, has been occupying headlines, official meetings and grandiose statements for years about a alleged strategic alliance against the West. But behind this photograph, according to several European experts, hides a deeply unequal relationship where China gains power and Russia loses autonomy at high speed. Friendship forced by interest in the first case and necessity in the second.
One of the most compelling analyzes is signed by historian Martin Wagner, a specialist in Chinese-Russian relations. His conclusion is that “in the Chinese interpretation there are at most two world powers, and Russia is a secondary regional power,” in published statements.
The phrase sums up the quiet geopolitical change that is accelerating since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Four years after the start of the war, Moscow depends economically, technologically and commercially on Beijing much more than during the Cold War.
Russia is filled with Chinese cars and products imported from Beijing
The transformation is already visible even in Russian everyday life. In cities like Saint Petersburg or Moscow, Chinese cars have quickly occupied the space left by European brands and Japanese after Western sanctions.
Models from manufacturers such as Haval, BAIC or Jaecoo increasingly dominate Russian streets. “The Chinese sell absolutely everything here,” explains a Russian student quoted in the same article by Welt. “Even many supposedly Russian products are Chinese,” he adds.
Dependency is not limited to domestic consumption. According to Chinese businessman Zhang Yong, based in Western Siberia, Russia already imports mining machinery, hydraulic systems and tunnel boring machines from China that it previously bought from Germany or the US. “Russia cannot make this by itself”resume.
From Soviet superpower to “China’s gas station”
For Wagner, the war in Ukraine has definitively consolidated Russia as a junior partner in the bilateral relationship. “Russia has become China’s gas station,” says the German historian.
The expression reflects an increasingly evident economic reality: Moscow depends on selling cheap raw materials to Beijing while losing access to European markets. China buys Russian oil and gas at deep discounts and, at the same time, fills the void left by Western companies that left Russia after the sanctions.
Bilateral trade between both countries practically doubled between 2021 and 2024. But Wagner insists that Beijing is not acting out of ideological friendship or strategic solidarity. “They did not help a friend in need. They took advantage of the Russian emergency situation for their own benefit.”
China’s great objective: a weak but useful Russia
You wish your friends the best, so this idea of a weak but useful Russia does not fit the concept of friendship. Pure interest. It is one of the most interesting points of the analysis: the idea that China also does not want a complete Russian victory in Ukraine. According to Wagner, Beijing needs to keep Russia weakened and dependent to continue expanding its own global influence.
“If Putin achieves his goals, Russia would regain strength against China and could reduce its dependence,” he explains. But at the same time, a complete Russian defeat is also of no interest to Beijing because Moscow would once again get closer economically to the West. That’s why, The ideal scenario for China would be one, just what is happening. “The war must continue,” summarizes the historian.
Central Asia and the silent Chinese advance
While Russia concentrates military and economic resources in Ukraine, China is quietly expanding its commercial and political power throughout Central Asia, a region historically considered an area of Russian influence.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Since 2019, Beijing has become the main trading partner of many Central Asian countries. Furthermore, much of the trade between Russia and China is already carried out directly in yuan, another sign of the growing financial imbalance between the two countries.
Chinese banks also do not show much interest in the Russian ruble, weakened by sanctions and war.
The historic fear between Russia and China still exists
Despite the current diplomatic closeness, Wagner recalls that the relationship between both countries was never really an alliance of equals. China has historically feared Russian expansionism since the 19th centurywhen the Tsarist Empire annexed extensive Chinese territories in the Far East. And in Russia there continues to be concern about the Chinese demographic and economic weight in sparsely populated regions of the Russian Far East. “The ‘yellow peril’ narrative is still alive,” explains the historian.
Even so, Moscow still retains some important strategic cards. Russia remains a top nuclear power and its armed forces have recent military experience in conflicts such as Georgia, Chechnya, Syria and Ukraine. China, on the other hand, has not participated directly in large-scale wars for decades.
But even there the difference begins to narrow. Beijing is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and already has a conventional military capability superior to Russia’s in many areas.
