At a time of European skepticism and contempt, the optimism of Anu Bradford (Finland, 1975) comforts. This professor of Law and International Organizations at Columbia University has been researching for more than two decades how European Union has used the regulation to project itself to the world as a “superpower”. To describe this global influence, he coined the influential concept of the “effect Brussels“.
The Finnish academic has also published Digital empires (Shackleton Books, 2024), a powerful essay on the growing weight that technology plays in the geopoliticsand has now produced the documentary Why Europe Matters (Why Europe matters). Bradford attends to EL PERIÓDICO within the framework of the I International Meeting for Digital Rights.
He maintains that the EU is a superpower. On what front?
Europeans can export their values because European regulations reflect those values: greater consumer protection and greater protection of our fundamental right to privacy. If these standards are also adopted by companies outside Europe, a global expansion of European rights occurs. Furthermore, this levels the playing field and creates an economic advantage for European companies. If those regulations are also followed in other markets, instead of at an economic disadvantage, European companies compete there on a level playing field.
If our standards are adopted by companies outside Europe, there is a global expansion of European rights
Do you think that sometimes we do not appreciate this strategic advantage and we self-flagellate too much?
I think some still don’t see that this has happened. European policymakers have internalized this recently, and I think that gave them confidence to move forward with the digital agenda. For example, many AI regulations were passed with the hope and understanding that they would likely have effects outside the EU.
The European Commission is postponing regulations like the Artificial Intelligence Act before they can even be implemented. Does that weaken the ‘Brussels effect’?
It sends more confusing signals to the world about your commitment to those values and laws. I am not against simplification. Technology regulation affects a sector that changes very quickly, so we must be agile and adjust the rules if they do not meet their objectives. But I distinguish between simplifying and eroding essential protections. That would be dangerous, especially when it is justified with the false narrative that deregulation is the path to European competitiveness and that it is regulation that holds European companies back.
“Deregulation is not the path to European competitiveness”
Is that narrative gaining too much weight?
Yes, and that distracts us from the key reforms we should be working on: integrating the digital single market, building the capital markets union and reforming bankruptcy laws. All of that should be at the center of the agenda. Too much political energy is being spent on the deregulation agenda right now.
Anu Bradford, author, law professor and international expert in technology regulation / Mobile World Capital Barcelona
Large European companies such as Airbus, Siemens, ASML or Mistral AI they are pressing to Brussels asking for changes to accelerate technological development. It is clear that being a regulatory superpower is not enough.
No, it’s not enough. Some people have misunderstood the idea of regulatory power, as if by itself it is enough and we can be complacent. We cannot regulate Russia out of Ukraine; we also need hard power.
What should the EU do?
We must ensure that our startups can finance their growth and scale in Europe. To do this, we need to eliminate the fragmented regulatory framework that still maintains internal barriers and slows that growth. All these reforms must advance in parallel with the protection of our rights. That is why I reject the idea that we have to choose between protecting rights or building the other pillars of the technological system. Perhaps we have focused too much only on protecting rights. It has not been a bad policy, but I would have liked to see the same ambition in others that directly help European companies, including small startups.
Perhaps we have focused too much only on protecting rights
Can we have a unified market if we continue to have political fragmentation?
It is much better to have one AI law than 27 different national laws. Regulation is not the problem; fragmented regulation, yes. It also occurs when there is uneven application. Directives, such as the one on online copyright, give more leeway to each government to implement it in its own way, and that creates more fragmentation. We must move from directives to regulations and make it clear that they must be applied uniformly. Member States should not be able to add their own national variations.
Does it happen often?
This happens a lot in Europe. Member States are not always fully loyal when implementing European regulation: they add national variations or additional rules. The Commission is the guardian of the treaties and must act against Member States that do not comply with European regulations. This is about protecting the single market and really harnessing its power: 450 million consumers and a rich market. We should not be at a disadvantage if we manage to take advantage of that scale.
The jurist Anu Bradford (right), in conversation with the journalist Esther Paniagua (left). / Mobile World Capital Barcelona
Is Brussels deregulation a victory for Donald Trump and Big Tech?
The European agenda of simplification or deregulation responds to external and internal pressures. The external one comes from the Trump administration and its main objective has been the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA). However, the core of the simplification agenda has rather been the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Artificial Intelligence Act. That’s why I think it would be wrong to attribute everything to a capitulation to Trump.
And the internal one?
It is partially connected to the external one. Europeans feel more vulnerable in the face of a more volatile geopolitical environment: we cannot trust the protection of the US, trade wars are costing us a lot and we are concerned about our technological dependence on Silicon Valley. It is in this scenario that European competitiveness takes on a new meaning. I agree with much of Mario Draghi’s report, which contained many good ideas, such as greater market integration and the capital markets union, but I disagree that I am much more favorable to such digital regulations and see them less as an obstacle to European competitiveness. That report provided an intellectual basis for European companies to begin opposing regulation. And I welcome the criticism of fragmentation and the lack of deep capital markets, but I am concerned about a misguided narrative about the relationship between digital laws and our competitiveness.
We should not be afraid to be forceful, including deciding that we do not need some of these services in Europe
The EU has pioneering digital regulations, but many voices regret the lack of their rigorous application. What can Brussels do to force someone like Elon Musk, the richest man in the world, to follow the rules?
Musk should not offer his products in Europe if he does not comply. And I don’t think that the European quality of life will worsen if X becomes unavailable. It does not make Europeans smarter, kinder, more compassionate or more resilient. It is a distraction, it consumes our attention and maintains a lot of hate speech and misinformation. So we shouldn’t be afraid to use the most forceful remedies, including deciding that perhaps we don’t need some of these services in our market.
It is more difficult with other technologies that Europe does need, for example to fly fighter planes or to access US intelligence. There are infrastructures on which hospitals and banks depend. That is why we must distinguish between technologies that are harmful to Europeans and essential ones.
In Digital empires He talks about three models: that of the US, that of China and that of the EU. However, is the American one increasingly like Chinese digital authoritarianism?
The US is playing Beijing’s game. Under Trump, the Government has become very interventionist: it is taking stakes in technology companies and Nvidia has asked for a share of the profits as a condition of allowing it to do business in China. I am also concerned about the sharp deterioration of democracy in the US, it is a huge concern. Washington has been a beacon of democracy, a promoter of freedom and democratic values. It has been an imperfect society, but I always felt that we fought the same battles for the protection of rights and democracy. Now we have to wonder if we are still committed to the same ideas.
US President Donald Trump, accompanied by magnates Elon Musk (Tesla, SpaceX, X) and Jensen Huang (Nvidia) on his arrival in China. / Brendan Smialowski / AFP
Do you think then that the ‘Beijing effect’ can displace the ‘Brussels effect’?
Given the appeal of authoritarianism in many parts of the world, we cannot take democracy for granted, even in our own societies. We have to defend it internally and work harder to demonstrate externally that it can deliver results. China has no difficulties in applying its rules. If the Chinese Communist Party wants something to happen, it happens. I don’t believe in that model, but we must ensure that democratic governments are also capable of passing laws and enforcing them. Because it is not democracy if we cannot apply those laws against the technological giants.
Given the appeal of authoritarianism in many parts of the world, we cannot take democracy for granted, even in our own societies.
We don’t want to do it the Chinese way. We must do it our way: with transparency, open debate, accountability of politicians, and determination to enforce laws passed by democratic institutions. We must be able to apply them to consolidate and protect those rights. That is the great challenge of democracies. And it is much more complex.
It is this efficiency that increasingly arouses fascination with the authoritarian.
With freedom of expression, for example, China has it easier: if it doesn’t like a speech, it bans it. In a democracy, however, we are committed to that right and are concerned about both falling short and going too far. That is why transparency is so important: knowing how technology companies moderate content and how our policy makers respond. Only then can we have a genuine democratic conversation about whether we are comfortable with the behavior of technology companies and the way our governments control them.
I spoke with a colleague who has lived in China for two decades about the lack of privacy of its state surveillance model and he told me that in Europe we are “too obsessed” with individual rights. It’s another mentality.
Yes, I have spoken to many Chinese who say they like to live in a safe society. They can leave the office in the middle of the night without fear because there are surveillance cameras everywhere. It’s a very different way of thinking.
There are also many developing countries that say they can’t afford to worry about rights because they have huge crime rates and need digital development. For them, the protection of the fundamental right to privacy is not among their main concerns. They need food, shelter and security.
They see privacy as a European luxury concern, something that Europe can afford because it has societies so developed that it has already advanced in the hierarchy of needs to a point where privacy matters. In the meantime, they’re still dealing with the basics. I think we need to be aware of this when we promote our model in societies that have deeper challenges than ours.
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