The generated discussions about electoral gains and losses — either for , who would have influenced the decision, or for . But from the perspective of public security, the problem goes beyond the two factions: as there is no single solution, combating crime requires understanding its different types.
Knowing international evidence is essential for any well-designed public policy. However, before copying Medellín, or Chicago, we need to ask whether the characteristics of crime faced in those places exist here and whether we have the institutional conditions to replicate the recipe. The diagnosis involves two questions: where does the crime money come from and what is the level of organization of the groups involved. That’s the argument.
For example, if the problem is a , hotspot policing makes sense. Sometimes, they are crimes committed impulsively and out of opportunity. For these cases, programs that combine cognitive behavioral therapy with cash transfers may be promising. This was in an experiment at .
The study was carried out with high-risk men: involved in theft, selling money, violent conflicts or in a vulnerable situation associated with these activities. Therefore, they were not members of factions with command and territory. The program sought to strengthen self-control, planning and a sense of belonging to society. When participants received only money or only therapy, they had good initial results, which were not sustained in the long term. It was the combination of the two strategies that sustained the effects for the longest time.
If it is associated with local rivalries and retaliations, the solution involves people with credibility in the territory, mediation between rival groups and programs aimed at self-control. When there is a , with and , sometimes in collusion with agents of the State itself, the scale changes. In this case, arresting the top drug seller may even become a success number in police statistics, but it hardly changes the power structure or causes great damage to the faction.
In contexts of greater territorial control, armed groups tend to face less direct competition and to diversify their economic activities. This is the result obtained by and other researchers in a study on territorial criminal enterprises in . In other words, less confrontation does not necessarily mean more public authority. In some cases, it may indicate that the criminal group has consolidated power in a certain region and started to explore markets with less resistance. A security policy that measures success only by the drop in shootings between criminals could leave the power structure of these groups untouched.
The evidence reinforces that each type of crime and each motivation requires its own diagnosis. A person who faces mental health issues and commits impulsive crimes is not in the same situation as someone involved in crimes that require planning, relationships with governments or coordination with other factions.
This diagnostic requirement should also guide the discussion about the American classification of and. Although it appears to be a strong response, there are reasons to question its usefulness. Lincoln Gakiya, a prosecutor who has worked in the area for decades, states that, by removing investigations from the scope of cooperation with the DEA, the measure would shift this cooperation to the area of defense and intelligence. , complaints and criminal proceedings.
PCC and CV do not need to be classified as terrorists to be effectively combated. What is shocking is that, in a country where territorial control in Rio, the structure of the country and the border routes follow different logics, we are still so susceptible to solutions that seem magical.
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