This is not a technical note. That is a fundamental value position. A litmus test that shows how foreign policy is understood in Central Europe: whether as a commitment of trust between allies, or as a two-sided game – for Brussels and for Moscow. Szijjártó’s problem lies not in whether he used a secure phone, but in the fact that his relations with Lavrov and Putin have come to be seen by EU authorities as a security risk.
I remember from my time as ambassador that a significant part of information from EU negotiations was classified. I read the reports from the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs in a secure room at the embassy and was not allowed to copy them.
The ambassadors passed security checks and were aware that they had to count on possible eavesdropping. It is a question of professionalism and loyalty to one’s own state and allies in the EU and NATO. Already after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it became clear that one must be extremely careful in dealing with Russian officials.
Fico’s government prioritizes Russian interests
The political signal of Blanár’s reaction is further strengthened by the fact that at the same time he and Szijjártó refused to join the visit of EU ministers on the anniversary of the massacre in Buča – a symbol of Russian brutality. He also repeated the narrative of Russian propaganda that the war is the result of “the West forbidding negotiations with Putin.” In other words, he once again shifted the responsibility from the aggressor to the victim and her allies.
It is necessary to remember a basic fact that is deliberately lost in this communication: the Russian Federation has all EU member states on the official list of enemy countries. In this context, Szijjártó’s communication with Lavrov is not neutral diplomacy. It is contact with a regime that the EU perceives as an enemy and that is trying to systematically weaken and disintegrate it.
The essence of the case therefore does not lie where the Slovak government situates it. It is not only about Szijjártó. The point is that Fico’s fourth government covers his behavior politically. In fact, it prioritizes the interests of Hungary’s ally and Russia over the interests of the European Union.
This pattern is not new. We have seen it in the blocking of aid to Ukraine, in disputes over sanctions, and in the systematic relativization of Russian aggression. Now it only shows itself in a purer form: as a willingness to justify behavior that EU partners perceive as a security risk.
The gray zone between Budapest and Moscow
Blanar’s statements cannot therefore be read in isolation. They are open supporters of Orbán’s political line – conflict with the European mainstream and maintaining friendly relations with Vladimir Putin’s regime. If the Minister of Foreign Affairs shifts the issue from information leaks to Russia to “dangerous wiretapping” by Western services, he sends a clear signal about who he considers the adversary.
This deepens the already strong mistrust towards the Slovak government in the EU. After all, the partners remember the “private visit” of the Slovak Prime Minister to the Kremlin on December 23, 2024 and the more than two-hour negotiation with Vladimir Putin between six or eight eyes without a Slovak witness. Or the meeting of Smer vice-chairman Ľuboš Blaha with the head of Russian foreign intelligence Sergej Naryshkin.
The consequences are also domestic. The government legitimizes the idea that sovereignty means the right to conduct a parallel policy regardless of the loss of trust with EU partners. The narrative is being normalized that the problem is not Russia, but those who draw attention to its aggression.
That is why the Szijjártó affair resonates more than it might seem. The relationship with it tells about the perception of Slovakia’s direction: whether it will remain part of the area of trust and shared responsibility in the EU, or whether it will move to the gray zone between Budapest and Moscow.
