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PARIS, Response
Manolis Spinthourakis
«Cto be free we must be feared, to be feared we must be strong, to be strong we must be united». With these three proposals, on March 2, 2026, from the French nuclear submarine base in Brest, he presented his country’s new nuclear doctrine. The first two sentences could have been said by General de Gaulle 66 years ago, when in his capacity as president of the French Republic – and without, of course, asking the opinion of the Bedouins – he “pushed the button” of its first nuclear test in the Sahara. The third proposal, namely “to be united”, is Macron’s.
He began to discourage her when o Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and said it in a stentorian voice when he returned to Washington and began to suggest that the US nuclear umbrella might not be enough to cover Europe. Thus, on March 2, the French president announced that – in cooperation with Britain – his country is ready to “promote” its nuclear “deterrence” throughout Europe, that is, in Central (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands), Northern (Denmark, Sweden), Eastern (Poland) and Southern (Greece).
In practice, as Macron explained, this is what it means “joint military exercises” and “strategic forces” of the Air Force capable “spread to the depths of the European continent”. In other words, for the first time since 1960, when de Gaulle saw to it that France became the world’s fourth nuclear power (after the US, the Soviet Union and the UK), Paris has, in a way, proposed that its own nuclear weapons be stationed in other European countries. France is estimated to have around 290 nuclear warheads today, and its nuclear arsenal includes four nuclear submarines capable of carrying up to 64 nuclear warheads each and two squadrons (40 Rafale aircraft in total) of nuclear capability.
In essence, it is a nuclear arsenal clearly smaller than that of other nuclear powers (see the USA, Russia), but capable, in the opinion of the French, of preventing any thought of an attack by a third country against France. Regarding the term “forward deterrence”which was frequently used by the French president on March 2, means, in addition to joint activities and exercises with allied countries, and the promotion of their cooperation for the contractual support of any nuclear operations, as is also the case in the context of NATO. That is to say, it means the creation of early warning capabilities, common anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense, exchange of knowledge, experience and information and generally strengthening the interconnectivity and interoperability of weapon systems.
At the same time, however, Emmanuel Macron made it clear that the French president will always have the final say on issues related to nuclear deterrence, with the main criterion being whether and to what extent the “vital interests” of the French nation. He certainly reiterated the longstanding French position that any threat to Europe constitutes a threat to France’s vital interests, but this did little to dispel the not-so-founded concerns about France’s stance in the post-Macron era.
In Berlin, regardless of the Chancellery’s support for Macron’s ideas, the press and analysts are wondering whether the term “advanced deterrence” is translatable to Goethe’s language. They certainly recognize France’s appeal to become Europe’s protectorate, they realize that Paris would like the project to be co-financed by the German state coffers, but they wonder if the Bundestag would ever approve spending without knowing exactly how and where it will be used. Doubts are also being expressed as to whether the French proposal is compatible with the provisions of the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the Federal Republic was a signatory, while many point out that Macron “today is and tomorrow is not” and that the position of the French Far Right, which precedes all opinion polls, is that the “nuclear deterrence” of France is not dismembered.
In Belgium, the far-right prime minister Bart De Viver sees France’s nuclear deterrent capability as limited and would like it pan-European in scope, while in Sweden, a country where the idea of neutrality is deeply rooted and which willy-nilly joined NATO in 2024, its conservative prime minister Ulf Christerson he contented himself with an announcement in X saying that his country would participate in consultations on how France’s nuclear arsenal could be put to good use, so that no country would ever think of attacking Sweden. In Poland, the perception prevails that with Macron’s proposals, France has decided to extend the “safety of life” given to it by its nuclear arsenal in a way that also covers Warsaw, while in Denmark, which has not yet recovered from the shock of Trump’s statements on Greenland, the moods towards the French initiatives are also more or less positive.
It is expected that the dispositions towards France’s new nuclear doctrine at the international meeting of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will be held from April 27 to May 22 at the United Nations headquarters in New York, will be less positive. Diplomatic observers estimate that during this meeting the countries of the so-called Global South will turn against France, accusing it of violating the Treaty with the new doctrine. In the same place, the Soviet leader reportedly said 70 years ago Nikita Khrushchev the dystopian “if there is ever a nuclear war, the living will envy the dead”.
