In this year’s presidential race, all but one position is already filled. () will seek his fourth term with (), the surprise element of 2022 who remains on the ticket. On the other side, () is still looking for a name to be the vice president. Among those who have emerged in recent weeks is that of a Catholic woman, close to federal deputy Simone Marquetto (PP-SP).
This April, the São Paulo leadership released a statement stating that they were working intensely to make Marquetto viable as vice-president on Flávio’s ticket. Ciro Nogueira and Guilherme Derrite would be some of those involved in the venture. Among the main arguments that would accredit Marquetto to the position is precisely the fact that she is Catholic and has access to this religious field. On her social networks, she appears praying the rosary, carrying the image of Our Lady of Aparecida, at masses alongside bishops and priests and kissing the hand of the .
The movement found an echo in the PL. The internal diagnosis is that with the evangelicals, the ground has been gained. Not with Catholics. The leader of the party in the Chamber himself, , was explicit in: “We will need to change tactics with the Catholics because we are losing ground with them. We can change this relationship, including with the vice president.”
The numbers explain the urgency. The last released in April, showed that among Catholic voters Lula leads with 43% of voting intentions against 30% for Flávio. Among evangelicals, the situation is reversed and Flávio opens up the advantage. It turns out, as Sóstenes well diagnosed, that the strategy for entering the field is different from the evangelical one. And that’s where Flávio still skates.
With evangelicals, it operates through church leaders. It seeks support and dialogue with pastors from the largest denominations and attracts candidates from these groups to its own legislative frameworks.
In the Catholic field, this strategy encounters a structural obstacle. The Church is more hierarchical and centralized than evangelical denominations, and its institutional leadership is not available for negotiation. The CNBB keeps its distance and progressive bishops are refractory. What remains and now emerges as a strategy are separate intermediaries: parliamentarians with a presence in charismatic communities, devout digital influencers, priests with a relevant media presence.
Flávio’s strategy for approaching Catholics seems to move in this direction. Since it is not possible to operate as it is done in the field, presence in the Catholic field will involve appealing to influencers and leaders of digital Catholicism. The deputy highlighted by the PL to build these bridges is symptomatic of this commitment. This is Eros Biondini, party parliamentarian, Catholic singer, member of the Charismatic Renewal and a name with a strong presence on the networks. It is because of this media and emotional Catholicism, and not because of institutional Catholicism, that Flávio intends to compete in this field with Lula.
The Brazilian progressive camp may be wary of this solution. After all, it points to a path very distant from that which brought Catholics closer to the political left in the last quarter of the 20th century. Liberation Theology, which supported part of this process, was a mass phenomenon rooted in the very structure of the Church, in base communities, in social pastorals. Nothing to do with digital influencers acting autonomously, outside of any institutional hierarchy.
It turns out that the Church has changed. He himself has been paying increasing attention to so-called digital missionaries. , the first internet saint, as already shown, is symptomatic of this process. This is where Flávio’s strategy can work. With Catholic vice or without it.
