A day before crossing the Strait of Hormuz, an Indonesian sailor aboard the Al Rayyan posted a photo online of a rainbow crossing the ship’s bow. “When the ship of dreams becomes reality,” he wrote, thanking God for the blessing. Soon after, the liquefied natural gas carrier turned off its transponder and began exiting the Persian Gulf.
The Al Rayyan, loaded with LNG from Qatar, was closely following another gas ship from the emirate, the Fuwairit, which was preparing to cross the strait as part of an agreement between Pakistan and Iran. For the sailors on the second ship, without the same official protection, it served as a guide through a corridor considered one of the most dangerous, they said later.
They slowly entered Iranian-controlled waters, scanning the horizon for other cargo ships, Iranian patrol boats and possible drones. All in silence. Until the signal from the first ship also disappeared. Some crew members began to pray.
A day later, the two reappeared on the other side of the dark crossing, already in the Gulf of Oman. After months of waiting, they headed east.
When attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran began at the end of February, Qatar was one of the first producers to fall into the economic crossfire. Its mega LNG hub and fleet of ships — including some of the most expensive in the world — were suddenly trapped.
Four months of war later, Hormuz remains under Iranian control. Even so, the world’s second largest LNG exporter has once again taken cargo out of the Persian Gulf. To do this, it began using contracting and navigation practices more common in the oil market than in the LNG market — a smaller, more conservative sector, where cargo-by-load tracking has always been part of its reputation for reliability.
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“It’s a battle for freedom of navigation,” says Michelle Wiese Bockmann, an analyst at maritime intelligence firm Windward. “When you look at all these bottlenecks, the basis of global maritime trade is simply gone. We’re seeing more dark crossings and an escalation of risk.”
In May alone, at least four Qatari ships appear to have crossed the strait discreetly, according to tracking data and people familiar with the voyages. It’s barely close to pre-war volume, but a relief for buyers like India and Bangladesh, who had to resort to the spot market to plug the hole, paying double the price of a Qatari cargo. Neighboring Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. (Adnoc) did the same with another group of ships.
The option to cross “in the dark” aims, first and foremost, at the safety of ships and crews passing through Hormuz — a risk that should only truly disappear with a lasting agreement. But it also reflects political and financial pressure on producers like Qatar and neighbors. And it could leave permanent marks on the LNG market, which is becoming less transparent at a time when consumers in Asia are already wondering about the future of a fuel that has gone through two supply crises in just over four years.
This report on the new flow of LNG in the Persian Gulf is based on more than a dozen interviews with brokers operating in the region, company and government executives, sailors and analysts. Everyone spoke on condition of anonymity, due to the sensitivity of the topic. Together, they outline the effort of exporters to adapt to an unprecedented energy crisis — and the impact on those who depend on this trade.
Adnoc and QatarEnergy did not respond to requests for comment.
The first sign of change in a previously fully traceable LNG market — thanks to the specialized nature of ships and terminals — came in 2023, when U.S. sanctions began targeting Russian gas exports.
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Moscow, desperate to transport production from the Arctic LNG 2 project, set up a parallel fleet of ships, copying the model used in oil to serve the world’s largest market: China.
Neither Qatar nor Abu Dhabi are under sanctions. But both learned from the Russians that sailing with a “ghost fleet” can be an emergency solution — even with International Maritime Organization rules requiring the use of AIS transponders, especially on narrow and congested routes.
“It is natural for Gulf LNG producers to try to evade Iranian attacks and adopt shadow fleet practices in the process,” says Saul Kavonic, senior energy analyst at MST Marquee. “This could continue as long as Iran tries to control and threaten passage through the strait, which could last beyond any peace agreement.”
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Last month, Qatar began asking its own or chartered ships to turn off the transponder in the region of Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG export terminal, and repeat the procedure when entering or leaving the Persian Gulf, according to people familiar with the operations. Ships are also advised to cross in pairs, in a kind of mini caravan, for extra safety.
At the same time, captains and teams that are unwilling or unable to face the strait are being replaced. In an important change, the requirement for specific experience is not always maintained for those who enter the position.
This is the case of Al Rayyan, owned by QatarEnergy, according to the Equasis database. Bloomberg tracking data since late 2016 indicates that for about a decade the ship operated primarily out of Ras Laffan. Since February, it has fallen into the center of a historic crisis.
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The ship was docked near the Qatar plant when Iranian missiles hit the region in March, forcing an emergency evacuation and pushing the vessel into open water. More than 20 Filipino crew members remember alarms going off in the early hours of the morning as they ran around the ship.
“You never imagine something like this until you see it with your own eyes,” one wrote online, along with a photo of the Ras Laffan complex in flames after the Iranian attack. “Just an hour after we left, even bigger explosions started, the attacks continued for 3 hours. Our ship was the last to leave the port.”
The crew reported receiving “treats” such as Toblerone chocolates in gratitude. Most still requested repatriation and left the ship soon after.
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Sailors on large LNG ships like the Al Rayyan — two and a half times the length of an American football field and worth hundreds of millions of dollars — are often highly specialized, because of the vessel’s complexity and super-cooled cargo. But this time, the rush spoke louder. The recruiter offered double the salary and no longer required direct experience with LNG.
The candidates were brought together by Captain David B. Sihombing of the recruitment company Savana Charta, which has already assembled Indonesian crews for at least two ships carrying sanctioned LNG to China. He narrowed the group down to 25 selectees. Everyone crammed into a small office in Jakarta early last month to hear a briefing on the risks of the mission — from drone strikes and collisions to the far more common risk of being stranded at sea for months.
The order was clear: if the ship was sent by Hormuz, it would have to “disappear from the map” to avoid becoming a target.
The strategy has already affected some of the most pressured buyers.
In early May, Pakistan got Iran’s approval to receive a shipment from Qatar, vital for a country struggling with power shortages and rotating blackouts. One ship, the Mihzem, was authorized to transit.
But as it approached Hormuz on May 11, the Mihzem turned around and disappeared from tracking systems. Authorities in Islamabad rushed to secure emergency cargo, including in the expensive spot market — until they discovered the maneuver was a distraction. Hours later, a Pakistani official received a call from a sailor on board warning that the ship had already crossed Hormuz safely. Soon after, the signal reappeared, along with confirmation from Qatar that the cargo would arrive later that week.
Qatar is not alone in its dark crossings. At the start of the conflict, Adnoc insisted that ships keep their AIS on, allowing for easy tracking. The captains reacted, advocating following the example of part of the oil market and crossing without notifying other vessels or maritime authorities. By traveling “in the dark”, they argued, the company failed to submit its movements to Tehran, a requirement of Iranian forces.
Adnoc ended up giving in. Under the current procedure, which helps keep the Das Island export terminal operating, captains of ships heading to the Persian Gulf must first stop at the Khor Fakkan anchorage area, east of Hormuz. There, the ship drops anchor — and turns off the AIS.
For the new crew of Al Rayyan, the order to set sail came after the successful crossing of the Mihzem. The ship would cross in complete darkness, they were informed. He had not paid a toll, according to sailors and traders familiar with the route, nor was he covered by an agreement with Iran — but he would travel in pairs with a ship protected by a diplomatic agreement, the Fuwairit, heading to China, Qatar’s main client.
If attacked, the instructions were simple: seek shelter and return.
Sailors clearly remember the moment the ship surfaced safely on the east side of Hormuz. There was relief on board: everyone feared that Tehran would order a return. Only when the Al Rayyan was north of Muscat, beyond the reach of the Iranian navy, was the tracking system turned on again.
On May 23, the ship left the Gulf of Oman for China, the first LNG cargo from Qatar to travel this route since the start of the war. In Jakarta, Savana Charta was already looking for the next volunteers.
© 2026 Bloomberg L.P.
