INTERVIEW || In a war like the one the US and Israel started with Iran almost a month ago, the asymmetries between one side and the other define a lot, starting with the fact that “not losing can be strategically equivalent to winning”, says Houssein al-Malla, PhD researcher at the German Institute for Global and Regional Studies (GIGA), in Hamburg. In an interview with CNN, the analyst specialized in conflict studies explains that, at this moment, “we are witnessing a recalibration of pressure under the guise of diplomacy” and defines what is at stake for everyone involved, including the Gulf monarchies – “a weakened Iran is useful, [mas] A cornered Iran is dangerous”
Even for those who are following this war with some attention, it has become difficult to understand how the conflict is unfolding behind the scenes. Since the beginning of the week, we have had one side, the US, * and the other side, Tehran, denying any type of conversation. And even as it announced a five-day pause in attacks, the Trump administration continues . How should we look at all this?
What we’re seeing at this moment is less a contradiction and more a familiar pattern of strategic signaling from both sides: Trump’s announcement of “productive talks” and a five-day pause appears designed to project de-escalation and diplomatic momentum, particularly by limiting attacks on energy infrastructure, while Iran’s categorical denial reflects its need to avoid appearing coerced or involved. [em negociações] under pressure.
Should we, therefore, believe that negotiations are actually taking place?
This is a classic case of talk without dialogue, where diplomacy unfolds through intermediaries while publicly both sides maintain their distance. In reality, there are probably active indirect channels, even if official narratives suggest otherwise.
At the same time, the continuation of military operations elsewhere makes it clear that this is not a ceasefire but a tactical pause inserted into an ongoing confrontation. What we are witnessing is not a transition to peace, but a recalibration of pressure under the guise of diplomacy.
And what results can this disguised diplomacy generate, taking into account how the war began and how it has unfolded?
In the short term, the most likely trajectory is a continuation of this two-way dynamic of sustained military pressure combined with side-channel negotiations, with a persistent risk of miscalculation and escalation. These temporary pauses have less to do with ending the conflict and more with managing its pace and signaling openness without ceding negotiating power.
Both sides are effectively testing the limits of escalation while keeping diplomatic options open – which creates a highly unstable balance in which even small incidents can trigger a broader escalation.
Both the US and Israel have invoked the idea of this war, although Donald Trump has since backtracked on that objective – and, this week, declared without support that . What could happen in Iran in the context of this conflict?
For the Iranian regime, the perspective is more complex and should not be reduced to binary scenarios of survival vs. collapse. External pressure and internal tension, including protests, repression and potential elite fragmentation, are clearly increasing, but these conditions do not automatically translate into regime collapse.
“For the Iranian regime, the perspective should not be reduced to binary scenarios of survival vs. collapse”, highlights Houssein al-Malla. “The regime does not need to defeat its adversaries completely to claim success. Survival itself becomes a powerful narrative, especially if it maintains the ability to impose costs through regional proxies or by threatening global energy flows.” photo Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images
Authoritarian systems are often more resilient than they appear in times of crisis, particularly when external threats allow them to justify internal consolidation. At the same time, resilience should not be confused with stability.
What tends to emerge in such situations is a slow erosion of the regime’s capacity and legitimacy, rather than a sudden rupture. The most likely trajectory is one of cumulative weakening, in which each successive crisis undermines the foundations of the system without immediately unraveling it, until the balance eventually shifts.
There is a valid argument that for the other side, claiming victory is more complicated. Would you say that we are facing a war that is impossible for either party to win?
Excellent question, and the answer is inherently complex, as it depends on how we define victory. If victory means a clear and decisive outcome that fundamentally alters the balance of power, then this is a war for either side. If, on the other hand, victory is defined more broadly, as achieving partial goals or maintaining one’s position, then all three actors can plausibly claim success.
This is what makes this conflict so paradoxical: strategically inconclusive, but rhetorically winnable for everyone. In many ways, this is a war where perception matters as much as results on the battlefield.
How could Israel, seen as , and the US declare victory over their adversary?
For Israel, the most realistic version of victory is not regime change in Tehran, but rather the sustained degradation of Iran’s military capabilities and its regional deterrence network. Weakening, rather than eliminating, is already a form of success in this context.
For the United States, victory would mean translating military pressure into political concessions, particularly on the nuclear and missile fronts, while avoiding a broader regional war. However, both results remain uncertain. Tactical gains do not necessarily translate into strategic resolution, and there is always the risk of overestimating the power of coercion. This is a conflict in which military success can coexist with political impasse.
Iran, on the other hand, operates under a very different logic of victory. The regime does not need to defeat its opponents completely to claim success. Survival itself becomes a powerful narrative, especially if it retains the ability to impose costs through regional proxies or by threatening . Resistance, in this sense, is reformulated as triumph.
As long as Iran cannot be decisively subdued, it can argue that it has withstood the combined pressure of stronger adversaries. In asymmetric conflicts, not losing can be strategically equivalent to winning.
How and when could this war then come to an end?
Taken together, all of this points to a broader conclusion: this is probably an unwinnable war if victory is understood as a clean, uncontested end state. What is much more likely is a scenario in which each side claims enough to avoid admitting defeat, while the underlying conflict remains unresolved.
Wars like this do not end with decisive victories, but with complex narratives of success built on incomplete results. The danger is that a war that everyone claims to have won is often a war that has not actually ended.
“What Riyadh and others likely support is sustained influence over Iran, not endless war. They are comfortable with a level of pressure that keeps Iran in check, but deeply uncomfortable with a conflict that expands beyond control.” photo Getty Images
What about the Gulf States, geopolitically, what are their interests and what do they have to gain – or lose – from all this? A few hours ago there were reports that the ongoing, for example… How can we frame this?
This is a really important question, because the Gulf States are, in many ways, the actors with the most to lose and . Their main interest is stability, both in terms of regime security and the uninterrupted flow of energy exports – only they are operating in the context of a crisis that directly threatens both aspects. This creates a fundamental tension in their position: they benefit from pressure on Iran, but fear the consequences of escalation. The Gulf countries want a controlled weakening of Iran that does not turn into a regional war. Its ideal result is pressure without collapse and conflict without contagion.
Hence the Saudi request that the war not end now?
From a strategic perspective, Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) stand to gain from weakening Iran’s military capabilities and its network of regional influence. A weakened Iran is a less assertive Iran, which directly improves its security environment. But there is a fine line here. A weakened Iran is useful. A cornered Iran is dangerous.
When Tehran begins to feel existentially threatened, incentives turn to escalation, including attacks on energy infrastructure and shipping lanes vital to Gulf economies. The same geography that gives the Gulf its wealth also makes it uniquely vulnerable. The Gulf benefits from pressure on Iran, but not from a conflict that turns its own economic model into a battlefield.
And what would be the position of the Gulf monarchies if, in fact, this proves to be a protracted conflict that doesn’t really end?
What Riyadh and others likely support is sustained influence over Iran, not endless war. They are comfortable with a level of pressure that keeps Iran in check, but deeply uncomfortable with a conflict that expands beyond control. This is a calibrated tension strategy. The Gulf does not want a resolution at any price, but it also cannot afford unlimited escalation. What they are effectively trying to manage is the pace and scope of the conflict, not its direct continuation.
If the conflict stabilizes into a new prolonged and unresolved phase, the Gulf monarchies will likely intensify their protective measures. They will continue to rely on US security guarantees, while maintaining diplomatic channels with Tehran to reduce the risk of direct repercussions.
This two-track approach reflects a broader reality: Gulf monarchies are in no position to shape the outcome, only to manage their exposure to it. In this sense, the Gulf is preparing less for victory and more for resistance.
* hours after this interview, the Trump administration sent one to Iran, which rejected the “excessive proposals” and guaranteed that it will not “allow Trump’s USA to dictate the time for the end of the war.”
