It is of utmost importance to discuss the consequences of a presidential victory by right-wing forces led by the dauphin of Bolsonaros. The debate divides respectable analysts of national politics.
Some think that, in Planalto, he would represent a clear threat to the democratic order, by reviving the coup that culminated with his father in Papudinha. Others believe there is no strong evidence that the more moderate son will follow in his father’s footsteps.
In other words, what is being debated is the possibility of the extreme right adapting to the representative system and, in government, not trying to bury it. What is known about the subject does not support definitive conclusions. In the past, fascism came to power through free elections and quickly crushed representative institutions and individual freedoms. At present, there are examples for all tastes.
In Russia and Eastern European countries, democracy has barely taken hold, having been replaced by clearly autocratic regimes. In Western Europe, the growth of extreme right-wing democracy was enough to transform it into a political power. It has become the second electoral force in most countries and participates in governing coalitions in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. But only in Belgium do extremist leaders — Giorgia Meloni and Bart de Wever — head their respective governments. In Italy, since the first victory in 1994, the radical right has adapted to the rules of representative democracy: when it did not win elections, it accepted defeat.
The great current unknown is the USA, where it is furiously attacking the Constitution, while the checks and balances to its authoritarian commitment are put to the test. What happens there could define the fate of democracy in America and around the world.
In Brazil, the hypothesis according to which, if victorious, Bolsonarism will respect the rules of the game is based on two demanding conditions.
The first is that democratic institutions, having prevailed over the will of the coup plotters, maintain the same capacity to impose limits on a ruler with an authoritarian appetite. In other words, the press is expected not to bend; that organized society puts pressure on the Powers; that governors resist; that the majority of Congress stops the most harmful projects; that the command of the Armed Forces does not succumb to authoritarian temptations; and that the Supreme Court can defend the electoral process and punish the conspirators. It is worth remembering that at least one of these requirements does not exist today: our high court is going through an undeniable process of delegitimization.
The second condition is that Flávio Bolsonaro, by belief or calculation, is not only more moderate than the family patriarch, but has the strength to frame his father and the leaders who fuel extremism on the streets and online. Despite his milder statements, the promise of pardon for the coup plotters does not indicate an effective commitment to respecting democratic rules.
It may be that Brazil follows the path taken by Italy. This will be much more likely if, instead of betting on the conversion of Bolsonarism, the Democrats increase the cost of extremism.
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