But he doesn’t really oppose it. In practice, what it does is support it. It supports it economically, diplomatically and politically. It vetoes efforts to hold Israel accountable and watches this process of Israeli-Jewish expansion and Palestinian shrinking while providing the necessary support for the continuation of this system.
So that was the position of the West. And October 7th and the Gaza genocide are just the latest iteration of the big explosion. Everyone says it’s unacceptable and has to stop. However, as soon as the peak of violence passes, the attention fades again. We in the West often talk about this conflict as if we were just neutral observers. However, to frame it this way is dishonest, because the West does not close its eyes to the situation – it is actively involved in it and has clearly chosen a side in it.
You used the word “genocide”. For a long time, it was also difficult for organizations like the UN to use this term. As a journalist you work with words, so what role do you think language plays in this conflict?
Being precise is very important to me. I don’t like when in the West it is reduced to a kind of rhetorical contest, a battle of words. This side uses this word, this side uses another word, and you’re expected to choose which side you’re on based on what language you’re using.
However, if the use of words is not based on a deep understanding of why you are using them, it does not matter much. It’s shallow. That’s why, for example, in this book I wanted it to show apartheid, but I don’t use the word apartheid myself. It appears only once, in the words of a senior Israeli defense official talking about apartheid roads in the West Bank.
The reason is that if I open the book with words that many readers do not accept, I will not convince them. I only ask them to accept my language. I want them to come open, to look and see things for themselves.
And I believe that when they go through that story, they will understand the reality of apartheid. And whether they then use the word or not is less important to me.
I feel the same way about genocide. If you are a lawyer, judge or diplomat, these words have precise definitions and are very important. Then you have to ask if the situation meets the definition.
And I am convinced that even according to the most conservative interpretation of the definitions of both apartheid and genocide, Israel meets these definitions, in the case of Gaza during genocide and in general towards the Palestinians during apartheid.
Your book takes place in 2012, but the situation has changed a lot since then. How do you think the daily lives of Palestinians have changed after October 7?
It changed differently for different groups of Palestinians. To understand this, you have to understand that Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians is a policy of fragmentation. Apartheid is not applied equally to all Palestinians. Different groups face different restrictions, also to oppose each other and not create unity.
The Palestinians are more than half the population over which Israel rules, and their unity would pose a major threat. Fragmentation is a way to counter this threat. Since October 7th, we have seen different practices towards different groups. In Gaza, it is a genocide, a complete destruction, where the territory has been reduced to rubble and tens of thousands of innocent people have been killed.
On the West Bank, we see significantly increased restrictions on movement. Gates at the exits from the villages, a dramatic increase in travel time, from journeys that took 30 minutes, are now journeys of several hours. In some cases, people slept at checkpoints because they were not allowed to continue.
There was also a huge loss of jobs. The economy of the West Bank is dependent on work in Israel and in the settlements, and most of those jobs disappeared after October 7. Palestinians face serious financial problems.
At the same time, Israel has withheld tax revenues that belong to the Palestinian Authority, which further weakens its functioning. We are seeing a massive increase in violence against Palestinian communities, a slow process of ethnic cleansing, whole communities in the West Bank have ceased to exist, have been driven out by force from the army and settlers.
At the same time, the number of arrests of Palestinians, the use of torture and inhumane conditions in prisons has increased sharply. People come out emaciated, unrecognizable to their families.
How did these changes manifest themselves in Jerusalem and in Israel itself?
In Jerusalem it is again a different set of practices, with a large increase in arrests, many of those arrested being tortured. There are also movement restrictions on access to the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Old City.
Inside Israel you have another set of practices that vary by region. For example, there are Palestinian communities in the Negev that are forced to leave their territories, similar to the West Bank.
At the same time, we are seeing a huge increase in repression against the Palestinian community. People are also arrested for clicking the “like” button on social networks. In the Palestinian community of citizens of Israel, there is a strong fear of expressing political opinions. Overall, Palestinians across the region see this situation as a massive escalation of Israeli oppression.
You said that criticism of Israeli politics was once a minority. Has it changed? We see protests against Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, is society more critical today?
First of all, I’m not Israeli. I am an American journalist living here. The number of people who have truly anti-occupation and anti-apartheid views in Israel is very small. The number of people who take to the streets to protest the abuse of Palestinians in the West Bank is very, very small.
Before October 7, there were large protests against Netanyahu, but they were not related to the Palestinians. These were protests by the secular part of society against what they perceived as a shift towards theocracy.
During the war in Gaza, people took to the streets mainly because of the hostages. Again, this was motivated not by aversion to Palestinian suffering, but by a sense that the state had an obligation to save its own citizens. And today the number of people who are against the war is not large.
Before October 7, many Israeli artists and public figures criticized the government and participated in protests. Today they are much quieter or seem more pro-Israel. What do you think has changed?
I think this points to a certain bubble in which the Israeli leftists live. They see themselves as the good ones, as liberals, democrats, people who stand behind universal values, because they are against theocracy, against right-wing government, against corruption. They think this means that their natural allies are liberals in the West. After October 7, however, this bubble collapsed for many. They realized that they were not seen as allies of the left in Europe or the United States.
Because the question for the Western left is not whether you are against right-wing government or against corruption. The question is: do you oppose genocide, do you oppose apartheid and do you truly believe in the equality of all people regardless of religion or ethnicity?
And here is the problem. Much of the Israeli left does not believe this. There is a small group that does, but the majority do not. People who can fill the streets with tens of thousands of protesters, that is, the center left, often do not believe in true equality between Jews and non-Jews. They believe that Jews should have special privileges that others do not have.
For the Western Left, this position is unacceptable. The Israeli left is ethnocratic in this sense. It is not a universal, democratic position. Many Israeli artists are then shocked when they come abroad and face criticism. They say: I’m on the left, I’m against Netanyahu, why do you criticize me? But what they fail to realize is that their positions are not seen as truly universalistic. And it’s good that they are shocked by this, because it can lead to a reconsideration of their own attitudes.
In Europe, we see an increase in tensions, where criticism of Israel is often labeled as anti-Semitism. At the same time, however, real anti-Semitism is also growing. Where do you think the line is between the two?
I think the line is very clear. Anti-Semitism is discrimination against Jews or hatred against Jews as such.
Criticism of the state of Israel is not. Even if you hate that country, even if you think it commits genocide and apartheid and does evil in the world, it is still not anti-Semitism. It is the same as criticizing the practices of Saudi Arabia. No one will say you are against Muslims.
If you attack a synagogue because it is a Jewish institution, that is anti-Semitism. If you attack, for example, fundraising for the Israeli army, it is an attack on the state of Israel, not on Jews per se.
In the Czech Republic, there was recently an attack in Pardubice on a company connected to the production of weapons for Israel. The attackers called themselves activists, the state called them terrorists. How should we perceive this type of action?
This is a separate issue from antisemitism because there is nothing antisemitic about attacking a weapons manufacturer for Israel if you disagree with how those weapons are used.
The question is rather how we define terrorism. According to the traditional, narrower definition, terrorism is an attack on civilians with the aim of achieving a political effect. This attack on a weapons plant was not an attack on civilians, so it would not fall under this definition.
Of course, states have laws that prohibit violence, sabotage, and similar acts. Activists sometimes consciously choose to break these laws in order to draw attention to an issue and influence public opinion. So the question is whether we want to extend the term terrorism to include such acts.
In my opinion, terrorism laws have been overstretched in recent years and we should stick to a definition that ties it to attacks on civilians.
