Until he set foot on the o Donald Trump next Thursday, a lot could have happened in , but it is rather unlikely that the conflict will have ended. The US president’s visit to China, originally planned for the end of March, was postponed by a month and a half with the expectation from the American side that by then the Tehran regime would have capitulated, which Washington did not achieve either through military or diplomatic means.
The visit of the Iranian foreign minister Abbas Aragchi in China last week raised hopes of a successful mediation by Beijing to end the impasse. Trump’s rhetorical outbursts, the dual blockade (Iranian and American) and the exchange of fire between the American armada and the Iranian coastal defense lowered the bar of expectations. Why would Trump want the strengthening of China’s role in the international arena, when he can simultaneously strangle Iran and damage the economy of the biggest trade rival of the USA?
The oil
Cultivating the image of a “quiet power”, China is offering its “good services” to end the Gulf conflict, which has upended the global oil market with an impact on its own economy. Before the war, China absorbed 80%-90% of Iran’s crude oil exports, covering 12%-14% of its needs. Another 4%-5% of Chinese crude needs were covered by imports from Venezuela. Beijing was the country’s biggest customer until the overthrow of the government Maduro from , who now practically control the cannulas.
Thanks to the diversification of suppliers, increased imports from Russia, the rapid rise of green energy and its large strategic reserves, China has been able to weather the first major shocks since the Gulf War. However, the prolongation of the deadlock in the Straits of Hormuz, through which Iraqi and – to a large extent – Saudi oil was also transported to China (covering 14%-20% of its needs), is gradually limiting the possibilities of maneuvering of the Chinese economy. The problem is not exclusively quantitative. Cheap oil from Iran and Venezuela has been one of the main drivers of China’s ever-growing economy, which is challenging American hegemony.
In April, in a goodwill gesture ahead of Trump’s visit, Beijing slightly increased imports of US oil, which still do not cover more than 2% of its needs. How much this move affected the US president’s mood will be seen in action next week. Behind the pomp and pageantry, the trade war will continue alongside the projections of military power in the Pacific.
Iran’s resistance to the US-Israeli offensive exposed US military weaknesses and rattled its relations with traditional allies. Arab regimes are having second thoughts about the credibility of American protectors who failed to prevent massive Iranian strikes on their infrastructure. Beijing sees challenges and opportunities, while accusing Washington of practicing the law of the jungle, and avoiding personal attacks against Trump.
“Lime Giant”
Chinese analysts liken the US to a “lame giant”, which, having failed to quickly impose itself on a regional power like Iran, would find it extremely difficult to militarily crush China, which is a global power. “Trump wanted to come here with the air of victory, to use the collapse of Iran as leverage on China, but now he is in a difficult position and it will be difficult to project the same arrogance.” the retired colonel told the New York Times Yue Gangwho often appears in international media unofficially giving the stamp of China’s defense policy.
Beijing denies it continues to bolster Iran’s defenses with weapons system shipments. But for China, the survival of the Iranian regime seems, for now, to be a one-way street. Not only because it would thus secure a major energy source, but also because, through the privileged relationship with Tehran, it would continue to project geopolitical power in Central Asia and the Middle East. Against Chinese influence, the US is promoting an economic axis that will start from India and end in the Eastern Mediterranean through Arab countries and Israel, bypassing Iran.
As the war enters its third month, several Western analysts believe that Trump is treating the conflict like poker and the Iranians like chess. Trump confirms this when he states that he has “all the papers”. Historically it has been proven that the Chinese prefer chess.
In theory, when sitting at the same table presidents Trump and Xi Jinping, they should agree on the type of game and the rules. In practice, it is most likely that the American president will continue to see cards on the felt, while the Chinese will continue to see pawns on the chessboard. Perhaps the most important question is what cards Trump will play and what pawns Xi will sacrifice in this game.
