Just one day after the start of the war, on February 28, Iraqi militias aligned with Tehran claimed responsibility for several actions against North American bases in Iraq and other points in the region. The next day, another close ally of Iran, the Lebanese group Hezbollah, launched an attack on Israel in retaliation for the . But a week after the start of hostilities, one of Tehran’s most prominent regional partners remains silent: Yemen’s Houthis.
The caution shown by the group so far, according to country analysts, responds to fear of new reprisals and domestic considerations. However, if the conflict drags on, many anticipate that they will be pushed to intervene, even in a calibrated way, out of religious duty, ideological commitment, reputation and loyalty to their allies. Among the actions they could take is the resumption of the blockade of maritime traffic through the Red Sea.
“For now, the Houthis are choosing caution: they remain in their own barracks and are waiting for the dust to settle,” observes Hisham al Omeisy, senior adviser for Yemen at the European Peace Institute. “It is a smart and strategic stance,” he believes, but “things could change on the ground and could push them to join the fight.”
In speeches since the start of the US-Israeli offensive, Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Huthi has portrayed the war as an aggression against all Muslims aimed at bringing Israel to dominance in the region. He has also highlighted that Iranian capabilities and its internal cohesion are sufficient for it to face the challenge. And although he has stated that his group “has its hands on the trigger” and is prepared to intervene militarily, for now he has avoided announcing specific support operations.
One of the reasons for this caution is that they already know the devastation that can be inflicted by the president of the United States, Donald Trump, who only two months after returning to the White House, in January 2025, . In just 50 days, it carried out 339 attacks that killed 238 civilians, according to the Yemen Data Project (YDP) platform, and the fire only ceased with a truce in May 2025 that could collapse if the Houthis act again.
Israel has also bombed Yemen on a large scale in response to much more limited Houthi attacks on its territory. Last year, , but in just 41 attacks it also took the lives of more than 600 civilians, according to the YDP, while hitting civilian infrastructure such as oil depots, power plants and factories. “They do not want to attract to them the firepower that is currently in the region,” says Al Omeisy, since “it would be very devastating and extremely costly.”
Domestically, absorbing another campaign of attacks would put the Houthis in a delicate position. The group controls approximately a third of the territory of Yemen (which concentrates three quarters of the population), and from there it fights intermittently against the country’s Government, recognized by the international community and supported by Saudi Arabia. But it is already struggling to pay salaries and maintain basic services in the areas under its control, where foreign aid has been affected by its reclassification as a terrorist organization by the United States last year. And, furthermore, his rivals on the Government side.
“The Houthis do not want to waste their military capacity at the height of the conflict, especially because they need this weaponry for the planned confrontation against the Yemeni government,” notes Al Omeisy. “Plunging headlong into the conflict with Iran would be costly and could make them lose their reserves and also territory if the other side takes advantage of it,” he warns.
The expert considers that the group’s lack of immediate response also reflects the complex balance it must maintain between its hard wing and its more moderate faction. “There is more and more pressure among their own ranks to take action,” he points out. “The problem is at the top, which is divided over the path forward and the strategy: while the toughest sectors press to act, the more moderate voices warn that it would be suicidal,” he adds.
The Red Sea, in the target
However, in the weeks prior to the offensive against Iran, and in anticipation of the possible attack, the Houthis adopted shock actions such as redistributing missile launchers and distributing military arsenals to areas under their control, according to Yemen analysts. If it enters the scene, especially if Tehran requires it, most experts believe that it is most likely that, at least initially, the group will measure its actions to avoid strong retaliation.
“If the war drags on and pressure increases within the country, it is more likely that they will intervene with a calibrated escalation,” anticipates Mohamed al Basha, an expert on Yemen and author of the risk report. Basha Report. “They would likely start with actions they can control and frame politically, such as resuming attacks on Israeli-linked Red Sea shipping or limited drone and missile launches, rather than a direct campaign against Gulf states or US bases,” he observes.
The Houthi attacks on the Bab el Mandeb Strait, the southern access to the Red Sea and through which over 15% of the volume of global maritime trade transits, have so far reduced traffic through this strategic sea route by more than half. A resumption of attacks on this route, in addition, would now have an even greater impact because it would coincide with , the only route of entry and exit to the Persian Gulf and one of the most important routes in the world for the export of oil and gas.
“Resuming their attacks on trafficking in the Red Sea would strengthen their control over this area and has already given them results in the past,” notes Al Omeisy. “But we could also see something else: the Houthis have already tried to launch drones into Tel Aviv,” he points out. “It wasn’t particularly successful or very effective, but it did have symbolic value,” he slips, “so they could try it again.”
