Why Vietnam is building islands to stop China

Vietnam is accelerating the construction of artificial islands to challenge Chinese dominance in the South China Sea, one of the most disputed and strategic maritime areas in the world.

Over the past four years, Hanoi has built a set of heavily militarized artificial islands in the Spratlys, an archipelago also claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

According to satellite images analyzed by and experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Vietnam transformed 21 rock formations and reefs – many of which were previously submerged at high tide – in fortified bases with ports, ammunition depots, defensive trenches and an airstrip over three kilometers long, capable of receiving large military aircraft.

These infrastructures allow Hanoi to project military power into the Spratlys and are a direct response to China’s own campaign to build and fortify artificial islands, which began more than a decade ago. In total, Vietnam created more than 2,200 hectares of new maritime territorycompared to the approximately 4,000 hectares built by China.

Disputes between the two countries in the region are not new. During the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese forces forcibly seized several Vietnamese-controlled reefs and islets, both in the Spratly and Paracel, in clashes that left dozens of Vietnamese dead. In 2012, China also took control of Scarborough Atoll, taking it from the Philippines and increasing fears among neighboring countries of a new Chinese offensive.

Beijing has been pressuring Hanoi to stop oil and gas exploration in maritime areas that it considers part of its territorial waters, in addition to restricting the access of Vietnamese fishermen to the Paracel area.

How to build an artificial island

The Vietnamese process of creating islands has intensified since 2021, with the arrival of large dredgers in the Spratly. These vessels collect sand, rock and coral from the seabed to create new surfaces, then reinforced with concrete and stone walls that protect them from erosion.

Within a few years, small formations like Sand Cay were transformed into complex military bases, with fortified ports, warehouses and administrative buildings. The largest of these structures, Barque Canada Reef, now has some of Vietnam’s most sophisticated military infrastructure in the South China Sea.

China has used its own artificial islands to keep ships and planes in prolonged operation without needing to return to the mainland, in addition to installing vast radar and surveillance systems that allow it to monitor all maritime traffic in the region. Experts tell the WSJ that they believe Vietnam will follow a similar strategy, albeit with a more defensive posture.

Despite the rapid progress of the works, the Vietnamese government avoids publicly commenting on its actions, limiting itself to reaffirming the defense of its sovereignty. Beijing, for its part, said in February that it opposes construction activities on illegally occupied islands and reefs, but has not stopped Vietnamese dredgers from operating.

According to researcher Khang Vu, from Boston College, this difference in treatment is explained by the more complex relationship between the two communist regimes. China is one of the biggest investors in Vietnamwith thousands of factories installed in the country that export to the United States and other markets that have imposed higher tariffs on Beijing. Both governments also maintain discreet diplomatic channels to resolve incidents and minimize tensions.

The role of the USA

While Washington has harshly criticized China’s construction of islands, it has not spoken out against Vietnamese expansion — an attitude that, according to analysts, reflects the North American interest in strengthening regional powers capable of containing Chinese influence.

A State Department spokesperson limited himself to calling for “claims in the South China Sea to be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law.”

Still, few experts believe that Vietnam, with naval and air forces far inferior to those of China, can effectively defend its new posts in the event of open conflict. Other countries in the region have preferred to ignore the pace of Vietnamese militarization, considering it a proportional response to the Chinese threat.

As Khang Vu summarizes, “China’s island building poses a direct threat to economic interests and freedom of navigation in Southeast Asia; Vietnam has no capacity — nor intention — to do the same.”