Abiy Ahmed
Less than 4 years after the end of the Tigray war, Ethiopia and Eritrea are once again experiencing a moment of tension that threatens to reignite the armed conflict.
The histories of Eritrea and Ethiopia have long been closely linked. Once part of Ethiopia, Eritrea began an armed struggle for independence in 1961, which resulted in its secession in 1993 following a referendum. But since Eritrea’s independence, relations between the two countries have been through ups and downsincluding a devastating war from 1998 to 2000, followed by two decades of mutual isolation.
The two countries appeared to have reconciled when Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki accepted peace overtures from newly inaugurated Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018. Unfortunately, by early 2026, this peace began to seem like a distant memory with the resurgence of prospect of a return to war.
What is the history of conflicts between the two countries?
A border dispute in 1998 triggered a bloody war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, countries that share a border of more than 1000 km. The war began when Eritrean troops invaded Badme, a disputed city in Tigray, the northernmost region of Ethiopia. It became one of the deadliest conflicts in contemporary Africa, with tens of thousands of deaths.
The war ended in June 2000 with the Algiers Agreement. The agreement established a ceasefire, ordered the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces and created a border commission to legally demarcate the disputed border. However, the fact that the borders have not yet been demarcated means that tensions may persist.
At the time, Ethiopia was governed by a four-party political coalition, created and dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The coalition, known as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, governed the country between 1991 and 2018.
Eritrea’s ruling party was historically an ally of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. This changed because the ally was in command of Ethiopia when it won the war.
O resentment never disappeared.
Tensions have been rising from time to time. The border is heavily militarized, with a no man’s land between the two armies serving as a security corridor.
Abiy Ahmed’s peace proposals towards Eritrea in 2018 and the resulting peace agreement were praised by many in the international community and locally. Most recognize that countries have more in common than differences.
But the agreement did not lead to greater political and economic cooperation. Just created an alliance of convenience short-lived. Here’s why.
Following Abiy’s rise to power in April 2018, Tigrinya’s rule over Ethiopia came to an end. In November 2020, the Tigray war began. Eritrea blamed the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) for its own economic and political weakness and isolation, and supported Abiy against the Tigrins.
The Tigray war became a devastating conflictwith allegations of war crimes committed by all parties – but the majority were attributed to Eritrean troops.
The prospect of a new war in the ever-unstable Horn of Africa would threaten a region already devastated by the ongoing conflict in Sudan.
What is driving the current tensions?
Despite the 2018 peace agreement between the countries, disagreements persist. The biggest of them is the access to the sea.
Eritrea’s independence in 2000 gave it control of a long stretch of coastline on the Red Sea, but left populous Ethiopia as a landlocked country. Addis Ababa now depends on the goodwill of its neighbors, such as Djibouti, for access to ports.
In recent years, especially since the end of the Tigray war in 2022, Abiy has raised the issue of access to the sea, citing Eritrea and Somaliland as possible paths. It argues that Ethiopia has a historic right to the Eritrean port of Assab, which it is just 60 km from the Ethiopian border.
In fact, many Ethiopians consider the loss of access to the sea a national tragedy. Abiy’s call for a diplomatic solution that guarantees Ethiopia access to the sea has galvanized domestic support.
This angered Eritreawhich does not accept the Ethiopian claim on Assab.
The second point of friction is the documented support from Eritrea to various Ethiopian rebel organizations and movements in recent periods. This support was already evident before the 2018 peace agreement. There are also new allegations of Eritrean military support for the Tigrinic and other rebellions in Amhara and Oromia, especially since 2022.
The main dividing line, however, emerged after the Tigray War. Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopia during the war. When the conflict ended, Eritrea complained of not been consulted or invited for Ethiopia to participate in the peace agreement.
Ethiopia now claims that Eritrea has switched sides. After the end of the Tigray War and the installation of a provisional administration in Mekelle, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government were unable to resolve their differences. And Eritrea reached out to its former enemy, the TPLF.
This angered Ethiopia and heightened cross-border tensions.
Is war inevitable?
In October 2025, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos wrote to the United Nations accusing Eritrea of new incursions in Ethiopian territory and the movement of its troops to Tigray.
He alleged that Eritrea’s collusion with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has become “more evident in recent months” and also accused Eritrea of “finance, mobilize and direct armed groups” in the Amhara region of Ethiopia, where militiamen known as Fano have been fighting the federal government.
In February 2026, Ethiopia also wrote to Eritrea demanding the withdrawal of its troops from its territory. Eritrea responded that the allegations were “patently false and fabricated.”
The danger of a return to war is real. And time is running out for diplomatic and political efforts to mitigate tensions. In its letter to Eritrea, Ethiopia stated that if remained open to dialogue. Addis Ababa has also demonstrated a willingness to participate in broader negotiations, including maritime issues and potential access to the sea through the port of Assab.
A dialogue could address Ethiopia’s desire for reliable maritime access and Eritrea’s fears of an attack on its sovereignty.
Diplomacy could now prevent the outbreak of a conflict. Just three years after the Tigray war – and with the war in Sudan about to enter its fourth year – the region can’t afford another. Based in Addis Ababa, the African Union, in particular, needs to invite both countries to the negotiating table before time runs out.
