The volume under direct influence reached R$61 billion during the proposal’s processing in the Legislature, an amount higher than the expected annual budget of 20 Brazilian states.
The information was obtained from a survey of official information from governments and Legislative Assemblies.
on January 14, with a veto on a smaller part of the appropriations changed by Congress to expand the space for parliamentary amendments. At the time, the government also announced the blocking and reallocation of resources that had been incorporated into the calculation during the text’s processing.
Formally, the approved Budget provides for . Parliamentarians, however, had included another R$11.393 billion in discretionary expenses in the calculation, resources originally under the control of the Executive, increasing the reserve under the influence of deputies and senators to around R$61 billion. In January, Planalto vetoed R$393 million of these allocations and reported that it intended to block and redistribute the incorporated additional amount.
The R$61 billion reserved by parliamentarians is almost equivalent to the total budget of the state of Pernambuco, which has planned expenses of R$60.7 billion for 2026. The state’s population is 9 million inhabitants.
Next come Santa Catarina (R$57.93 billion), Pará (R$54.2 billion), Goiás (R$53.4 billion), Ceará (R$48.2 billion) and Mato Grosso (R$40.7 billion).
State budgets include all attribution expenses in the three Powers. Unlike the amendments, which finance specific actions with fragmented execution, they support permanent expenses, such as payroll, pensions, maintenance of the Military Police and state schools.
The comparison shows that these governments manage continuous commitments with volumes lower than the amount currently concentrated under parliamentary influence in the federal Budget.
The contrast between the volume of amendments and local budgets is even more pronounced in states with less fiscal capacity. Roraima will have a budget of R$9.92 billion in 2026, while Amapá (R$12.42 billion) and Acre (R$13.8 billion) are also well below the value concentrated in the amendments. Tocantins and Sergipe are part of the group, alongside Amazonas, Maranhão, Piauí, Espírito Santo, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte, Alagoas and Mato Grosso do Sul.
The advancement of amendments over the last decade is associated with a change in the balance of forces between the Executive and Congress. The process gained strength during the period of impeachment of former president Dilma Rousseff (PT), was deepened with the expansion of mandatory amendments and consolidated itself as a central instrument of political negotiation, especially in moments of government fragility.
For economist and professor at Insper Marcos Mendes, who is a columnist for Sheetthe escalation of amendments reflects recurring conflicts between the Powers. “There was an imbalance in the game of forces at times when the Executive did not have the ability to negotiate with Congress. This occurred during the Dilma Rousseff and Jair Bolsonaro governments. Congress’ response was to change the Constitution to appropriate part of the Budget”, he states.
According to Mendes, although the comparison with state budgets helps to measure the phenomenon, the most relevant impact appears within the federal budget itself. “The amendments represent around 25% of the Union’s discretionary expenses [aquelas de livre uso dos governantes]. It’s an absurdly high percentage. In other countries, when there are amendments, they are no more than 1%”, he says.
The economist assesses that the model compromises the coordination of public policies. “The amendments disrupt federal spending planning. In the case of health, for example, the SUS is an integrated system. When parliamentarians disperse resources without planning, this creates waste”, he states.
Economist Zeina Latif, partner at Gibraltar Consulting, former secretary of Economic Development of São Paulo and former chief economist at XP Investimentos, states that the scale reached by the amendments already produces an effect comparable to that of a structural reform. “If you consider how big this has become, the fiscal impact is equivalent to that of a reform,” he says.
For her, although the comparison with state budgets has educational value, the most appropriate parameter is to observe the weight of the amendments in the Union’s discretionary expenses.
“The government already operates with a very narrow margin. When you disperse resources on a large scale, you reduce the capacity to finance structuring projects and increase inefficiency”, he states.
Zeina assesses that any change will require gradual negotiation. “A government that needs to approve structural reforms cannot, at the same time, drastically reduce amendments. The reduction would have to be gradual and negotiated throughout the mandate.”
If the current trajectory is maintained, he states, the risk falls on the already compressed discretionary space of the Union. “It pushes the fiscal authorities to increasingly difficult levels. The Brazilian State has increasing mandatory expenses. Without margin, the execution of public policies is compromised.”
