Russia takes advantage of crisis in Hormuz and uses access to fertilizers as pressure for support

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz to cargo ships, initially practiced by Iran and later by the United States, ended up becoming a gift for Russia. Around a third of global fertilizer supplies transported by sea pass through the narrow route that connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea. With the route practically interrupted, the country governed by Vladimir Putin emerges as a natural alternative: it is the second largest producer and largest exporter of fertilizers in the world. And these shipments do not pass through Hormuz

Thus, the Kremlin is weaponizing access to these supplies in an attempt to garner support — not only in the Global South, but also in the US and Europe — to ensure the easing of Western sanctions.

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The website The Conversation recalls that, between 2023 and 2025, the Gulf countries, led by Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, supplied 36% of all global exports of urea, the nitrogen fertilizer most used by global agribusiness, in giants such as Brazil, Australia and New Zealand.

In addition to the supply of inputs, buyers also suffer from the effects of higher prices. Urea is made from natural gas, and when gas prices rise – as has been the case since the war escalated – it also becomes more expensive.

An analysis by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) think tank highlights that developing economies are particularly dependent on Russian fertilizers. Since Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western countries have been imposing restrictions on purchases of Russian fertilizers, prompting Moscow to diversify its export routes towards the Global South.

This strategy paid off, says Agathe Demarais, senior researcher in Public Policy at the European think tank. By 2025, the author highlights, Russian companies will supply approximately a quarter of fertilizer imports from agricultural giants such as Brazil and India.

Now, faced with growing fears that disruptions in Hormuz could block fertilizer shipments and trigger a global food crisis, the Kremlin has sensed a new opportunity: In late March, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Alexander Venediktov declared that Moscow is ready to send fertilizers to the Global South.

This “generous offer,” however, comes with a condition: Venediktov suggested that those receiving fertilizer would need to support the development of Russian-led groupings such as BRICS, the defensive-minded Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. “In other words, Moscow is now placing conditions on its fertilizer shipments,” warns Demarais.

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Covid-19 Vaccines

This Russian “crisis diplomacy playbook,” says the study, is nothing new. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Moscow turned access to its Sputnik V vaccine into a “weapon”, offering doses to countries in the Global South in exchange for economic agreements or political alignment. It’s

This strategy was perhaps most evident in Latin America. In Bolivia, for example, Moscow linked vaccine deliveries to Gazprom’s development of the Incahuasi gas field and Rosatom’s construction of a nuclear technology research center.

A few months later, this strategy bore fruit: Bolivia was among the five Latin American countries that refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the United Nations — the other four were Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

The think tank recalls that, in most countries, Russia’s vaccine diplomacy ended up failing. Delays in deliveries, lack of transparency about clinical data and doubts about the quality of some batches fueled widespread hesitation in relation to the Russian vaccine, which never received approval from the World Health Organization (WHO).

However, it is highlighted that vaccine deliveries were never the central factor. “For the Kremlin, vaccine diplomacy was a public relations operation. What mattered to Moscow was being seen as the one coming to the aid of the Global South at a time when rich economies were perceived as hoarding vaccines. Similarly, what matters today for the Kremlin is to assert that it will send fertilizers to the global south. Actual deliveries are a secondary detail”, compares the author.

Limitations on the policy

An important point is that Russia does not have the capacity to significantly increase fertilizer exports. The Togliatti–Odessa pipeline, which transports ammonia to shipping terminals in the Black Sea, has remained out of operation since 2022 — this pipeline runs through areas of active combat in Ukraine and has suffered extensive damage.

Additionally, Ukrainian drone strikes frequently target Russian fertilizer plants, further reducing production capacity. Just a week before Venediktov made his generous offer, the Kremlin imposed strict limits on fertilizer exports in an attempt to avoid domestic shortages. This highlights how hollow Russian offers to bail out developing economies are: at best, Moscow can replace supplies produced in the Gulf only at the margin.

Pressure on the West

Russia’s “fertilizer diplomacy” is not limited to the Global South, the analysis also says: it also targets the United States and Europe. In these cases, however, Moscow’s objective is different: to obtain economic sanctions relief. This strategy appears to be paying off in the US: at the end of March, Washington lifted sanctions against three Belarusian potash manufacturers, including Belaruskali, the world’s second largest producer. “It is difficult to imagine that the timing — amid growing fears of rising fertilizer prices and a possible food crisis — was a mere coincidence,” writes Demarais.

But the European Union may soon be under intense pressure to do the same. At the end of March, the French food safety agency revealed that the French population absorbs high levels of cadmium, a metal associated with cancer and present in fertilizers of Moroccan origin.

“This development perfectly serves the Kremlin’s interests. Under the guise of an environmental crusade, Russian fertilizer giant PhosAgro has long advocated tightening EU cadmium limits in a bid to encourage the bloc’s purchase of low-cadmium supplies from Russia’s Kola Peninsula.”

This would leave the EU without a good option, the author argues. She comments that the bloc can either ease restrictions on Russian fertilizers — thus financing Moscow’s war machine and dismantling the European sanctions regime — or maintain dependence on high-cadmium supplies, fueling a public health crisis. “Russia is likely to use France, where the narrative that sanctions harm Europe is dominant, as a pressure point to divide Europeans,” he predicts.

Demarais concludes by stating that the fate of Hormuz remains uncertain, but as seen from the Kremlin, fertilizer diplomacy is already a resounding success even before a single additional shipment has left Russian ports.

“Whatever happens in Iranian waters, Russia’s ‘fertilizer diplomacy’ will cement the Kremlin’s narrative that a US-led war is starving the global South and that easing sanctions is the only viable option for Western economies. For Moscow, this is a golden scenario — whether Hormuz reopens in just three days or in three years.”