Washington, D.C. Response
Petros Kasfikis
From the war in to , American diplomacy returns to the same basic question: how does a war end in ? During the first discussions in Washington about the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a phrase from General David Petraeus was destined to remain in history. While the military staffs were focusing on how to overthrow the Saddam HusseinPetraeus reportedly posed a more complicated question, saying “tell me how this story ends.”
Twenty-three years later, Petraeus’ question still reverberates in the American capital. After successive wars, hundreds of graves of dead and caravans of refugees, the Middle East is again at war without a clear time horizon, a clear goal and above all without an exit strategy.
In Washington, the military side of the operation is clearly described. The goal is to systematically dismantle the main pillars of Iranian military power. The logic is familiar and involves high-precision strikes against launchers, factories and military installations combined with an ongoing effort to neutralize Revolutionary Guard structures. Militarily, the Pentagon’s assessment is that dismantling these capabilities can be accomplished within a relatively short period of time. But the key question is not what can be destroyed on the battlefield, but what will come next.
Two factors will determine developments
In Washington circles, two factors are increasingly appearing in analyzes of the evolution of the conflict: and available ammunition. Iran has already shown how it intends to respond. Instead of limiting itself to attacks against Israel, it has repeatedly hit US military bases and diplomatic buildings along with energy infrastructure in the Gulf countries. The logic is clear. Increase the cost of the war to the extent that it becomes politically difficult to continue.
He has admitted that he did not expect Iran to target neighboring Arab countries with such intensity. This admission, combined with the fact that the White House had not drawn up an advance plan for the evacuation of the thousands of American citizens in the region, reinforces the assessment that Washington was taken by surprise by Tehran’s asymmetric counterattack.
For the US, energy markets are also a critical factor. A sustained rise in oil prices or major turmoil in financial markets could pull the rug from under Trump’s feet. Moreover, it is no secret that the US president closely monitors these indicators.
The second factor that will determine the evolution of the conflict is even more practical because it concerns the stockpiles of weapons. In essence. Iranian drones cost a few tens of thousands of dollars. The interceptor missiles used to shoot them down cost hundreds of thousands. If the conflict turns into a war of attrition, this equation becomes problematic.
Race to run out of supplies
The conflict thus begins to resemble a race for who will exhaust the opponent’s reserves first. Tehran may attempt to force the US and its allies to use large numbers of expensive interceptor missiles for defensive purposes or to destroy launchers and military infrastructure. The problem is that these systems do not exist in unlimited quantities. As the experience of American aid in Ukraine has shown, production times are long and stock replenishment can take months or even years.
The US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth sought to allay these concerns by assuring that the US “they have no shortage of ammunition” and that they are able to continue the business for as long as necessary. However, the US government recently convened a meeting with the largest US defense industries to consider ways to speed up production of missiles and other critical munitions.
At the same time, under Hegseth’s leadership, a broader effort has begun to change the way the Pentagon buys weapons, putting more emphasis on speed of production and the ability to mass-build, bypassing bottlenecks that lead to delays.
Washington’s murky political plan
At the same time, the political side of the conflict remains unclear. The White House insists that the goal of the operations is to weaken Tehran’s military capabilities, not immediate regime change, which, as President Trump said in his opening remarks, he would leave to the Iranian people. In another instance, he left open the possibility of a “Venezuela model” of transition, where part of the existing regime could remain in place provided the new leadership has Washington’s approval.
Of particular interest are the movements around the Kurdish element. The White House was quick to deny reports that US intelligence agencies had reached out to the Kurdish opposition in Iran and the political leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan with the aim of arming fighters to open a ground front inside Iran. But he was forced to confirm that President Trump had telephone contacts with the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan. Officially, the talks were about issues related to the US military base in the region. But there was one detail that raised questions. The president didn’t just talk to the official Kurdish leadership. He also contacted representatives of the opposition. If the issue was really only the security of an American base, then why was it necessary to contact the opposition as well?
The answer was indirectly but clearly given by Trump himself, who admitted that “that would be great” if the Kurds took up arms against the Iranian regime and that he himself would be “absolutely in favor” their.
All this brings back the question of 2003. The military part of a war can be precisely planned. But how a war in the Middle East ends is much more difficult to predict.
