Scolding the naughty person in class does not have the same effect as punishing the exemplary student, even with a slap on the wrist. For this reason, the , which until this week, when its foreign minister said that Iran was in the war, had done everything well in terms of not openly confronting Washington ―as Spain has done―, has been felt strongly throughout NATO.
Because although the impact in military terms is small, the political message of the gesture has sounded loud and clear in all the allied capitals: to blindly follow him in his military adventure against Iran and is willing to make him pay. With fewer troops or more tariffs, like the ones he now also wants to impose on the United States. This Saturday, the Republican raised his order, and assured that he will not limit himself to removing 5,000 soldiers. “We are going to reduce drastically and we are going to cut much more than 5,000,” he said in statements to the press in Florida.
“The announced withdrawal is relatively small, but seeks to send a political message after criticism from the chancellor [Friedrich Merz] to US policy in Iran,” says Daniel Kochis, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Europe and Eurasia and a specialist in transatlantic security.
The possibility of the United States carrying out a withdrawal of NATO troops in Europe was something that the allies on this side of the Atlantic had counted on even before the Republican returned to the White House. In fact, Washington already took a first step in October of last year, when it announced its intention to cut the , in one of the Alliance’s missions to protect the eastern flank against the Russian threat.
This has also been estimated by the German Defense Minister, Boris Pistorius, who has described as “foreseeable” the decision to relocate a small contingent – 5,000 of more than 36,000 permanently deployed in German territory. The military impact, allied sources agree, will be limited both for a Germany that is strengthening its defense against the clock, and for the Alliance itself. Especially since Trump has little room for maneuver to go much further, given that the US Defense Authorization law passed at the end of last year prohibits the Government from reducing its military presence in Europe below 76,000 soldiers.
84,000 US troops in Europe
At the end of 2025, US forces in Europe were estimated at around 84,000. Of these, the vast majority, some 68,000, are permanently assigned to bases in various countries: some 36,400 to those in Germany, the main US support point in Europe; 12,600 more in Italy, another 10,000 in the United Kingdom or almost 4,000 in Spain, according to official figures for December. They are joined by thousands of other soldiers sent within the framework of rotating deployments – such as the 10,000 troops assigned to Poland or those deployed in Romania – or for temporary missions, according to the United States Department of Defense.
The estimate is that US troops will be reduced to the same number they were before the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted a reinforcement in Europe, around 80,000 troops.
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What effects does withdrawing US troops from bases in Europe have?
Photo: ALLISON JOYCE (AFP)
“The fact that this is not a broader withdrawal reveals, on the one hand, a political reality in the United States, which limits the Government’s room for maneuver and, on the other, the recognition that the American presence in Europe is simply enough to support deeper cuts,” analyzes Kochis.
In total, the United States has 31 so-called “persistent” military bases — which it has used continuously for at least 15 years and over which it exercises some degree of operational control — in Europe, most in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. They are joined by another 19 facilities to which the US Department of Defense has “access”.
These are air bases, naval bases, army garrisons, anti-missile defense systems and surveillance centers that allow Washington to maintain land units, Navy warships and Army, Navy and Air Force aircraft in European territory. Most bases are interoperable with NATO actions and needs. The command center for US forces, EUCOM, is based in Stuttgart, Germany.
Kochis emphasizes that, however, Trump’s announcement must be taken very seriously. “The Russian threat to NATO is as real as ever, so returning to the pre-2022 situation sends the wrong signal,” the analyst notes by email.
Especially because, as the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, warned after learning of the decision on Germany: “The greatest threat to the transatlantic community is not its external enemies, but the continued disintegration of our alliance.”
The greatest threat to the transatlantic community are not its external enemies, but the ongoing disintegration of our alliance. We must all do what it takes to reverse this disastrous trend.
— Donald Tusk (@donaldtusk)
And Trump’s decision once again puts under tension an organization that does not seem to find the key to appease its main – and most volatile – partner: Trump’s management of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, nor the commitment reached at the Hague summit almost a year ago to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP, are making the Republican stop questioning – and therefore undermining – what is considered the most successful defensive alliance in history.
“We must do everything necessary to reverse this disastrous trend,” Tusk claimed this Saturday in a message on X.
But the “this is not our war” with which Europe responded almost unanimously to Trump’s demand that allies help him reopen the Strait of Hormuz, closed as a result of a war against Iran that it launched without consulting or notifying any of its European partners, has only strained the already difficult relationship, also put to the test at the beginning of the year with , when for the first time the EU stopped Trump for his intention to annex the autonomous territory of Denmark.
Because it is no longer just the President of the Spanish Government, who stands up to Trump, first by refusing to commit to 5% defense spending and, now, by closing his airspace to the in addition to preventing the use of the bases in Rota (Cádiz) and Morón de la Frontera (Seville) for combat or resupply aircraft. Also the British Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, or even the Italian Giorgia Meloni, until recently one of Trump’s key alliances in Europe, for not supporting his new military adventure in the Middle East.
In fact, Trump threatened this week to also withdraw troops from Spain and Italy. A few days before, the Reuters agency had leaked that the Pentagon was “difficult” with NATO that did not help it in the conflict with Iran, like (again) Spain or the United Kingdom. On Friday, the Minister of Defense, Margarita Robles, recalled that Spain is “committed to international legality and the Atlantic Alliance.” For this reason, he added: “I would ask President Trump to respect Spain.”
Deterrence and defense
Hence, Pistorius has stressed the need to strengthen the so-called European pillar of the Alliance. “It is clear that NATO must be more European in order to continue being transatlantic. We Europeans must assume more responsibility for our security,” he stressed. It is an argument that the countries most exposed to the Russian threat, such as Estonia, have also been insisting on for a long time, whose prime minister recalled in an interview with EL PAÍS just a week ago that its net defense budget this year will now reach 5.4%, above the objective set by NATO for 2035.
The new war in the Middle East is also causing the United States to have warned European countries like Estonia, which buy weapons from it, that their delivery will be delayed “because, as the conflict with Iran continues, they have to review their own stocks” before delivering the orders to the allies, confirmed Michal, for whom this only reinforces the idea that Europe should be more autonomous in defense.
An idea that the Alliance itself also abounds in. NATO spokesperson Allison Hart said this Saturday that the announced troop “adjustment” “underlines the need for Europe to invest more in defense and assume a greater part of the responsibility for shared security,” indicating in this sense the agreement to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP until 2035 agreed at the Hague summit last June. “We remain confident in our ability to ensure our deterrence and defense as this process of progress towards a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO continues,” he added.
